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Abstract 
One significant disadvantage of interpreted bytecode languages, such as 
Java, is their low execution speed in comparison to compiled languages 
like C. The mobile nature of bytecode adds to the problem, as many 
checks are necessary to ensure that downloaded code from untrusted 
sources is rendered as safe as possible. But there do exist ways of speed-
ing up such systems. 
One approach is to carry out static type checking at load time, as in 
the case of the Java Bytecode Verifier. This reduces the number of 
runtime checks that must be done and also allows certain instructions 
to be replaced by faster versions. Another approach is the use of a 
Just In Time (JIT) Compiler, which takes the bytecode and produces 
corresponding native code at runtime. Some JIT compilers also carry 
out some code optimization. 
There are, however, limits to the amount of optimization that can safely 
be done by the Verifier and JITs; some operations simply cannot be car-
ried out safely without a certain amount of runtime checking. But what 
if it were possible to prove that the conditions the runtime checks guard 
against would never arise in a particular piece of code? In this case it 
might well be possible to dispense with these checks altogether, allowing 
optimizations not feasible at present. In addition to this, because of time 
constraints, current JIT compilers tend to produce acceptable code as 
quickly as possible, rather than producing the best code possible. By 
removing the burden of analysis from them it may be possible to change 
this. 
We demonstrate that it is possible to define a programming logic for 
bytecode programs that allows the proof of bytecode programs containing 
loops. The instructions available to use in the programs are currently 
limited, but the basis is in place to extend these. The development of this 
logic is non-trivial and addresses several difficult problems engendered 
by the unstructured nature of bytecode programs. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
One significant disadvantage of interpreted bytecode languages, such as Java [3, 24, 
18, 28J, is their low execution speed in comparison to compiled languages like C. 
The mobile nature of bytecode adds to the problem, as many checks are necessary to 
ensure that downloaded code from untrusted sources is rendered as safe as possible. 
But there do exist ways of speeding up such systems. 
One approach is to carry out static type checking at load time, as in the case of 
the Java Bytecode Verifier [29J. This reduces the number of runtime checks that 
must be done and also allows certain instructions to be replaced by faster versions. 
Another approach is the use of a Just In Time (JIT) Compiler, which takes the 
bytecode and produces corresponding native code at runtime. Some JIT compilers 
also carry out some code optimization [23J. 
There are, however, limits to the amount of optimization that can safely be done 
by the Verifier and JITs; some operations such as array bounds checking and type 
casting simply cannot be carried out safely without a certain amount of runtime 
checking [29J. But what if it were possible to prove that the conditions the runtime 
checks guard against would never arise in a particular piece of code? 
In this case it might well be possible to dispense with these checks altogether, al-
lowing optimizations not feasible at present. In addition to this, because of time 
constraints, current JIT compilers tend to produce acceptable code as quickly as 
possible, rather than producing the best code possible. By removing the burden of 
analysis from them it may be possible to improve on the current situation. 
12 
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1.1 Java 
Java is a concurrent object-oriented programming language developed by Sun Mi-
crosytems [2J. It is syntactically similar to C and C++, but imposes a 'safer' pro-
gramming style than these languages. This is achieved by the use of stricter runtime 
type-checking, not allowing the user to manipulate pointers directly, and using au-
tomatic garbage collection as opposed to users explicitly allocating and deallocating 
memory. 
Java was initially intended to be used in the construction of software systems running 
on networks of machines with varied architecture. This meant that it was important 
that the code produced should be portable----able to run on any machine in the 
network regardless of differences in architecture, and that a machine receiving some 
Java code across the network should be able to assure itself that the code was, to 
some degree of certainty, safe to run. 
The issue of portability is addressed by a Java program being compiled into a class 
file containing architecture neutral bytecodes, which are then run on the Java Virtual 
Machine (JVM) [29, 55], an emulator running on a 'real' machine. This means that 
the same Java program can be run on any machine for which there exists an imple-
mentation of the JVM, without the rewriting/recompilation needed in traditional 
systems. The class files are designed to be downloaded from the Internet, which 
further simplifies the matter of obtaining new software. 
Classes are loaded by the JVM using a class loader. The 'primordial' class loader, 
shipped with the JVM, loads both the trusted core classes shipped with the JVM 
and any classes that can be found on the CLASSPATH a designated area of 
filespace [29, 30J. These classes will be assumed not to be malicious and are not 
subject to bytccode verification. If a class cannot be found on the CLASSPATH, a 
specialised class loader object will be instantiated to download it from a web server. 
These classes are subject to bytecode verification. 
Once loaded, a class will be linked and initialized. During linking, classes obtained 
from outside the system the current JVM is running on will be verified by the JVM's 
Bytecode Verifier. The Verifier ensures that the classfile meets certain criteria of type 
safety and well-formedness that mean it will not cause certain catastrophic problems 
at runtime, thereby dealing with the problem of the safety of code received across a 
network. 
The verifier ensures, amongst other properties, that bytecode instructions receive 
the right number of arguments, and that the arguments are of the correct type 
and in the right order, that the operand stack will not overflow or underflow, the 
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program counter is never pointing to somewhere outside the range of a method's 
code, and that objects are initialized before use. This ensures the type safety of any 
downloaded classes, i.e. that instructions are passed arguments of the correct type. 
It is assumed that classes written by a user and located on the CLASSPATH will 
have been created by the javac compiler and will therefore also be correctly formed. 
A full description of the verifier can be found in [29]. 
In addition to checking classes conform to certain rules, the Bytecode Verifier carries 
out some optimization of the bytecode by substituting faster versions of certain byte-
codes (signified by the suffix quick). These instructions are more efficient because 
they do not contain checks that are redundant after bytecode verification. 
Before it can be initialized, a class must be loaded and linked. It is up to an 
implementation of the JVM to decide whether it will load and link classes 'early', 
but a class must be loaded on its first active use. The initialization of a class will 
also trigger the initialization (preceded if necessary by loading and linking) of all its 
superclasses. A diagram outlining these operations can be seen in Figure 1.1. Note 
that the shaded parts of the diagram indicate the additional elements of the JVM 
necessary to run untrusted code from outside the local file system. 
1.2 JIT Compilers 
As mentioned, one of the biggest drawbacks of interpreted bytecode languages like 
Java is their slow execution speed. One solution to this might be to compile Java 
programs to native machine code rather than bytecode. But, unlike bytecode, the 
native code will be specific to a particular machine and, if downloaded from an 
untrusted source, cannot be verified by the JVM's bytecode verifier. The execution 
speedup will therefore be offset by a severe deterioration in the code's mobility-the 
main selling point of interpreted bytecode systems. 
Systems using a Just In Time (JIT) compiler attempt to provide as much speedup as 
possible while still keeping the advantages of bytecode. This is done by downloading 
bytecode files and verifying them as usual, but then also calling the JIT compiler 
to translate the bytecode to native code at runtime, producing the native code just 
before it is needed. JIT compilation is carried out on a method only at the point at 
which it is called so that unnecessary translation is not done. Some JIT compilers 
also profile code in order to determine whether it is worth compiling a method [23]. 
The native code produced by the JIT for a particular program is not stored after 
termination of the program but, during execution, the pointer to a method's code 
is replaced by a pointer to the compiled code for that method. 
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The most basic JIT compilers carry out a process known as inlining. The usual 
implementation of the JVM interpreter is a large switch statement with cases cor-
responding to the various instructions of the virtual machine; execution of a JVM 
program consists of repeated execution of this switch statement. This means that 
a signicant amount of time is spent executing the various jumps and comparisons 
involved in the switch statement itself, rather than in executing the instruction of 
the program running on the JVM. 
Inlining the code means taking the corresponding native code instructions for each 
virtual machine instruction in a method's code and concatenating them into a single 
stream of machine code. This not only removes the overhead inherent in the inter-
preter, but means that it is no longer necessary to maintain the program counter 
and stack of the virtual machine; the method has effectively been detached from the 
virtual machine paradigm and can be treated just like any other program for the 
concrete machine it is running on. 
For example, the chunk of code in one interpreter implementation, [19], correspond-
ing to the JVM instruction dup is 
Id [1.11 - 4], %00 
st %00, [%11] 
add %10, 1, %10 
add %11, 4, %11 
b .LL16 
nop 
Ilload val on top of JVM stack into reg 00 
I/store val in reg 00 at new top of JVM stack 
//increment JVM program counter 
//increment stack pointer 
//branch 
I/do nothing 
Of these instructions, only half are actually concerned with carrying out the dup 
instruction; the others are there only to implement the interpreter. By inlining the 
code for dup we can reduce it to the following three instructions 
Id [1.11 - 4], %00 
st %00, [%11] 
add %11, 4, 1.11 
Ilload val on top of JVM stack into reg 00 
//store val in reg 00 at new top of JVM stack 
//increment stack pointer 
It is also possible to inline method calls, whereby the call to a method is replaced by 
the code of the method itself. This is usually only possible for very short methods. 
In addition to this basic translation technique, more complex JIT compilers carry 
out optimization of the code. This is usually carried out on some sort of intermediate 
code which is at a lower level than that of the bytecode, while not actually native 
code. Methods used may include 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 17 
Copy Propagation Bytecode is stack based whereas most 'real' machines are reg-
ister based. The translation from bytecode to native code often causes un-
necessary mov instructions, which move values from one register to another, 
to be generated. For example, mav r1 -> r2 followed by mav r2 -> r3 is 
equivalent to mov r1 -> r3. Copy propagation is concerned with eliminating 
these unnecessary instructions and can also be carried out backwards. 
Assertion Merging When a bytecode instruction is broken down into simpler in-
termediate instructions it can become apparent that a particular assertion is 
being repeated, e.g. a reference is non-null or a number is non-zero. Analysis 
of the code may allow removal of these duplicate assertions. 
Live Variable Analysis A variable is live if it holds a value that may be needed 
in the future. Therefore, if two variables in a program are never live at the 
same time, the same register may be used to store their values. 
Dead Code Elimination This attempts to identify and eliminate instructions 
which carry out redundant operations. 
Strength Reduction This attempts to replace an operation with an equivalent 
one that executes faster, e.g. use shift to divide and multiply by powers of 
two. 
Common Subexpression Elimination Removes redundant calculations. 
Loop Unrolling In cases where it is possible to calculate n, where n is the number 
of times the loop will be executed, remove the loop structure and replace with 
n copies of the loop body. 
More information on code optimization can be found in [5] and [6]. 
One other way in which Java enforces type safety is by checking all array references 
at runtime to ensure that the array reference is non-null and that the index is not out 
of bounds. This avoids the potentially catastrophic results of writing to an area of 
memory outside the array bounds, a situation all too possible in programs written in 
C or C++. But it also means that bytecodes for array operations cannot be replaced 
by the more efficient qui ck bytecodes mentioned in Section 1.1. The following ix86 
assembly code was produced by the GCJ program [44J and corresponds to the Java 
statement testarray [i) : = 2 
53: movl Oxfffffff8(%ebp),%ebx 
56: movl Oxfffffffc(%ebp),%esi 
59: cmpl Ox8(%ebx),%esi 
//bounds check 
//bounds check 
//bounds check 
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5c: jb 70 <main __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox50> 
5e: addl $Oxfffffff4,i.esp 
61: pushl i.esi 
62: call 63 <main __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox43> 
67: addl $Ox10,i.esp 
6a: movl i.eax , i.e ax 
6c: testl i.eax , i.eax 
6e: je 70 <main __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox50> 
70: leal Oxc(i.ebx),i.eax 
73: leal OxO(,i.esi,4),i.edx 
7a: addl i.edx , i.e ax 
7c: movl $Ox2, Ci.eax) 
82: leal Oxffffffe8(i.ebp),i.esp 
85: popl i.ebx 
86: pop I i.esi 
87: movl i.ebp,i.esp 
89: popl i.ebp 
Only the instructions 
70: leal Oxc(i.ebx),i.eax 
73: leal OxO(,i.esi,4),i.edx 
7a: addl i.edx,i.eax 
7c: movl $Ox2, (i.eax) 
actually update the array, and so if it was possible to prove that the array bounds 
check for this operation was unnecessary it would be possible to eliminate the extra 
instructions. As it is often the case that an instruction such as testarray [i] : = 
2 appears in the body of a loop in order to carry out an operation on the entire 
array, the number of instructions eliminated could potentially be quite large. 
1.3 Reasoning about Programs 
In order to reason about programs it is necessary first to build a logical model of the 
world of the programs: the language used to write them and its semantics, and the 
environment in which they run. This section provides a brief background to some 
techniques used to do this which are of particular relevance to the work described 
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in the rest of this report. A detailed discussion of all the topics in this section can 
be found in [56]. 
1.3.1 Assigning Meaning to Programs 
There are three main approaches to formalising the meaning of a program: op-
erational semantics, denotational semantics, and axiomatic semantics. The ideas 
behind axiomatic semantics will be dealt with in the following section 1.3.2. 
An operational semantics for a language is defined in terms of the operations carried 
out by an abstract machine, where a rule is stated defining the result of execution 
for each type of command in the language. Commands are identified synt.actically, 
e.g. a rule would exist for an assignment statement x := expr. Application of the 
rules leads to evaluation of an expression in the language in relation to a particular 
state which encapsulates the environment in which the program is being executed. 
Evaluation can be described either as one complete operation, i.e. a boolean ex-
pression evaluating to a boolean value, or as a series of smaller transformations on 
a state leading eventually to a value. The former is known as a 'big-step' semantics, 
the latter a 'small-step' semantics [56]. 
A denotational semantics formulates the meaning of a program more abstractly as 
a partial function from states to states rat.her than rules of execution for particular 
syntactic constructs. This has the advantage of making it possible to compare the 
equivalence of two programs written in two different languages. 
1.3.2 Reasoning about Program Properties 
In his seminal paper An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming, [20], 
c. A. R. Hoare describes a set of rules (or axioms) that can be used to reason about 
what a program does. Rules of the form described in the paper are often referred to 
as a programming logic or Hoare logic, and allow us to go one step further than an 
operational or denotational semantics in terms of reasoning about programs. Rather 
than just allowing reasoning about the value of initial and final states with regard 
to a program, a Hoare logic allows us to make more fine-grained statements about 
states. We are able to say whether if we execute a command C in any state satisfying 
the predicate P--and execution t.erminates- we will end up in some state satisfying 
Q. 
A Hoare logic specification takes the form 
~ {P} C {Q} 
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where 
• C is a statement in the programming language 
• P is a precondition 
• Q is a postcondition 
Partial correctness specifications (signified by the curly brackets around pre- and 
post-conditions) do not require proof of termination. 
Although in both operational semantics and Hoare logic predicates are used to assist 
reasoning about programs, they are essentially quite different: 
• Operational Semantics describe what the operating environment of the 
program 'looks like' after the execution of each instruction. This description 
of the environment is known as the state and includes information such as the 
types of values held on the stack and in local variables. 
• Predicates in Hoare Logic describe properties which are true at a particular 
point in the execution of a program (i.e. in a particular state). For example 
'the value at the top of the stack is greater than 10' or 'variable x has the 
value 7'. 
In situations where an operational semantics for a language exist, it is possible to 
formulate the Hoare triple in terms of the logic in which the semantics is described. 
In higher order logic the relationship between the Hoare rules and the operational 
semantics can be defined as follows: 
{P} C {Q} == "Va a'. P(a} /\ eval(C,a} = a' => Q(a'} (l.1) 
This states that a Hoare Logic specification {P} C {Q} is equivalent to the statement 
that for all states, a, a', if P holds in the state a, and executing C in the state a 
results in the state a', then Q will hold in the state a'. 
Although the rules of a Hoare logic are often stated as axioms-hence the alternative 
description of such rules as an axiomatic semantics---it is also possible to derive them 
from the operational semantics using 1.l. Derivations from denotational semantics 
are equally possible, as described by Gordon in [16]. 
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Derivation from an operational or denotational semantics results in a programming 
logic in which we may have more confidence than one in which the rules are merely 
arbitrarily stated. This is particularly true if we are dealing with a language which 
is sufficiently different from the simple imperative language described by Hoare as 
to make it unclear exactly what form the rules should take. This is the situation 
described in Chapter 4, in which we describe the derivation of a programming logic 
for bytecode programs, which are certainly very different from the programs dealt 
with by Hoare. Our derivation is based on the operational semantics for the JVM 
developed by Pusch [45], and this is described in some detail in Section 2.1.2. 
1.3.3 Inductively Defined Relations 
It is often the case that operational semantics and other execution relations are 
defined in terms of inductively defined sets. And while Pusch's semantics are not 
defined in this way, two of the execution relations for bytecode described in Chapter 3 
are. Consequently we give a brief outline of the concepts involved in such a definition 
and the related technique of rule induction. This technique is described fully by 
\Vinskel in his book The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages [56J. 
We can inductively define a set by a collection of rules. For example, the set of odd 
numbers is defined by the rules 
Odd 1 
Odd x 
Odd (x + 2) 
In order to show that a property P is true of all members of such a set, we use the 
principle of rule induction. This is based on the idea that if a property is preserved 
by application of all the rules defining the set, it is true for all members of the set. 
The principle can be stated as: if for all axioms 
x 
P{ x) is true, and for all rules of the form 
x 
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the statement 'Vi. 1 SiS n ==> P Xi ==> P X holds, then P{n) holds for any n 
in the set. 
1.4 Mechanized Reasoning 
Much of the work that has been done recently on proving properties of the Java 
language has involved the use of some form of mechanical proof assistant [38, 45, 26, 
46]. As the semantics for even subsets of Java, or simplified versions that disregard 
aspects of the language such as exception handling, are very large and complex it 
is easy for mistakes to creep into a paper and pencil proof. Indeed one of the few 
substantial pieces of work undertaken in the area without the aid of a proof tool, 
that of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach [14], was found to contain 'one major error and 
one noteworthy omission' when checked by Syme using his proof tool Declare [52]. 
This does not imply that all proofs carried out using a mechanised proof tool are 
completely flawless. All results depend, at the bottom line, on the definitions pro-
vided by the user. But if such definitions are correct, a proof tool can be relied 
upon to provide a greater degree of reassurance that results produced are also cor-
rect, leaving critics only the smaller task of examining the definitions. Obviously 
the degree of confidence in the proofs depends to a great extent on the proof tool 
used and its implementation. 
1.4.1 Isabelle 
Our work, and that of Pusch on which it is based, uses the Isabelle system [42]. Most 
proof systems support one particular logic from among the many used by computer 
scientists. For example, the HOL system [33] supports reasoning in higher order 
logic, whereas Larch [51] supports proofs in multisorted first order logic. Isabelle, 
designed by Paulson, is a generic prover, meaning it supports a variety of logics 
(known as object logics). Isabelle has a meta logic which is used to formulate object 
logics. The meta logic is the subset of higher order logic containing implication, 
universal quantification, and equality. A full description of the system can be found 
in [42], and discussion related to implementation and development issues in [40, 
41,43]. 
Like HOL, Isabelle is based on the LCF prover designed by Milner and his colleagues 
in the 1970s [32, 17]. In LCF, terms and formulae are values in ML, the meta-
language used to implement the system, and can be composed and decomposed by 
ML functions. Theorems are values of type thm. Rather than constructing theorems 
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arbitrarily, inference rules are used to map existing theorems to new theorems 
starting with a small set of built in theorems, known as axioms. New theorems can 
be proved in two ways: by working forwards, using the inference rules to map already 
proved theorems to new theorems; or working backwards, splitting the original goal 
into smaller goals which can be proved trivially using existing theorems and inference 
rules. The process of backwards proof is managed by functions known as tachcs. 
Isabelle is an interactive prover, meaning that while it supports a variety of poten-
tially complex logics, the user is expected to find the proof. Isabelle does, however, 
provide several powerful automatic tactics in the form of decision procedures based 
on non-logic-specific tableaux methods. Isabelle is a procedural prover, but recently 
the Isar interface has been developed [1], providing a more declarative interface. 
The definitions and datatypes that make up each logic are stored in a theory file 
(denoted by the suffix . thy). Proof scripts for derivation of new theorems from 
these definitions are stored separately in files with the suffix .ml (for ML). 
1.5 Contribution 
We demonstrate that it is possible to define a programming logic for bytecode pro-
grams that allows the proof of bytecode programs containing loops. The instructions 
available for use in the programs are currently limited, but the basis is in place to 
extend these. 
The development of this logic was not by any means straightforward. It required the 
definition of several execution relations for bytecode programs, each necessary for 
proofs of different aspects of execution. In addition, the fiat, unstructured nature 
of bytecode programs presents a number of difficulties, particularly when reasoning 
about loops. But there are, as we demonstrate, some quite elegant solutions to these 
problems. 
1.6 Outline of Thesis 
Chapter 2 examines work done in four main areas, all of which relate to our own 
work, namely: proving properties of the Java language itself, proving properties of 
programs written in Java, improving the performance of JIT compilers, and incorpo-
rating proof into 'real world' systems. In each case two or three papers are discussed 
in some detail, followed by a brief description of examples of other notable work in 
the area, concluding with a discussion of the relevance of the approaches taken to 
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the work described in this report. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of three execution relations for bytecode pro-
grams and the alterations and extensions of Pusch's semantics necessary for this. 
All these relations are necessary for the development of the programming logic for 
bytecode programs described in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 describes the derivation of the rules of the bytecode programming logic 
and the difficulties encountered in its development, particularly with respect to the 
unstructured nature of bytecode. 
Chapter 5 outlines in some detail the proof of soundness of the rule for loops in 
bytecode programs. Although the rule itself does not differ greatly from the rule 
for while statements in the conventional Hoare logic, the proof of its soundness is a 
great deal more complex. In this chapter we describe the soundness proof and the 
three main results necessary to achieve it. 
Chapter 6 discusses the use of the bytecode programming logic to prove properties 
of example programs. 
Chapter 7 discusses the results of the work and the lessons learnt from it, particularly 
with regard to two topics: the practicalities of proof at the bytecode level, and the 
role of mechanized reasoning in such proofs. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
areas in which the work could be developed further. 
1.7 Related Publications 
Early results relating to this project were published in [47], and a more complete 
summary of the work in [48]. 
Chapter 2 
Related Work 
In this chapter we review work related to our own in four general categories, namely: 
proving properties of the Java language itself, proving properties of programs writ-
ten in Java, improving the performance of JIT compilers, and incorporating proof 
into 'real world' systems. In each case two or three papers are discussed in some 
detail, followed by a brief description of examples of other notable work in the area, 
concluding with a discussion of the relevance of the approaches taken to the work 
described in this report. 
2.1 Proofs about the Java Language and JVM 
A large amount of work has been done in recent years on formalizing aspects of 
the Java language and the JVM with the aim of proving that they possess certain 
desirable properties. The starting point for such projects is the English language 
specifications of the Java language [18] and the JVM [29] published by Sun Mi-
crosystems. 
2.1.1 The Java Language 
As one of Java's main attractions for users is its claim [18] that its strong type 
system makes downloading and running programs across a network safe, much work 
has been done on formally proving the type soundness of the language. The aim is 
to show that the static checks done on a Java program at compile time really do 
lead to type safe execution at runtime, i.e. the program will not carry out operations 
that violate the typing rules, such as attempting to add a value of type String to 
25 
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one of type Integer. 
In Java is type-safe probably [14], Drossopoulou and Eisenbach describe an opera-
tional semantics for a subset of Java that they call Javas. Javas includes primitive 
types, classes with inheritance, instance variables and instance methods, interfaces, 
shadowing of instance variables, dynamic method binding, statically resolvable over-
loading of methods, object creation, null pointers, arrays and a minimal treatment of 
exceptions. The authors also define the notion of a well-formed environment and go 
on to prove that indeed a well-typed Java program run in a well-formed environment 
will not give rise to typing violations. 
The work of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach is unusual in that it does not utilize any 
form of mechanized proof tool. In Proving Java Type Soundness [52], Syme uses 
their work as a basis for a proof of the type soundness of a very similar subset of 
the Java language using the prover DECLARE. Syme goes on to validate much of 
the work of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach, but does identify 'one major error and a 
noteworthy omission' in their work, highlighting the difficulties inherent in dealing 
with such large proofs without the aid of a proof tool. 
In JavG-!ight is Type Safe-Definitely [38], Nipkow and von Oheimb have carried out 
a similar proof of type soundness, this time for a subset of Java they call Javalight, 
using the prover Isabelle/HOL. Though independent of the work of Drossopoulou 
and Eisenbach, and differing in certain aspects (such as the use of a big-step rather 
than small-step semantics), there are similarities between the two projects, which 
are discussed. 
2.1.2 The JVM 
The work described above is all concerned with the Java language as a high-level, 
object oriented language. But while the Java language and the JVM are obviously 
closely related and their type-systems very similar, they are separate entities and as 
such, a proof of type soundness of one does not necessarily imply the same property 
holds of the other. 
In her paper Formalizing the Java Virtual Machine in Isabelle/HOL [45], Pusch 
details a formalization of the JVM-which she describes as preliminary 
-~in the theorem prover Isabelle (using the HOL object logic). We describe this 
paper in more detail than the others mentioned in this chapter as it is the work on 
which our own is based. 
Pusch's aim is to provide a formal version of the Java Virtual Machine Specification 
[29] that is not prey to the ambiguities and inconsistencies which tend to invade 
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Operational semantics 
exec 
-
all :: [instr classfi Ie ,jvm_ tate, jvm_state] -> bool 
- -- - - - - - - - -- -
- -
- - - - -
----------- - - - - - - - - ------
exec :: instr clas file * jvm_s tate -> jvm_statc option 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------- - - - - -
- - - - - -
------- . 
exec_XX :: [command, paltial state] -> partial state 
Model Syntax and Environment 
jvm_state = (xcpt, heap, frames) val ::= rntg int I Addr loc I Null 
The Language 
C ::= Pop I Dup I Skip I ... 
Figure 2.1: l'E'presentation of the .lVI\1 opewlional sculllnt irs 
ill formal sl)('cinr(ttions (and indC'cd do in the cas(' of the .JV:\[ Sp('('ifiC'<tt ion). As 
t his is a C'ollsidcrH blc lllldcrt aking, thc theorem provcr l scl \)elle is \I s('d t () ensure 
a degree of I'eliabilit), not likciy Lo be achieved in a proof by ll<llld. Alt hough a 
large subset of the .len·a IcUlguage is formalised. there nre Clrcas not trcatC'd in lhis 
impietnelltat ion; LlH'sC includc cxception hand ling anel cl.vnaIllic class loading. 
The paper ollLiinC's the formalization of hot h static aspects o[ .JeWel prograllls, e.g. 
well -fontwlillC'ss of dassfiles and ['clations lwlw('('n classes. and prop('rti('s of the 
Java run-ti nH' systcm including object initialisation and Lhe .JVl\l heap. The author 
also describcs eUl operational scmantics for the subscL of the .J V [\ I i ll!-.LrucLioll set 
cOllsidel'rd. 
As Pll!:>ch 's semantics are the b&c,is for our work, we give c1 brief descriplion of SOtlll' of 
llw maill feat mes of lwr formalization herc. An ou t linc of l he fOl'l1l of the sl'manl ics 
can 1)(' S('C' l1 ill Figure 2.1. 
Th Language The commands in the langUi:l.ge are .Lwa hytccoc\r instruct ions. 
C ::= Pop I Dup I Swap I .. , 
The Environment Valucs arC' modelleci by the c\c)LaL,Vpe 
unl ::= Intg ml I Addr lor I Null 
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and a state is a triple (xcpt Option, heap, frame list) where xcpt Option is 
an exception option (this is None if no exception has been thrown at this point 
in execution), heap is the object heap of the JVM, and frame list is the frame 
stack for the program. The frame stack is a list of frames, each frame relating 
to the invocation of a particular method. A frame consists of variables of the 
following types: 
• opstack---operand stack for the current method, modelled as a list of type 
val 
• locvars---list of local variables for the current method, each of which can 
hold a value of type val 
• cname--name of the class the current method belongs to, 
• method_lac-method locator for the current method, and 
• p_count~current value of the program counter. 
Operational Semantics of Commands Unlike the operational semantics men-
tioned in Section 1.3 and described in detail in [56], Pusch's semantics for the 
JVM are not presented as a set of rules. Instead she takes the approach more 
common to denotational semantics of defining execution in terms of a partial 
function on states. Partial functions deal with the situation where, for some 
values, the result of the function can be undefined. They can be represented 
in Isabelle by the Option type 
datatype 'a option = None I Some 'a 
where an undefined result returns the value None. 
Pusch's semantics can be viewed as having three layers: 
execution of a single class of bytecode operations Pusch divides the byte-
code instructions of the JVM into several categories: 
• load and store 
• create object 
• manipulate object 
• manipulate array 
• check object 
• method invocation 
• method return 
• operand stack 
• conditional branch 
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• unconditional branch 
The effect on the state of executing the commands in each category is 
defined in a separate Isabelle theory file for each category of command, 
for example 
execos ::[ op_stack, opstack, p_countJ =} 
(opstack * p _count) 
execJas :: [load_and_store, opstack, locvars, p_countJ =} 
(opstack * locvars * p_count) 
At this level the operational semantics are similar to conventional oper-
ational semantics, in that the command itself is passed to the function 
exec....xx along with a state (in this case actually only the part of the state 
affected by the execution) and the updated state returned. 
execution of a bytecode instruction The next layer defines the execution 
of one bytecode instruction of any category by the function 
exec :: instr classfiles * jvm_state =} jvm_state Option 
It is at this point that the semantics become noticeably different to the 
usual style. Here the arguments to the function exec are a state and 
instr classfiles, so the function is not passed a single command and state, 
but a complete environment from which it must extract the relevant in-
struction and state. Once we have obtained the correct classfile from 
the set of classfiles passed to the function, we must look at the program 
counter of the current stack frame (contained in jvm_state) in order to 
determine the current instruction. The result jvm_state Option reflects 
the fact that the result of execution may not be defined. 
execution of a whole program The execution of an entire program is given 
by the function 
execa II :: [bytecode, jvm_state, jvm_state ] =} bool 
CFS ~ s ~* t = (s, t): {(s, t). exec (CFS, s) - Some t}* 
where CFS denotes a set of classfilcs. 
This corresponds to eval, mentioned in Section 1.3, in that it returns 
true only if executing the given code in the initial state s results in the 
final state t. Once again, the code to be executed is not explicit in the 
arguments to the function, but must be extracted from the state and 
relevant classfile. 
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In Pr07Jing the Soundness of a .Java Bytecode Verifier in Isabelle/HOL [46], Pusch 
uses the operational semantics described here to prove the type-soundness of the Java 
bytecode verifier, i.e., that any program bytecode program passed by the verifier will 
have the properties described in Section 1.1. 
2.1.3 Comments 
The work described in this section differs from our own aims in that we wish to prove 
properties of specific bytecode programs compiled from Java source code and run 
on the JVM, rather than properties of the Java language and JVM themselves. But 
since it is pointless to prove 'extra' desirable properties of a program not believed 
to possess the more basic property of type-soundness, the proofs of Java's type-
soundness can be considered fundamental to our own work. In addition to this, 
Pusch's formalization of the semantics of the JVM is the basis of our work. 
2.2 Proving Properties of Java Programs 
In this section we describe a number of projects whose aim is to enable the proof of 
properties of individual Java programs. 
2.2.1 Extended Static Checking 
The Extended Static Checking system (ESC) [13] aims to statically determine sim-
ple errors in programs, e.g. array out of bounds errors or simple deadlocks and race 
conditions in concurrent programs. The user annotates programs with simple speci-
fications, and these are passed to a verification condition generator, which produces 
a logical formula encapsulating the desired property. This formula is then passed to 
ESC's dedicated automated proof system, Simplify which either proves the validity 
of the formula, or returns an instance in which it is false to the user. 
ESC differs from the traditional approach to program verification, in that it does 
not attempt to prove that a program is correct, merely that it does not suffer from 
certain specific problems. The authors refer to this as 'lightweight' verification, 
but note that the comparative simplicity of the properties proved is offset by the 
complexities of the Java and Modula-3 languages and environment. The paper also 
draws attention to the fact that the information produced by ESC for an incorrect 
program is similar to that returned by a debugger. Furthermore, it is suggested 
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that this additional verification of simple properties might be viewed by users in 
the future in a similar light to typechecking. To this end, any additional burden on 
users is reduced by ensuring that annotations are simple and proof of the required 
logical properties is both fast and automatic. 
The authors also describe how in designing ESC's integral theorem prover, they faced 
the challenge of achieving the correct balance between interaction and automation. 
Interactive provers are often very powerful, but require a great deal of user input and 
knowledge---a feature the authors felt would be likely to discourage a great many 
programmers from using the system. Automatic provers, on the other hand, require 
little user interaction but are often unable to deal with the decision procedures the 
authors felt were essential to the system-e.g. those for linear arithmetic. The 
resultant prover is described as having two parts: a set of co-operating decision 
procedures, and a search procedure that manages the search for a proof. 
The system has been used to verify properties of several programs, including an 
interface for Modula-3 that implements a dynamically expandable array, the 10 
streams package of Modula-3; and parts of the ESC system itself. 
2.2.2 The LOOP Project 
The aim of the Logic of Object-Oriented Programming (LOOP) Project [25] is to 
specify and verify properties of classes in object oriented languages, with the aid of 
proof tools such as Isabelle and PVS [4]. The main focus of the project is the verifi-
cation of programs written in JavaCard- -a subset of Java used to program Smart-
Cards. In [54], van den Berg and Jacobs note that reasoning about "real world" 
programming languages, such as Java, which may not be mathematically clean has 
always been extremely challenging. However with improvements in theorem prov-
ing technology and increased computing power, it is now becoming a realistic goal. 
The authors also mention the high level of interaction and feedback between the 
theoretical basis of their work and the practical aspects involved in verifying actual 
programs. 
The LOOP tool accepts Java programs, CCSL specifications [49]' and JML programs 
(Java programs annotated with Java Modelling Language (JML) specifications). 
JML is a behavioural interface specification language, designed specifically for Java, 
which enables pre- and post-conditions to be written in a Java-like manner. It is 
designed with ease of use for those with little experience of logic in mind. 
The tool translates the input programs into higher order logic descriptions of their 
semantics acceptable to a theorem prover. Currently these descriptions are produced 
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for the Isabelle and PVS provers, but the authors claim that this could be extended 
to any other prover that uses higher order logic. On the basis of these descriptions, 
the provers can be used to prove that the programs meet their specifications and 
other properties. These proofs are often carried out using a specialised Hoare logic. 
Unlike the ESC, which requires no input from the user, but is limited in the prop-
erties it can check, the LOOP tool can be used to provide a basis for an unlimited 
variety of properties, but requires a great deal of user interaction. As both ap-
proaches are valid for different users and problems, and especially as both tools use 
the JML language, the authors suggest they may provide complementary approaches 
to proofs of 'real world' programs. 
2.2.3 The T JVM 
In [34] Moore describes the development of a simplified or 'toy' JVM (T JVM) in 
order to explore verification issues for object-oriented bytecode. The TJVM was 
formalized in ACL2 (A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp) [27], 
and is based on Cohen's defensive JVM [12]. Moore employs the standard method 
of formalizing machines in ACL2, whereby the state of the T JVM is represented as a 
LISP object and an interpreter for T JVM bytecode as a LISP function. The T JVM 
differs from the JVM in that it does not deal with resource limitations, exceptions, 
or access types (e.g. a load instruction loads a value of any type). 
The interpreter for the TJVM is defined as an iterated step function: tjvm s n 
where the function that evaluates a single step of execution is applied n times to the 
initial state s. This definition of the execution of a bytecode program in terms of a 
concrete number of steps contrasts with Pusch's definition in terms of the reflexive 
transitive closure of pairs of states in a successful execution path. This reflects the 
differing aims of the authors: Pusch's proof objectives are of abstract properties of 
the JVM and bytecode programs in general; Moore's involve proving that specific 
programs are "correct" in the more widely understood sense of the word, i.e. they 
result in a particular value being produced. 
After setting up the ACL2 prover by proving several lemmas about simple arithmetic 
and single steps of execution, Moore describes how proofs can be obtained for the 
total correctness of several small programs (e.g. factorial) by instructing the 
prover to inductively "unwind" the code. Each method that is proved increases the 
capacity of the prover, as any future occurences of such a method will be treated as 
a primitive operation. 
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2.2.4 Comments 
While all three projects described above involve proving properties of actual Java 
programs, ESC and LOOP are probably most closely related in that they attempt 
to model the Java world with as much accuracy as possible, and carry out proofs 
at the level of the Java source language. Moore's work, in addition to dealing with 
proofs at the bytecode level, is concerned with a restricted subset of the language 
and does not model many of the features that make reasoning about Java and other 
'real world' languages particularly difficult. 
Despite this, van den Berg and Jacobs claim that thanks to improved proof tech-
nology and advances in computing power such 'real world' proofs are becoming a 
realistic goal. Certainly ESC and LOOP demonstrate that this is true to a de-
gree. However it seems likely that the aim of projects nowadays to prove only that 
programs possess certain, comparatively simple, desirable properties, or do not pos-
sess other undesirable ones plays a part. Due to the sheer complexity and scale 
of real world systems, it seems likely that the distinction between 'toy' systems, 
like Moore's, in which it can be proved that a very simple program is correct, and 
systems like ESC and LOOP which can prove that a program of some considerable 
complexity does not have certain clearly defined classes of error, will be preserved. 
But as the proof of a few specific properties is frequently all that is needed in prac-
tice, perhaps the tendency towards this 'lightweight' verification is an advance in 
itself. 
With regard to our own work, despite the fact that Moore's work carries out proof 
at the level of bytecode, it seems likely that ESC and LOOP are more immediately 
relevant as we are aiming at real world applicability and proof of certain properties 
rather than correctness per se. 
2.3 Improving Performance of JIT Compilers 
In this section we describe two projects whose aim is to improve the performance 
of JIT compilers. One is specifically aimed at Java JIT compilers, the other is not 
specifically concerned with Java or JITs, but the techniques used to improve the 
efficiency of a bytecode-like assembly language may well have applications to JIT 
compilers. 
In Annotating the Java Bytecodes in Support of Optimization, [22j, Hummel, Azevedo, 
Kolson, and Nicolau observe that while Java provides a portable, platform-independent 
stack machine, it does so at the expense of execution speed, as stack machines do not 
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map well onto modern CPUs, which rely heavily on the use of register and caches 
for speed. In addition to having no concept of registers, Java bytecodes are also 
unable to express optimizations like instruction scheduling, elimination of runtime 
checks, and automatic reclamation of memory. 
With the goal of achieving C-like performance while retaining the portability of 
bytecode and preserving compatibility with existing JVMs, the authors propose an 
annotating compiler. This behaves initially like a traditional optimizing com-
piler, analysing the code and performing optimizations before emitting bytecode. 
But rather than discarding the information produced by the analysis, the compiler 
attaches the relevant information to each emitted bytecode in the form of an anno-
tation. 
The annotations contain information useful for 
• register allocation 
• memory disambiguation 
• memory reclamation 
• run-time checking 
This information would normally have to be recomputed from the bytecode by the 
JVM, which in some instances may not be possible as too much information may 
have been lost. Annotations are stored separately from the bytecode in a classfile 
in order not to interfere with the running of the program on standard JVMs. A 
JVM with an annotation aware JIT compiler, however, can use the annotations to 
produce more efficient code more quickly. 
The table in Figure 2.2 (taken from [22]) shows the annotated bytecode for the Java 
expression 
a[i] = (2*a[i]) + b[i] 
The src, inter, dest, and last use columns denote virtual register allocation performed 
during the original source to bytecode translation. Virtual register vO is mapped to 
physical register RO, vi to Ri, etc. until all available registers are used up, after 
which the virtual registers are mapped to memory locations. 
The inter column tells a JIT compiler to save intermediate values in the specified 
register(s) if possible. The last use column denotes when a register ceases to be 
used for a particular variable and so can potentially be used for another one. The 
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CODE src inter dest last use r-t check memory ref tag 
aload a vO /stack/objref/a 
iload i vI /stack/int/i 
iconst 2 
aload a vO vO /stack/objref/a 
iload i vI vI / stack/int /i 
iaload vO,v1 v2 v3 111 /heap/array /int/* 
imul v2,v3 v3 
aload b vO / stack/ ob jref/b 
iload i vI vI / stack/int /i 
iaload v4,v1 v2 v4 101 /heap/array /int/* 
iadd v3,v4 v3 v4 
iastore vO,v1,v3 v2 v3 v3 000 /heap/array /int/* 
Figure 2.2: Example of annotated bytecode 
r-t check column specifies which run-time checks should be performed. For array 
accesses, at most three possible checks are required: 
1. Is the array reference equal to Null? 
2. Is the array index less than O? 
3. Is the array index greater than or equal to the length of the array? 
Each check is assigned a bit in r-t check; if the bit is 1, then the code must be 
generated to do the check. The memory ref tag column provides memory reference 
information suitable for performing disambiguation. 
The authors report substantial improvements in performance when using the An-
notated JIT. For one benchmark the performance is almost three times faster than 
with a standard JIT, for another, almost twice as fast. 
In A Dependently Typed Assembly Language [57] Hongwei Xi and Robert Harper 
describe an assembly language with a restricted form of dependent types. Dependent 
types are types which depend on terms, e.g. List (n) is the type of lists of length 
n . as opposed to the more usual type of List which includes no information about 
its length. More information can be found in [58]. 
In an overly complex type system, type checking can be infeasible (or actually unde-
cidable). In order to avoid this situation most type systems are very simple, which 
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means that only very elementary properties can be expressed and hence checked: it 
is usually not possible for a type checker to identify an attempt to remove an item 
from an empty list, for example. By restricting the dependent types in the language 
to those needed to ensure certain specific properties, the authors attempt to strike 
a balance between these two extremes. 
In Dependent Types in Practical Programming [58] the authors describe a method for 
eliminating array bounds checks in functional programs. They define dependent 
type constructors of the form 
{n:nat} 
Constructors may also contain conditions such as 
{n:nat Hi:natl i < n} 
A function nth, which returns the nth item of a list, therefore has the type 
{n:nat }{i:natl i < n} 'a list(l) * int(n) -> 'a 
which eliminates the need for runtime checks on the length of the list. This approach 
is now applied to assembly language, producing a dependently typed assembly 
language (DTAL) that supports a limited form of dependent type system which 
captures both type safety and memory safety. The paper describes an operation 
semantics and a set of typing rules for DTAL, from which type-soundness is proved. 
2.3.1 Comments 
The work described in this section represents two very different approaches to the 
optimization of assembly language programs. The AJIT project starts by gathering 
information from a high-level Java program, applying it to the 'middle' stage of 
a bytecode program, resulting in a more efficient assembly language program. The 
techniques involve no formal methods-although the authors mention the benefits in 
increased user confidence of applying such methods-but demonstrate a measurable 
improvement in the efficiency of the JIT. 
The DTAL project, on the other hand, is not concerned with high level languages 
or stack-based languages, but purely with assembly language. It takes a very formal 
approach to the problem, but ultimately also results in more efficient code. 
With regard to our work, it is clear that the AJIT project has more relevance. It 
demonstrates the value to JIT performance of the knowledge of the existence of 
certain properties in a bytecode program, and provides a system by which they can 
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 37 
be conveyed to a user. It seems likely that a proof element could be incorporated 
into such a system. While not disregarding the applications of a JIT producing 
dependently typed assembly code, it appears to have less immediate relevance to 
our work. 
2.4 Incorporating Proof in Systems 
While users may be keen to have the added reassurance of code that has been proved 
to have desirable properties such as type-soundness, they may well be put off using 
such systems if they are presented with a great deal of extra work and complexity to 
achieve such a result. In this section we discuss three projects aimed at incorporating 
proof into real world systems while retaining a 'user-friendly' interface. 
2.4.1 Eiffel 
Eiffel [53] is an object oriented language that implements proof annotations (known 
as assertions) that allow programmers to express formal properties of classes. As-
sertions are boolean expressions and can have the following forms: 
• Routine Preconditions: these express requirements a client must satisfy 
before they call a routine. 
• Routine Postconditions: these express conditions the supplier (i.e. the 
routine being called) guarantees on return, if its preconditions were satisfied 
on entry. 
• Class Invariant: this must be satisfied by every instance of the class, when-
ever an instance is externally accessible. It characterises the semantics of the 
class. 
The assertion mechanism can be used to implement what the developers of Eiffel 
refer to as programming by contract. This means that every routine in the 
code has a client-supplier contract specifying how it should be used by calling 
procedures (clients) and what it does itself (as a supplier). The aim is that all 
routines used in a system conform to their client-supplier contracts. Unlike type-
constraints which can be checked statically, Eiffel contracts may rely on data values 
and so can only be checked at runtime. The handling of such errors is dealt with by 
Eiffel's exception mechanism, and Eiffel provides a history table in order to make 
debugging of such situations easier. 
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2.4.2 Ada Spark 
Spark [9] is a subset of the Ada programming language enriched with annotations. 
Spark uses a tool known as the Examiner, which has two basic functions: 
• checking that the code conforms to the rules of the kernel language. 
• checking consistency between the code and the embedded annotations by con-
trol, data and information flow analysis. 
In order to ensure correct dynamic behaviour of the code, certain proof annotations 
can be inserted that allow analysis of a program's dynamic behaviour prior to ex-
ecution. The annotations allow the Examiner to generate theorems; proving these 
theorems verifies that the program is correct with respect to the annotations. The 
proof annotations comprise 
• pre and postconditions of subprograms 
• assertions such as loop invariants 
• declarations of proof functions 
The generated theorems are known as verification conditions and can be veri-
fied by hand or by using other Spark tools such as the Simplifier and the Proof 
Checker. The Examiner is also able to generate path functions which show the 
effect of traversing the various paths in a subprogram. 
The Examiner provides three different levels of analysis, according to how critical 
the safety of the code is 
• The lowest level of analysis is Data Flow Analysis. This involves checking 
that the usage of parameters and global variables corresponds to their modes; 
that values are not overwritten without being used; that all imported variables 
are used somewhere. The interdependencies between variables as expressed in 
the derives annotation are not checked. 
• The next level is Information Flow Analysis. This requires derives anno-
tations, and in addition to carrying out data flow analysis it checks that the 
modes of parameters and global variables and their usage in the code of the 
body correctly match the interdependencies given in the derives annotation. 
This level of analysis is known as shallow verification as it checks the static 
semantic dependencies, though not dynamic ones. 
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• The highest level of analysis involves generating verification conditions in 
addition to performing flow analysis and requires proof annotations. 
Verification conditions are obtained through a series of operations on the stated 
conditions which annotate the code. These operations correspond closely to those 
involved in Hoare Logic proofs, e.g. the Assignment Axiom. 
2.4.3 Proof Carrying Code 
Proof Carrying Code (PCe) [36,35, 11, 50} is a technique developed by George Nec-
ula and Peter Lee to attempt to address the problem of safe execution of untrusted 
code. In an instance of pee a code receiver establishes a set of safety rules that 
guarantee safe behaviour of programs (or at any rate, what the receiver is defining 
safe behaviour to be); the code producer then creates a formal safety proof that 
proves the untrusted code's adherence to the safety rules. The receiver is then able 
to use a simple and fast proof valida tor to check that the proof is valid and hence 
that it is safe to execute the untrusted code. 
A pee implementation contains the following elements: 
• A formal specification language-first order predicate logic- is used to 
express the safety policy. 
• A formal semantics of the language used by the untrusted code. This 
is usually in the form of a logic relating programs to specifications. A form 
of Floyd's verification-condition generator [15J is used to extract the safety 
properties of a program as a predicate. This predicate must then be proved by 
the code producer using the axioms and inference rules supplied by the code 
consumer as part of the safety policy. 
• The language used to express the proofs is a variant of Edinburgh Logical 
Framework (LF) [8J (a typed lambda calculus). 
• An algorithm for validating the proofs. This involves type-checking the 
LF expression that represents a proof according to a set of typing rules agreed 
on by the code producer and receiver. 
• A method for generating the safety proofs. This element is used only 
by the code producer and the implementation involves a theorem prover that 
emits the required proofs. In [37J the use of a certifying compiler, which 
translates programs written in a typesafe subset of C into machine code and 
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a certifier which checks the type and memory safety of any program produced 
by the compiler is investigated. The use of a certifying compiler has the added 
advantage that it is much simpler to verify the output of the compiler than to 
verify the compiler itself. 
2.4.4 Comments 
Both PCC and Java are designed to ensure the safety of untrusted executable code, 
downloaded from another system, without access to source code. Eiffel and Spark try 
to ensure the production of safe executable code within a system; and they depend 
on being able to examine the source code (in order to deal with annotations). 
PCC employs a combination of First Order Logic, a language semantics, a theorem 
prover and a form of the lambda calculus to produce and encode its proofs of program 
correctness. It can therefore be viewed as the most 'heavy duty' in terms of formal 
methods. Spark involves data and information flow analysis combined with a form of 
Hoare logic in order to carry out both static and runtime checks. Whereas Java uses 
dataflow analysis with additional runtime checks to ensure the safety of programs, 
Eiffel uses a rather weaker form of the annotations used in Spark. 
In terms of our own work, the notion of annotated code as used in Spark and Eiffel, 
could be used in some form in the proof of bytecode programs. It is unreasonable 
to imagine that users would be willing to annotate bytecode programs themselves. 
However as many of the properties involved are very low level (e.g. just prior to 
execution of an array store application, checking whether the array reference is non-
null), an automatic annotating mechanism might be feasible. 
The concept of Proof Carrying Code is very relevant to our work, as it provides 
a method of providing the user with the added reassurance of verified code in a 
relatively painless manner. As the vast majority of Java users are not well-versed in 
theorem proving techniques, they are unlikely to welcome a system that demands 
skill in such techniques. 
2.5 Conclusions 
A large amount of work has been carried out on proving that the Java language and 
JVM are type safe. Most of this work has been carried out with the aid of mecha-
nized proof tools. In addition to this there are several ongoing projects that aim to 
develop proof systems for real world Java programs. These tend towards lightweight 
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verification in which the aim is to prove particular properties of programs, rather 
than program correctness. We feel that these techniques are applicable to our own 
work on proving certain properties of Java bytecode programs with a view to im-
proving the performance of JIT compilers. 
In addition there exist several projects on improving the performance of JIT compil-
ers, and incorporating proof into systems, which would be of relevance to developing 
a technique to proving properties of bytecode programs into a working system. 
Chapter 3 
Bytecode Execution Relations 
The decision to prove properties of the bytecode programs themselves, rather than 
the corresponding Java source was made based on two main factors: 
1. Java programs are downloaded by consumers as bytecode, not source 
2. It is perfectly feasible (albeit not common in practice) to produce Java byte-
code from another high level language, e.g. C, ML. 
In order to reason about properties of bytecode programs it is necessary to develop 
a logical framework that supports this. 
The fact that bytecode is 'flat' and contains goto instructions presents difficulties 
not encountered in the standard logic, which deals with a structured programming 
language. The standard Hoare logic has three main components, however, which 
can be applied to bytecode programs, namely: 
1. The notion of evaluation of a section of code in the language (which can be 
based on the operational semantics) 
2. Definition of a pre- and post-condition relation on execution of code. 
3. Higher level rules for combining patterns of code 
The development of some logical relations corresponding to the first item in this 
list the evaluation of bytecode--is discussed in the rest of this chapter. There are 
three execution relations for bytecode instructions. The block execution relation 
(Section 3.3) describes the complete execution of a block of bytecode. The sequence 
42 
CHAPTER 3. BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 43 
execution relation (Section 3.2) describes the complete execution of a block of byte-
code of a very restricted class of instructions. Finally, the execution path relation 
(Section 3.4) is concerned with the relationship between intermediate states in the 
execution of a block of bytecode and the initial and final states. These relations 
are all necessary for the development of points 2 and 3 on the list, which will be 
discussed fully in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.1 Extending the Semantics 
While Pusch's formalization of the JVM is fairly comprehensive, the objective of 
the work differs from ours, and some alterations to the model are necessary in order 
to allow the definition of the bytecode logic. We describe these alterations briefly 
before commencing discussion of any bytecode execution relations. 
3.1.1 Arithmetic Instructions 
As Pusch's work formalises a subset of the JVM, certain instructions are omitted. 
These include all arithmetic instructions, such as iadd, isub. In order to prove 
properties of real programs, however trivial, Pusch's model must be extended to 
include this class of instructions. 
Each of the load and store instructions in Pusch's instruction subset are represented 
by a value in the datatype load_and_store whose components are the name of a load 
and store instruction and its arguments. The following function is then defined for 
each element of the load_and_store datatype: 
execJas :: [load_and_store, opstack, locvars, p_countJ =? 
(opstack * locvars * p_count) 
This takes a load and store instruction, an operand stack, a set of local variables 
and a program counter and returns the updated values of the operand stack, local 
variables and program counter. 
It is simple to add the instructions 
• iadd- - add the two integers at the top of the stack 
• iinc var val-- increment local variable var by integer value val 
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to the existing load and store instructions of the model. The corresponding exten-
sions to execJas are also straightforward, and the resultant Isabelle theory file can 
be found in Appendix B of this report. 
3.1.2 Branching Instructions 
Problems are also encountered with the representation of branching instructions. In 
Java bytecode, branching instructions are absolute jumps to a label, but in Pusch's 
model they are represented by relative branches, where the new value of the program 
counter is obtained by adding an offset to the current value. This offset is positive 
for a branch forward, negative for a branch backwards. 
While this convention appears suitable for Pusch's higher-level proofs, difficulties 
arise when using it to reason about lower-level properties. In particular, problems 
are encountered with proofs involving branches backwards where a negative integer 
is added to the program counter (a natural number cast to an integer) and the result 
is then cast to a natural. This repeated type-casting makes the proofs in Isabelle 
very awkward. 
Consequently, in place of the two varieties of branching instructions in Pusch's model 
(cond_branch and uncond_branch) we have four types of branching instruction: 
cond_branch-fwd = IfnulUwd nat 
Ilfiacmpeq_fwd ins_type nat 
Ilficmpit-fwd nat 
cond_branch_bwd - IfnulLbwd nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_bwd ins_type nat 
IlficmplLbwd nat 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
All of these take a natural number as offset, which is either added or subtracted to the 
current program counter depending on whether the branch is forwards or backwards. 
This keeps all branching proofs in the realm of natural number arithmetic, greatly 
simplifying the Isabelle proofs. 
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3.2 Execution of a Sequence of Bytecode 
Instructions 
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The conventional Hoare logic is based on an operational semantics where execution 
begins at the start of the sequence of commands and finishes at the end (assuming 
the program terminates). But with bytecode there is the possibility of jumping into 
the code at some point after the start and out at a point before the end. How, then, 
should execution of a sequence of bytecode be defined? 
Consideration of a straightforward recursive definition of the form 
exec· [] ao = a 
exec· (x : xs) ao = exec· xs (exec x ao) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
where x is a bytecode instruction and xs a list of bytecode instructions, immediately 
reveals it to be unsuitable as the execution of xs would not necessarily be linear: ex-
ecution might well jump back to the beginning of xs after a few instructions. Pusch's 
formalisation recognises this by defining execution of several bytecode instructions 
as the reflexive, transitive closure of a series of single execution steps: 
execall ::[bytecode, jvm_state, jvm_state] =} bool 
CFS ~ s ---,>* t = (s, t): {(s, t). exec (CFS, s) = Some tr (3.7) 
where CFS denotes a set of classfiles. 
To define a partial correctness relation it is necessary to know that, for a sequence 
of bytecode instructions, if we start executing in state ao we will finish execution 
in state an. But the above relation does not have anything to say about a state's 
position in the sequence of states produced by executing a number of bytecode 
instructions, only whether or not it is in the sequence. We must therefore define 
what it means to 'finish' execution of a sequence of bytecode instructions. 
One possibility is to state that execution of a sequence of instructions has finished 
when the program counter is no longer pointing into the sequence. This results in the 
definition of a relation describing the execution of a list of bytecode instructions in 
which if execution begins in state ao inside a sequence, it results in state (Tn, where 
the program counter of an is outside the section. 
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3.3 The Block Execution Relation 
Suppose that 
• CPS is a set of Classfiles 
• The start of the bytccode sequence is signified by 5, and the fimsh by f, where 
sand f are triples of the form (classname, method locator, program counter) 
each allowing identification of a single instruction in CPS. 
• ao and an are states, each consisting of (exception option, heap, frame stack 
list). 
We write (CPS, a 0) ~ an to mean that executing the sequence of instructions 
f 
in CPS that begins at the instruction indentified by s and ends at the instruction 
identified by f, starting in the state ao, results in the state an, where the instruction 
identified by an is not contained in the sequence of instructions in CPS bounded by 
sand f. 
The program counter of s must be less than or equal to the program counter of f, 
i.e., the block consists of at least one instruction. The program counter of state 0"0, 
should be greater than or equal to the program counter of s and less than or equal to 
the program counter of f. The program counter of f should be less than the length 
of the code of the current method (measured from the start of the method code) to 
ensure that we are not referring to non-existent pieces of code. This condition also 
ensures that Isabelle's standard lemmas about lists can be used, as many require 
that an indexing value, e.g. pc(f), be less than the length of the list being operated 
on. 
The program counter of the final state O"n should be either less than the program 
counter of s or greater than the program counter of f. Finally, sand f should 
identify instructions in the same method of the same class. 
We introduce the following definitions 
Definition 1 (Program counter inside block) 
inside pC(O"o) s f = pc(s) ~ pc(ao) 1\ pC(O"o) ~ pc(f) 
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Definition 2 (Program counter outside block) 
outside pC(O'o) s I == pC(O'o) < pc(s) V pc(f) < pC(O'o) 
Definition 3 (States in same method) 
same_method s 0'0 0' n I == (cJass( s) = class( 0' 0) = 
class( 0' n) = cJass(f» /\ 
(method(s) = method(O'o) -
method(O'n) = method(f) 
And the block execution relation is defined inductively by the rules 
Definition 4 (Block Execution Relation) 
exec( CFS, 0'0) = Some O'n; 
inside pC(O'o) s I; 
same_method s 0'0 O'n I; 
pc(f) < length(geLcode CFS s); 
outside pc( 0' n) S I 
(CFS,O'o) ~ O'n 
f 
exec( CFS, 0'0) = Some 0'1; 
inside pC(O'o) s I; 
same_method s 0'0 0'1 I; 
pc(f) < length(get_code CFS s); 
(CFS, 0'1) ~ O'n 
f 
(CFS, 0'0) ~ O'n 
f 
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(Stop) 
(Continue) 
Rule Stop refers to the case in which one step of execution results in the program 
counter being outside the sequence of instructions under consideration. At this point 
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execution of the block would be considered finished, giving us the final state required 
by the programming logic. 
Rule Continue is the case where, after one step of execution, the program counter 
is still within the block of code delimited by 8 and 1- This the inductive part of the 
definition, as the relation is defined in terms of itself. Execution of the block would 
now carryon, with continued application of the rules until the Stop rule applies 
and we obtain a final state. 
As can be seen from the definition of the block execution relation, all states in the 
relation must refer to instructions within a single method. Obviously it would be 
desirable to extend the relation in the future to allow method invocation and possible 
ways of doing this are discussed in Section 7.2. 
In addition to this, it is assumed either implicitly or, where necessary, explicitly, 
that execution of the instructions between the boundaries of an instance of the 
block execution relation do not throw exceptions. This is to simplify the definition 
of the bytecode programming logic described in Chapter 4. Again, further work 
could be done leading to a programming logic for bytecode which allows for abrupt 
termination, such as that described by Huisman and Jacobs in [21] for Java source 
code. The exception - free property is defined in Section 3.4, Definition 9. 
The case split and induction rules for the block execution relation are shown in 
Figure 3.1 as they appear in Isabelle. It will be apparent, however, that this format 
is not very readable and so all proofs will be described in the text using a less 
proof-tool specific notation. 
As many of our proofs involve retrieving the code of a particular method in a set 
of classfiles, and then taking a smaller 'slice' from it, the following definitions are 
given: 
Definition 5 (Isolate sequence of instructions from classfile) 
CFS [8 ... f] == slice pC(8) pc(J) (get-code CFS 8) 
Definition 6 ('Slice' instructions from longer list) 
sliceabx8 = take (Suc(b-a)) (drop a xs) 
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val mycases = 
"[I ?CFS ?s ?f 1- ?a -block-> ?b; 
[I exec (?CFS, ?a) K Some ?b; inside (third_of ?a) ?8 ?f; 
pc_of ?f < length (get_code ?CFS (cn_of ?s) (ml_of ?s»; 
same_method_frs ?s (hd (snd (snd ?a») (hd (snd (snd ?b») ?f; 
outside (third_of ?b) ?s ?f I] ==> ?P; 
!! c. 
[I exec (?CFS, ?a) E Some c; inside (third_of ?a) ?s ?f; 
pc_of ?f < length (get_code ?CFS (cn_of ?s) (ml_of ?s»; 
same_method_frs ?s (hd (snd (snd ?a») (hd (snd (snd c») ?f; 
?CFS ?s ?f 1- c -block-> ?b I] => ?P I] a_> ?p" : thm 
val exec_block3.induct -
"[I ?xo (?xn, (?xm, ?x1) , 
?xk) (?xj, (?xi, ?xh) , ?xg) 1- (?xf, ?xe, ?xd) -block-> ?xc, ?xb, 
?xa; 
!!CFS a aa b ab ac ba ad ae bb bc af ag bd be. 
[I exec (CFS, a, aa, b) - Some (ab, ac, ba); 
inside (third_of (a, aa, b» (af, (ag, bd), be) (ad, (ae, bb), bc); 
pc_of (ad, (ae, bb), bc) 
< length 
(get_code CFS (cn_of (af, (ag, bd), be» 
(ml_of (af, (ag, bd), be»); 
same_method_frs (af, (ag, bd), be) (hd (snd (snd (a, aa, b»» 
(hd (snd (snd (ab, ac, ba»» (ad, (ae, bb), bc); 
outside (third_of (ab, ac, ball (af, (ag, bd), be) 
(ad, (ae, bb), bc) I] 
_a> ?P CFS af ag bd be ad ae bb bc a aa b ab ac ba; 
!!CFS a aa b ab ac ba ad ae bb af ag bc bd ab ai be bf. 
[I exec (CFS, a, aa, b) - Some (ad, ae, bb); 
inside (third_of (a, aa, b» (ab, (ai, be), bf) (af, (ag, bc), bd); 
pc_of (af, (ag, bc), bd) 
< length 
(get_code CFS (cn_of (ab, (al, be), bf» 
(m1_of (ab, (ai, be), bf»); 
same_method_frs (ab, (ai, be), bf) (hd (snd (snd (a, aa, b»» 
(hd (snd (snd (ad, ae, bb»» (af, (ag, bc), bd); 
CFS (ab, (ai, be), 
bf) (af, (ag, bc), bd) 1- (ad, ae, bb) -block-> ab, ac, ba; 
?P CFS ab ai be bf af ag bc bd ad ae bb ab ac ba I] 
_a> ?P CFS ab ai be bf af ag bc bd a aa b ab ac ba I] 
--> ?P ?xo ?xn ?xm ?xl ?xk ?xj ?xi ?xh ?xg ?xf ?xe ?xd ?xc ?xb ?xa" thm 
Figure 3.1: Case split and induction rule as they appear in Isabelle 
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3.3.1 Lemmas for the Block Execution Relation 
Working with the rules defined above, we obtain proofs of the following properties 
as 'sanity checks' on the inductive definition of the block execution relation. 
Lemma 1 (Initial state in block execution relation is inside the block) 
V CFS s f 0'0 O'n· (CFS, 0'0) ~ an ----t pc(s) ~ pC(O'o) ~ pc(J) 
f 
PROOF This follows from the rules for the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definition of inside (Definition 1). _ 
Lemma 2 (Final state in relation is outside the block ) 
VCFS s f 0'0 an. (CFS,O'o) ~ O'n ----t PC(O'n) < pc(s) V pc(J) < PC(O'n) 
f 
PROOF This follows from the rules for the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definition of outside (Definition 2). _ 
Lemma 3 (Initial and final states in relation not equal ) 
V CFS s f 0'0 an· (CFS,O'o) ~ an ----t 0'0 =1= O'n 
f 
PROOF This follows from the rules for the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definitions of inside (Definition 1) and outside (Definition 2). The initial 
state is inside the block, the final state is outside and, as a state cannot be both 
inside and outside a block, the states cannot be equal. _ 
Lemma 4 (List of frames in initial state not empty ) 
V CFS s f 0'0 an- (CFS, 0'0) ~ an ----t frames(O'o) =1= [ 
f 
PROOF This follows from the rules for the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and Pusch's definition of the partial function exec which defines execution of a state 
with an empty list of frames as evaluating to undefined. _ 
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'----------'[] 
x y 
Figure 3.2: Extension of block, final program counter on right 
As in imperative programs, a bytecode program can be viewed as a block composed 
of several smaller blocks of code. It is therefore useful to prove some lemmas relating 
to the extension and combining of blocks of code. 
We begin by describing the extension of blocks. Given a block in the block execution 
relation and the position of the program counter on exit, pc(an ), it is possible to 
extend the relation to include all instructions in the method on the opposite side of 
the block from pc(an ), and all instructions up to it on the same side. 
Lemma 5 (Extension of block with final program counter on right) 
'if CFS sf x y ao an· (CFS,ao) ~ an ~ 
f 
pc(y) < pc(an ) 1\ pc(x) < pc(s) 1\ pc(J) < pc(y) 1\ 
pc(y) < length(geLcode CFS s) ~ (CFS,ao) ~ an 
y 
PROOF By induction on the rules for the block execution relation (Definition 4). 
The base case then follows from construction rule Stop and the definitions for inside 
(Definition 1), and outside (Definition 2). The inductive step can be proved by 
the inductive hypothesis, construction rule Continue, and the definition of inside 
(Definition 1). This is shown in Figure 3.2. • 
Lemma 6 (Extension of block with final program counter on left) 
'if CFS sf x Y 170 an· (CFS,ao) ~ an ~ 
f 
pc(an ) < pc(x) 1\ pc(x) < pc(s) 1\ pc(f) < pc(y) 1\ 
pc(y) < length(geLcode CFS s) ~ (CFS,ao) ~ an 
y 
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r:?C? 1:::::::1 
'-----'f 
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x y 
Figure 3.3: Extension of block, program counter on left 
[~} '------------~ 
x y 
Figure 3.4: Add block on right, finish on right, blocks adjacent 
PROOF As for Lemma 5. See Figure 3.3. 
• 
We now consider the problem of combining two blocks in the block execution. Given 
two blocks in the relation where execution of the first block finishes inside the second, 
and execution of the second finishes to the right or left of both blocks, the two can 
be combined to form one larger block. This larger block can itself be extended 
to include all instructions in the method on the opposite side of the block from 
pc(un ) the position of the program counter on exit from the second block~-and all 
instructions up to it on the same side. 
The two original blocks may be adjacent to each other, as in Figure 3.4, be separated 
by a gap, as in Figure 3.5, or overlap to the extent that one block is exactly 'on 
top' of the other. The only situation not permitted is that the second block should 
be contained within the first, as it is necessary from the definition of the relation 
for the program counter of the final state to be outside the block. These lemmas 
refer to situations where there is no looping between blocks (although either or both 
of the individual blocks may contain a loop); loops will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
There are four cases that we will consider, defined by the position of the program 
counter in the final stage of each block: add a block to the right of the initial block, 
finish on the right of the two blocks; add a block to the right of the initial block, 
finish on the left of the two blocks; add a block to the left of the initial block, finish 
on the right of the two blocks; and add a block to the left of the initial block, finish 
on the left of the two blocks. 
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s f s' f 
'---______ --.JI_-_-_-_-i 
x y 
Figure 3.5: Add block on right, finish on right, gap between blocks 
As the proofs are all very similar, we will only describe in detail the first case: 
execution of first block finishes on the right of the first block, but within the second; 
execution of the second block finishes to the right of both blocks. This is depicted 
in Figure 3.3.1. 
We note briefly that one other case does exist, in which execution of the first block 
finishes in the second block, and execution of the second block finishes in the gap 
between the blocks. It is likely that proofs of this case would necessitate a different 
approach to those described below, but as it is not fundamental to any work later 
in the dissertation consideration of this case is omitted. 
Lemma 7 (Add a block on right, finishing on right) 
'V CFS 5 f x Y 5' J' 0"0 O"n O"~. (CFS, 0"0) ~ (Tn ----+ 
/ 
S' (CFS,O"n) - CT~ -/' 
pC( 5) ::; pC( 5') A pC(J)::; pC(J') -
pC(X) < pC(5) A pc(J') < pC(y) ----+ 
pC(y) < length(geLcode CFS 5) ----+ 
pC(y) < pC«(J~) 
----+ (CFS, (J 0) ---=-. (J~ 
y 
PROOF The proof proceeds by rule induction (Section 1.3.3) on the first assumption 
(CFS,CTo) ~ (In' 
/ 
Basis 
The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced by 
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one application of the Stop rule, giving us the assumption 
exec (CFS, 0"0) = Some O"n 1\ 
inside 0"0 S f 1\ 
outside 0" nsf 
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(3.8) 
We now consider the two possible positions of the program counter in O"n. From the 
definition of outside (Definition 2) we know that 
(3.9) 
The left hand disjunct, pe(O"n) < pe(s) gives a contradiction as we know from 
Lemma 1 that 
inside pe( O"n) pe( s') pe(J') (3.10) 
and from 3.8 that 
pe( s) ::; pe( s') (3.11) 
Thus pC(J) < pe(O"n) and the basis can then be proved using the Continue rule 
and Lemma 5. 
Inductive Step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by at least one application of the Continue rule. By rule induction, we have the 
assumption 
exec (CFS, 0"0) = Some 0"1 1\ 
inside 0"0 S f 1\ 
(CFS,O"l) ~ O"n 
f 
And from the inductive hypothesis after simplification we have 
which by application of the Continue rule, gives the desired result. 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
• 
A block of size one is equivalent to execution of that instruction, providing the in-
struction is not a 'degenerate' branch (one which branches back to itself, or branches 
outside the bounds of the method), or an instruction which results in a frame being 
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"-----______ -..--JI_-_-_-_-! 
x Y 
Figure 3.6: Add a block to the right, finish on the right 
pushed or popped from the stack, i.e. method invocation or return. The latter 
constraint is due to the current, simplified, definition of the block execution relation 
which demands that all states in the relation be in the same method_ 
The constraint on branching instructions is due to the fact that it would be possible 
to create a bytecode program (though probably not via a conventional compiler) 
which pushed the value Null onto the stack, followed by some other values, then 
had a "branch if not null" instruction which looped back to itself. Initially the top 
value on the stack would not be Null, but every time the branch instruction was 
evaluated, the top value on the stack would be popped, leading eventually to a state 
where the top value was Null and the loop was exited. This would mean that this 
instruction was in the block execution relation, but that this instance of the relation 
was not equivalent to a single-step execution of the initial state. 
Lemma 8 (Single instruction block execution equivalence) 
\:fCPS s X 0"0 O"n- (geLcode CPS s)!pc(s) - x 1\ 
nOLdegenerate_branch x 1\ 
not--ShifLframe x 1\ 
pc(s) < length (geLcode CPS s) ~ 
(CPS, 0"0) ~ O"n = exec( CFS, 0'0) = Some O'n 
s 
PROOF The result follows from case analysis of the instruction x and the operational 
semantics of the JVM. • 
3.4 The Execution Path Relation 
The block execution relation can be used to reason about an intermediate state in 
the execution of a block and the final state_ It does not, however, allow discussion 
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Figure 3.7: One step of execution 
of the connection between an intermediate state and the initial state, or between 
two intermediate states, as both the states in question are inside the block. Since 
it is clearly useful to be able to do this, a relation that enables us to reason about 
two states, at least one and possibly both of which are within a particular sequence 
of bytecode, is needed. 
This relation is particularly useful in the proofs of the sequencing rule, where we 
have to prove the existence of a 'crossover' state in the execution of a block which 
is the result of joining two smaller blocks together. Also, in the proof of soundness 
of the while rule (Chapter 5), we must reason about the relationship between the 
initial state and various intermediate states in the execution of the loop. 
The execution path relation is defined 8..<; the set of pairs of states obtained by a 
successful execution step, where the program counter of the first member of the 
pair is inside the block in question, see Figure 3.7. We write (CFS, a 0) ==* alto 
f 
mean that ao is inside the block from s to f, and executing the instruction in CFS 
identified by ao results in the state al. 
Definition 7 (Execution step in a block) 
same_method s ao a1 f A inside ao sf} 
The execution path relation is the transitive closure of this set, and we write 
(CFS, ao) ==*+ an to mean that the pair (ao, an) is an element of the transitive 
f 
closure of the set of pairs of states represented by the relationship (CFS, a 0) ==* a 1 
f 
Figure 3.8. 
Definition 8 (Execution Path Relation) 
(CFS, ao) ==*+ an == (ao, an) E {(ao, an). exec (CFS, ao) = Some an A 
f 
same_method s ao an f A inside ao s f} + 
CHAPTER 3. BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 57 
Figure 3.8: Execution path relation 
Many of the proofs involving the execution path relation rely on lemmas about 
transitive closure which come as part of the standard Isabelle distribution. 
The following lemmas show the correspondence between the execution path relation 
and the block execution relation. 
Lemma 9 (Block execution relation implies execution path relation ) 
PROOF This follows from induction on the construction rules for the block execu-
tion relation (Definition 4) and the definition of the execution path relation (Defi-
nition 8). _ 
Lemma 10 (Execution path implies block execution) 
V CFS sf ao an· (CFS, ao) ==*+ an /\ outside an sf 
f 
~ (CFS,ao) ~ an 
f 
PROOF By induction on the execution path relation and the construction rules for 
the block execution (Definition 4). _ 
Lemma 11 (Unrolling the relation from the start) 
V CPS sf (To (Tn· (CPS, (To) ==*+ (Tn 
f 
~ (CFS,ao) ==* an V 
f 
:3 a1. (CFS, ao) ==* a1 /\ (CPS, (T1) ==*+ an 
f f 
PROOF This follows from the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8) 
and the standard lemmas for transitive closure in Isabelle. _ 
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Lemma 12 (Unrolling the relation from the end) 
V CFS sf ao an· (CFS, ao) ==*+ an 
f 
~ (CFS, 0"0) ==* O"n V 
f 
:3 O"n-I. (CFS, (To) ==*+ O"n-I /\ (CFS, an-I) ==* (Tn 
J f 
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PROOF This follows from the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8) 
and the standard lemmas for transitive closure in Isabelle. _ 
The execution path relation is also used to define the concept of a list of instructions 
being free of exceptions 
Definition 9 (Exception free instructions) 
excep_free ys == V CFS xp hp frs xp' hp' frs' sf. 
ys = CFS [s ... fl /\ 
(CFS, (xp, hp,frs») ==*+ (xp', hp',frs') 
f 
~ xp = None /\ xp' = None 
3.5 Determinism Theorems 
Lemma 13 (Execution of a single instruction is deterministic) 
V CFS s f 0"0 0" n O"~. exec (CFS, 0"0) = Some 0" n /\ 
exec (CFS, 0"0) = Some a~ ~ 
PROOF By case analysis of the instruction identified by ao, followed by automatic 
simplification with the rules for exec. _ 
We now show that this determinism is preserved by the block execution relation, 
and discuss the determinism of execution of a series of instructions not defined in 
relation to any particular class file. 
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Theorem 1 (Block execution relation is deterministic) 
VCFS sf ao an a~. (CFS,ao) ~ 
I 
(CFS,ao) ~ 
I 
an --+ 
a' --+ n 
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PROOF The proof proceeds by rule induction (Section 1.3.3) on the first assumption, 
(CFS,ao) ~ an· 
I 
Basis 
The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced by 
one application of the Stop rule, giving us the assumption 
exec (CFS, ao) = (Yn A 
inside (Yo s f 1\ 
outside an s f 
(3.14) 
We now consider the two possible cases of derivation of the second assumption, 
(CFS,(Yo) ~ a~. 
I 
1. The block was formed by one application of the Stop rule, giving us the 
assumption 
exec (CFS, ao) = a~ A 
inside ao sf A 
outside a~ s f 
(3.15) 
From this and (3.14) we are able to show the desired conclusion by Lemma 
13. 
2. The block was formed by at least one application of the Continue rule, giving 
us the assumption 
exec (CFS, ao) = (Y~ A 
inside ao sf A 
(CFS,a~) ~ (Y~ 
f 
(3.16) 
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From this assumption and Lemma 13 it follows that Un = u~, but we also 
have from (3.14) outside Un S f and, from Lemma 1, inside u~ s f. From 
the definitions of inside (Definition 1) and outside (Definition 2) the program 
counter of a state cannot be both inside and outside any block, and so we are 
able to show a contradiction. 
Inductive Step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by at least one application of the Continue rule. The Isabelle output for this step 
is shown in Figure 3.9 for comparison. By rule induction, we have the assumption 
exec (CFS, uo) = Ul A 
inside Uo sf /\ (3.17) 
(CFS,Ul) ~ Un 
f 
The inductive hypothesis is 
{3.18} 
Again we consider the two possible cases of the second assumption, 
1. The block was formed by one application of the Stop rule, giving us the 
assumption 
exec (CFS, uo) = U~ /\ 
inside Uo s f /\ 
outside u~ s j 
(3.19) 
From this, Lemma 13, and {3.17} we can show that U1 = u~. It follows from 
Lemma 1 that inside U1 s j, and from 3.19 that outside U1 s f. Once again, 
from the definitions of inside (Definition 1) and outside (Definition 2) we are 
able to show a contradiction. 
2. The block was formed by at least one application of the Continue rule, giving 
us the assumption 
exec (CFS, uo) = a~ /\ 
inside Uo sf A 
(CFS,a~) ~ u~ 
f 
By this, Lemma 13, and (3.17) we have a1 
hypothesis gives the required result. 
(3.20) 
U~ which by the inductive 
• 
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CFS (ent. (mnt. pdt). pcm) (en2. (mn2. pd2). PCj) 
1- (xpt. hpt. frsl) -bloek-> xp2. hp2. frs2 --> 
CFS (ent. (mnt. pdt). PCm) (en2. (mn2. pd2). PCj) 
1- (xpl. hpl. frsl) -bloek-> xp3. hp3. frs3 --> 
frs2 -= [) --> xpt - None --> (xp2. hp2. frs2) z (xp3. hp3. frs3) 
t. !!CFS a aa b ab ae ba ad ae bb af ag be bd ab ai be bf. 
[I exee (CFS. a. aa. b) = Some (ad. ae. bb); 
inside (third_of (a. aa. b» (ab. (ai. be). bf) (af. (ag. be). bd); 
pc_of (af. (ag. be). bd) 
< length (get_code CFS (en_of (ab. (a1. be), bf» 
(ml_of (ab. (ai. be). bf»); 
same_method_frs (ab. (ai, be). bf) 
(hd (snd (snd (a. aa. b»» 
(hd (snd (snd (ad. ae. bb»» 
(af. (ag. be). bd); 
CFS (ab. (ai. be). bi) (af. (ag, be). bd) 
1- (ad, ae. bb) -bloek-> abo ae. ba; 
CFS (ab. (ai. be). bf) (af. (ag. be). bd) 
1- (ad. ae. bb) -bloek-> xp3. hp3. frs3 --> 
ba -= [] --> ad = None --> (ab. ae. ba) - (xp3. hp3, frs3); 
CFS (ab. (ai. be). bf) (af. (ag. be). bd) 
1- (a. aa. b) -bloek-> xp3. hp3. frs3; ba -= [];a = Nonel) 
==> (ab. ae. ba) = (xp3. hp3. frs3) 
Figure 3.9: Induction step in Isabelle for Theorem 1 
3.5.1 Determinism of Two Identical Instruction 
Sequences 
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It would seem likely that executing the sequence of instructions xs starting in state 
(To should result in state (Tn regardless of whether xs is found in one set of class files 
CFS, or a different set CFS'. 
But this is not the case as, in both the block execution relation and the operational 
semantics on which it is based, instructions are not independent entities which can 
be described separately from the state in which they are being executed. We might 
consider that a state contains two separate sets of information: traditional environ-
mental data such as the stack, local variables and program counter; and contextual 
information in the form of a class name and method locator. This means that two 
states which are environmentally equal - and would consequently be equal in the 
traditional sense-may have different contextual information and therefore not be 
equal at all in the JVM setting. 
Thus it is possible in some cases to prove that the execution of a sequence of in-
structions is deterministic even if it appears in two, non-identical sets of classfiles. 
However it is only possible to prove this in the~somewhat unlikely---situation in 
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CFS 10111 C II 
cFs·IGJIIII F II 
s· f 
Figure 3.10: Two 'coinciding' class files 
CFS 10111 C II 
cFs·11 D 1111 F Il 
s· f 
Figure 3.11: Classfiles containing same sequence at different points 
which the two sets of classfiles containing the same instructions, at the same point, 
in identically named methods inside identically named classes (Figure 3.10). This 
is a very limited result and leaves us unable to prove determinism for the more re-
alistic scenarios of Figures 3.11 and 3.12, where xs appears in two disparate sets of 
classfiles, or in two different classes in the same set of classfiles. 
3.5.2 Data-equality of States 
As we have seen in the previous section, it is not possible to talk meaningfully about 
deterministic execution in terms of an entire JVM state. Pusch's formalization 
of the JVM aims to mirror as closely as possible the 'real world' in which Java 
bytecode programs are executed. Consequently, in Pusch's model of the JVM world 
instructions are not viewed in isolation as independent entities, but as part of the 
state itself. Therefore, in order to discuss determinism in the accepted sense of the 
word, we must define a different type of 'equality' for states. 
Two states are said to be dataequal (~), if their exception options and the values of 
CFS \0 D 
s f s· f 
Figure 3.12: Two instances of a sequence in one set of classfiles 
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the stack and local variables in the top frame of their frame stacks are equal: 
Definition 10 (Data-equality of states) 
(xp, hp,frs) ~ (xp', hp',frs') == xp = xp' A 
stk frs - stk frs' A 
lac frs = loc frs' 
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Of course, this definition of data-equality is not the only possible one. In a situation 
where we wish to compare two states within the execution of a single method- as will 
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 in relation to while loops it would be necessary 
only to exclude the current value of the program counter from the comparison. 
Equally, if we wished to talk about a situation involving the execution of instructions 
which reference the heap, this would have to become part of the definition of data-
equality. And so it is apparent that there may be several equalities of this nature. 
For the purposes of this document, however, there are only two situations in which we 
will need to use the idea of data-equality. First, in the proof of the determinism (in 
terms of data-equality) of two identical instruction sequences appearing in different 
places; and second, in the comparison of two states in the execution of a single 
method. 
Both cases are involved either directly, or indirectly, with the calculation of the 
weakest precondition with respect to a sequence of instructions and a condition Q. 
As will be discussed in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the instructions will be 
restricted to classfile independent, non-branching instructions, and all instances of 
Q will be concerned only with the stack and local variables of the topmost frame. 
As there will be no alteration to the object fields or heap, the notion of data-equality 
given in Definition 10 is therefore sufficient for the work described here. 
3.5.3 The Sequence Execution Relation 
In order to prove that if the initial states of two instances of the block execution 
relation are data-equal, then the final states will also be data-equal, it would seem 
reasonable to proceed by induction on the block execution relation. But while this 
approach succeeds for the base case, the step case requires us to prove that if the 
initial cases of each block are data-equal, then the initial state of the second block 
and the state reached after one step of execution of the first block are also data-equal. 
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case. For example, consider the blocks 
s ~ (CFS,ao) ----+ an and (CFS',ab) ----+ a~ where 
f r 
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CFS[s .. ·fl = CFS'[s' .. ·f'l = XS, ao ~ ub and exec (CFS, uo) = al· If the first 
instruction in xs pushes a value onto the stack, the length of the stack in state al, 
i.e. the state reached after one step of execution of the first block, will be greater 
than the length of the stack in a~, and so the states are not data-equal. We must 
therefore find another solution to the problem. 
One possibility is to again abstract away from the contextual aspects of the state 
within a set of classfiles. This results in an inductively defined relation operating 
only on the elements of state involved in the definition of data-equality, the relevant 
instructions as a sequence in its own right, and a pointer into the current position 
within this sequence. 
One further restriction necessary to produce a truly 'context-independent' relation 
is to limit the instructions involved to only classfile independent instructions. These 
are instructions that do not reference additional information in the relevant classfile, 
such as whether or not it contains a particular class or method instance, and comprise 
the load and store instructions, opstack instructions, and all branching instructions. 
Suppose that 
• xs is a list of bytecode instructions 
• Uo and an are of type minstate, a tuple consisting of an exception option, an 
operand stack, a list of local variables, and a program counter relative to the 
start of xs. 
We write xs f- ao ~ an if executing the sequence of instructions in xs in the state 
Uo results in the state an, where the instruction identified by an is not contained in 
xs (where xs is non-empty). 
The function execindep is defined as a partial function using Option types. It 
returns the updated state according to the operational semantics for all opstack 
instructions, load and store instructions, and branching instructions, and the value 
None for all other instructions. It follows as closely as possible the definition of 
exec in the underlying semantics, but with the omission of the 'exception handling' 
method of returning an empty list of frames if a state containing an exception is 
executed. Here the result is simply None- the result reached by exec on the next 
step of execution in any case. 
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Definition 11 (Execute CFS independent instruction) 
execindep ([ ], (xp,frs» = None 
execindep (xs, (None, (stk,loc, pc») = case xs!pc of 
I LAS ins::} let (stk', loc', pc') = execJas ins stk loc pc in 
Some (None, ( stk', loc' , pc') ) 
ICO ins ::} None 
I MO ins ::} None 
I MA ins ::} None 
ICH ins ::} None 
I MI ins ::} None 
IMR ins ::} None 
lOS ins ::} let (stk', pc') = execos ins stk pc in 
Some (None, (stk',loc, pc'» 
ICBF ins::} let (stk', pc') = execcb_fwd ins stk pc in 
Some (None, (stk', loc, pc'») 
ICBB ins ::} let (stk', pc') = execcb_bwd ins stk pc in 
Some (None, (stk',loc, pc'») 
IUBF ins ::} let (pc') = execub_fwd ins pc in 
Some (None, (stk,loc, pc') 
IUBB ins::} let (pc') = execub_bwd ins pc in 
Some (None, (stk,loc, pc')) 
execindep (xs, (Some xp,frs» = None 
We also define 
Definition 12 (Inlist) 
inlist xs pc == 0 s pc A pc S «(length xs) - 1) 
and 
Definition 13 (Outlist) 
outlist xs pc == (length xs) S pc 
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The sequence execution relation is then described by the following rules 
Definition 14 (Sequence Execution Relation) 
execindep(xs, TO) = Tn; 
XS =f. [J; 
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inlist xs pe(TO); 
outlist xs pe( Tn) 
xs I- TO ~ Tn 
(Seq-Stop) 
execindep(xs, TO) 
xs =f. []; 
inlist xs pe( TO); 
XS I- T1 ~ Tn 
xs I- TO ~ Tn (Seq-Continue) 
Using these definitions, we arc able to prove determinacy for execindep and, by 
induction, for the sequence execution relation. 
Lemma 14 (Execute CFS independent function is deterministic) 
v xs sf TO Tn T~. execindep(xs, TO) = Some Tn /\ 
execindep(xs, TO) = Some < 
I 
--+ Tn = Tn 
PROOF By exhaustion on the instruction at pe( TO) and simplification using the 
definition of execindep (Definition 11). • 
Theorem 2 (Sequence execution relation is deterministic) 
v xs sf TO Tn T~. XS I- TO ~ Tn 
XS I- TO ~ < 
I 
--+ Tn = Tn 
PROOF By induction on the rules for the sequence execution relation (Seq-Stop, 
Seq-Continue). • 
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3.5.4 Determinism of Instruction Sequences with Data-equality 
Using the sequence execution relation described above, we are now able to prove the 
determinacy of a block of bytecode instructions, regardless of their location within 
a set of classfiles. We begin by establishing the relationship between the block 
execution and sequence execution relations. 
Although in the above definition and the subsequent lemmas involving the sequence 
execution relation values of type minstate are denoted by the symbol T for ease of 
reading, such variables of course represent a 4-tuple of the form (xp, stk, loc, pc). 
Despite being stated in terms of a single state in the Isabelle proof scripts, Isabelle 
produces an induction theorem in terms of the fully expanded minstate. This is 
useful as it makes it possible to prove by induction lemmas concerned with the 
value of individual elements of a minstate (Figure 3.13). 
The definition of the block execution relation is similarly stated in terms of a single 
variable of type state of the form (xp, hp,frame stack list). In this case, however, 
Isabelle produces an induction theorem where the frame stack list is a single, un-
expanded variable (Figure 3.13). This means that, unlike the case of the sequence 
execution relation, we are unable to use the induction theorem to prove statements 
involving individual parts of a frame stack, e.g., Lemma 21. 
This makes it necessary to introduce a definition that is equivalent to the block 
execution definition but which explicitly mentions the individual parts of a frame 
stark. This is done by defining the frame stack list of any state as two separate 
variables: the topmost frame on the stack and a list containing the lower frames. 
The production rules for this and the original block execution relation are shown in 
Figure 3.14 and the induction rule for the expanded version in Figure 3.15. 
It was proved that if two states are in the block execution relation with expanded 
syntax then they are also in the standard syntax block execution, allowing lemmas 
involving both the block execution relation and the sequence execution relation to 
be obtained. But as the expanded relation is essentially an artefact of the proof 
tool and not of any interest in itself no further lemmas explicitly involving it will 
be discussed in this document. Interested readers can examine the proofs on the 
attached CD. 
We now prove a number of lemmas involving the sequence execution relation, several 
of which use the following predicate on lists as defined in the standard Isabelle 
distribution 
Definition 15 (All elements in list have property P) 
lisLall P xs == Vx. x E (set xs) --- Px 
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val exec_instrs.induct = 
"[I ?xi 1- (?xh, ?xg, ?xf, ?xe) -instrs-> ?xd, ?xc, ?xb, ?xa; 
!!a aa ab b ac ad ae ba xs. 
[I execCFSindep (X5, a, aa, ab, b) R Some (ac, ad, ae, ba); xs -- []; 
inlist xs (snd (a, aa, ab, b»; 
outlist xs (snd (ac, ad, ae, ba» I] 
==> ?P xs a aa ab b ac ad ae ba; 
!!a aa ab b ac ad ae ba af ag ab bb xs. 
[I execCFS1ndep (xs, a, aa, ab, b) - Some (af, ag, ab, bb); xs -. []; 
inlist xs (snd (a, aa, ab, b»; 
xs 1- (af, ag, ab, bb) -instrs-> ac, ad, ae, ba; 
?P xs af ag ab bb ac ad ae ba I] _.> ?P xs a aa ab b ac ad ae ba I] 
-=> ?P ?xi ?xh ?xg ?xf ?xe ?xd ?xc ?xb ?xa" : thm 
val exec_block3.induct = 
• [I ?xo (?m, (?xm, ?xl) , 
?xk) (?xj, (?xi, ?xh), ?xg) 1- (?xf, ?xe, ?xd) -block-> ?xc, ?xb, 
?xa; 
!!CFS a aa b ab ac ba ad ae bb bc af ag bd be. 
[I exec (CFS, a, aa, b) - Some (ab, ac, ba); 
inside (third_of (a, aa, b» (af, (ag, bd), be) (ad, (ae, bb), bc); 
pc_of (ad, (ae, bb), be) 
< length 
(get_code CFS (cn_of (af, (ag, bd), be» 
(ml_of (af, (ag, bd), be»); 
same_method_frs (af, (ag, bd), be) (hd (snd (snd (a, aa, b»» 
(hd (snd (snd (ab, ac, ba»» (ad, (ae, bb), be); 
outside (third_of (ab, ac, ba» (af, (ag, bd), be) 
(ad, (ae, bb), bc) I] 
-=> ?P CFS af ag bd be ad ae bb be a aa b ab ac ba; 
!!CFS a aa b ab ac ba ad ae bb af ag bc bd ab a1 be bf. 
[I exec (CFS, a, aa, b) - Some (ad, ae, bb); 
inside (third_of (a, aa, b» (ab, (ai, be), bf) (af, (ag, bc), bd); 
pc_of (af, (ag, bc), bd) 
< length 
(get_code CFS (cn_of (ab, (ai, be), bf» 
(ml_of (ab, (ai, be), bf»); 
same_method_frs (ab, (ai, be), bf) (hd (and (snd (a, aa, b»» 
(hd (snd (snd (ad, ae, bb»» (af, (ag, bc), bd); 
CFS (ab, (ai, be), 
bf) (af, (ag, be), bd) 1- (ad, ae, bb) -block-> ab, ac, ba; 
?P CFS ab ai be bf af ag bc bd ad ae bb ab ac ba I] 
-=> ?P CFS ab ai be bf af ag bc bd a aa b ab ac ba I] 
._> ?P ?xo ?m ?xm ?xl ?xk ?xj ?xi ?xh ?xg ?xf ?xe ?xd ?xc ?xb ?xa" thm 
Figure 3.13: Induction theorems for sequence and block execution relations 
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val exec_block3.Stop = 
"[I exec (?CFS, ?a) = Some ?b; inside (third_of ?a) ?s ?f; 
pc_of ?f < length (get_code ?CFS (cn_of ?s) (ml_of ?s»; 
same_method_frs ?s (hd (snd (snd ?a») (hd (snd (snd ?b») ?f; 
outside (third_of ?b) ?s ?f I] ==> ?CFS ?s ?f 1- ?a -block-> ?b" thm 
val exec_block3.Continue = 
"[I exec (?CFS, ?a) = Some ?c; inside (third_of ?a) ?5 ?f; 
pc_of ?f < length (get_code ?CFS (cn_of ?s) (ml_of ?s»; 
same_method_frs ?8 (hd (snd (snd ?a») (hd (snd (snd ?c») ?f; 
?CFS ?s ?f 1- ?c -block-> ?b I] ==> ?CFS ?s ?f 1- ?a -block-> ?b" thm 
val exec_blockO.Stop -
"[I exec (?CFS, ?xp, ?hp, (?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) # ?frs) a 
Some (?xp', ?hp', (?stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd'), ?pc') # ?frs'); 
inside «?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) # ?frs) 
(?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS) (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF) , ?pcF); 
?pcF < length (get_code ?CFS ?cnS (?mnS, ?pdS»; 
same_method_frs (?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS) , ?pcS) 
(?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) 
(?stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd'), ?pc') (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF) , ?pcF); 
outside «?stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd'), ?pc') # ?frs') 
(?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS) (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF) , ?pcF) I] 
a=> (?CFS, (?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS), (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF), ?pcF) , 
(?xp, ?hp, ?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc), 
(?xp', ?hp'. ?'stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd J ), ?pc J ), ?frs, ?frs') 
exec_blockO" : thm 
val exec_blockO.Continue = 
"[I exec (?CFS, ?xp, ?hp, (?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) # ?frs) ~ 
Some 
(?xp", ?hp", (?stk", ?loc", ?cn", (?mn", ?pd"), ?pc") # ?frs"); 
ins1de «?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) # ?frs) 
(?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS) (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF) , ?pcF); 
?pcF < length (get_code ?CFS ?cnS (?mnS, ?pdS»; 
same_method_frs (?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS) , ?pcS) 
(?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) 
(?stk", ?loc", ?cn", (?mn", ?pd"), ?pc") 
(?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF), ?pcF); 
(?CFS, (?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS), (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF), ?pcF) , 
(?xp", ?hp", ?'stk", ?loc", ?'cn", (?mn", ?pd"), ?pc"), 
(?xp', ?hp', ?stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd'), ?pc'), ?frs", ?frs') 
: exec_blockO I] 
_a> (?CFS, (?cnS, (?mnS, ?pdS), ?pcS), (?cnF, (?mnF, ?pdF) , ?pcF) , 
(?xp, ?hp, ?stk, ?loc, ?cn, (?mn, ?pd), ?pc) , 
(?xp', ?hp'. ?stk', ?loc', ?cn', (?mn', ?pd'), ?pc J ) J ?frs, 7frs') 
: exec_blockO" : thm 
Figure 3.14: Production rules for block execution relations 
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val exec_blockO.induct & 
• [I (1ya, (1xz, (1xy, 1xx), 1xv) , (1xv, (1xu, 1xt), 1xs), 
(1xr, 1xq, 1xp, 1xo, 1xn, (1xm, 1xl), 1xk), 
(1xj, 1xi, 1xh, 1xg, 1xf, (1xe, 1xd), 1xc), 1xb, 1xa) : exec_blockO; 
!!eFS cn cn' cnF cnS frs frs' hp hp' loc loc' mn mn' mnF mnS pc pc' pcF 
pcS pd pd' pdf pdS stk stk' xp xp'. 
[I exec (eFS, xp, hp, (stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) # frs) = 
Some (xp', hp', (stk', loc', cn', (mn', pd'), pc') # frs'); 
inside «stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) # frs) (cnS, (mnS, pdS), pcS) 
(cnF, (mnF, pdf), pcF); 
pcF < length (get_code eFS cnS (mnS, pdS»; 
same_method_frs (cnS, (mnS, pdS) , pcS) (stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) 
(stk', loc', cn', (mn', pd'), pc') (cnF, (mnF, pdF), pcF); 
outside «stk', loc', cn', (mn', pd'), pc') # frs') 
(cnS, (mnS, pdS), pcS) (cnF, (mnF, pdf), pcF) I] 
==> 1P CFS cnS mnS pdS pcS cnF mnF pdf pcF xp hp stk loc cn mn pd pc 
xp' hp' stk' loc' cn' mn' pd' pc' frs frs'; 
!!CFS cn cn' cn" cnF cnS frs frs' frs" hp hp' hp" loc loc' loc" mn 
mn' mn" mnF mnS pc pc' pc" pcF pcS pd pd' pd" pdF pdS stk stk' 
stk" xp xp' xp". 
[I exec (eFS, xp, hp, (stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) # frs) '" 
Some 
(xp' , I hp' J I (stk') , loc J J, cn J " (mn J " pd' , ), pc» J) • frs' , ) ; 
inside «stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) # frs) (cnS, (mnS, pdS), pcS) 
(cnF, (mnF, pdf), pcF); 
pcF < length (get_code eFS cnS (mnS, pdS»; 
same_method_frs (cnS, (mnS, pdS), pcS) (stk, loc, cn, (mn, pd), pc) 
(stk", loc", cn", (mn", pd"), pc") (cnF, (mnF, pdf), pcF); 
(CFS, (cnS, (mnS, pdS), pcS) , (cnF, (mnF, pdf), pcF), 
(xp", hpJ', stk", loc", cn", (mn", pd"), pc"), 
(xp', hp', stk', loc', cn', (mn', pd'), pc'), frs", frs') 
: exec_blockO; 
1P CFS cnS mnS pdS pcS cnF mnF pdf pcF xp" hp" stk" loc" cn" 
mn' , pd" pc" xp' hp' stk' loc' cn' am' pdt pc' frs" frs' I] 
="'> 1P CFS cnS mnS pdS pcS cnF mnF pdf pcF xp hp stk loc cn mn pd pc 
xp' hp' stk' loc' cn' mn' pd' pc' frs frs' I] 
==> 1P 1ya ?xz ?xy 1xx 1xv 1xv ?xu 1xt 1xs ?xr 1xq ?xp 1xo 1xn ?xm 1x1 ?xk 
1xj 1xi 1xh 1xg 1xf ?xe ?xd ?xc 1xb ?xa" : thin 
Figure 3.15: Induction theorem for expanded syntax block execution relation 
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In the following lemmas involving the sequence execution relation full states are 
abbreviated by a and minstates by T in the statement of the lemma, followed by 
expanded versions signified by 'where'. 
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Lemma 15 (Full state execution implies minstate execution) 
where 
\;/ CFS s I (To (TnTO Tn XS. exec(CFS,(To) = Some (Tn 1\ 
I isLa II CFSjndep xs 1\ 
lisLall nOLbranch xs 1\ 
XPo = None 1\ 
CFS[s . .. fl = xs 1\ 
pc( s) ::; pc(J) 1\ 
pc(J) < length (geLcode) CFS s) 
--+ execindep (xs, TO) = Some Tn 
(TO (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso) 
(Tn (XPn, hpn, (stkn, locn, cnn, mln, PCn) : frsn) 
TO = (XPo, stko, loco, (pco - pC(S))) 
Tn (XPn, stkn, locn, (pcn - pc(s))) 
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PROOF By case analysis of the instruction at (pc(s) - pc(s)), followed by simplifica-
tion with the definition of execindep (Definition 11) and the operational semantics 
of JVM execution. Note that this instruction is the instruction at pCo in the original 
code, and pco - pc(s) in the block xs, e.g. if pCo = pc(s), the instruction would 
be the first instruction in xs. • 
Lemma 16 (Minstate execution implies full state execution) 
\;/ CFS sf (To (TnTO Tn XS. execindep (XS, TO) = Some Tn 1\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs 1\ 
lisLall nOLbranch xs 1\ 
XPo = None 1\ 
CFS[s ... fl = xs 1\ 
pC( s) ::; pC(J) 1\ 
PC(J) < length (geLcode CFS s) --+ 
\;/ hp Irs. exec( CFS, (To) = Some (Tn 
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where 
ao = (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pees) + pco) : frso) 
an - (XPn, hpo, (stkn, locn, cno, mlo, pees) + PCn) : frsn) 
TO = (XPo, stko, loco, pCO) 
Tn = ( XPn, stkn, [OCn, pCn) 
PROOF By case analysis of the instruction at pees), followed by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition 11) and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution. _ 
Lemma 17 (Inlist implies inside) 
where 
\rI CFS sf ao anTO Tn XS. XS i= [] 1\ xs = CFS[s ... f] 1\ 
inlist xs pCO 1\ 
pe(J) < (length (geLcode CFS s)) 
----+ inside pc(ao) sf 
ao (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco + pees»~ : frso) 
TO - (XPo, stko, loco,pco) 
PROOF From the definitions of inlist (Definition 12), inside (Definition 1), and 
CFS[s ... f] (Definition 5). _ 
Lemma 18 (Inside implies inlist) 
where 
'if CFS sf ao anTO Tn XS. XS i= [] 1\ xs = CFS[s ... f] 1\ 
inside pe(ao) s f 1\ 
pe(J) < (length (geLcode CFS s») 
----+ inlist xs TO 
ao = (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso) 
To = (XPo,stko,loco,pco -pe(s» 
PROOF From the definitions of inlist (Definition 12) , inside (Definition 1), and 
CFS[s ... f] (Definition 5). _ 
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Lemma 19 (Outlist implies outside) 
where 
V CFS sf Uo UnTO Tn XS. XS =1= [1 /\ xs = CFS[s ... J] /\ 
outlist xs TO /\ 
PC(J) < (length (geLcode CFS s)) 
~ outside pc( U 0) s f 
Uo (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco + pc( s)) : frso) 
TO (XPo, stko, loco, pco) 
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PROOF From the definitions of outlist (Definition 13), outside (Definition 2), and 
CFS[s .. . fl (Definition 5). • 
Lemma 20 (Outside implies outlist ) 
V CFS sf Uo UnTO Tn XS. (CFS,uo) ~ Un ~ 
f 
where 
inside pc( U 0) s f /\ 
excep_free xs /\ 
CFS[s ... fl = xs /\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs /\ 
lisLall nOLbranch xs /\ 
pc(J) < (length (geLcode CFS s)) 1\ 
outside PC(<Tn) S f 
~ outlist xs Tn 
U 0 = (XPO, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mIo, pco) : frso) 
<Tn = (XPn, hpn, (stkn' locn, cnn, mIn, PCn) : frso} 
Tn = (XPn, stkn, locn,pcn - pC(S)) 
PROOF In addition to the definitions of outlist (Definition 13), outside (Definition 2), 
and CFS[s ... J] (Definition 5), we need the additional assumptions (CFS, uo) ~ 
f 
<Tn and I isLa II nOLbranch IS, which allow us to show that PC(<Tn) = pc(J) + 1. 
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This is necessary since all program counters are defined as natural numbers and, 
while IS may have instructions on the left as part of a larger list of instructions 
in a dassfile, we cannot refer to positions to the left of the head of the list IS in 
isolation. _ 
Lemma 21 (Block execution implies sequence execution ) 
V CFS sf ao anTO Tn I IS. (CFS,ao) ~ an ----+ 
I 
where 
CFS[s ... fl = IS A 
lisLall CFSjndep IS A 
lisLall not-branch IS A 
excep_free IS ----+ 
IS f- TO ~ Tn 
ao - (XPO, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo,pco) : frso) 
an (XPn, hpn, (stkn, locn, cnn, mLn, PCn) : frsn) 
TO = (XPo, stko, loco, (pco - pC(S))) 
Tn (XPn, stkn, locn, (pcn - pc(s))) 
PROOF Under the condition that the initial states in the block are data-equal and 
are pointing to the same instruction within the block of instructions, the proof 
proceeds by rule induction on the assumption 
(CFS,ao)~ a'. 
I 
Base 
The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the Stop rule for the block execution relation, giving us the 
assumption 
exec ( CFS, (To) = Some an A 
inside pc(ao) sf A 
same_method s (To (Tn f A 
PC(j) < length(get-code CFS s) A 
outside pc(an ) sf 
(3.21) 
from this assumption, the first production rule for the sequence execution relation 
Seq-Stop, and Lemmas 15, 18 and 20, we are able to show the desired conclusion. 
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Inductive step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the second production rule for the block execution relation 
(Continue), giving us 
exee( CFS, ao) = Some al f\ 
inside pe(ao) sf f\ 
same_method s ao aJ f f\ 
pe(J) < length(geLeode CFS s) f\ 
The inductive hypothesis is 
where 
CFS[s . . . fl = xs f\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs f\ 
lisLall nOLbraneh xs f\ 
excep_free xs ---+ 
xs f- Tl ~ Tn 
al - (XP1, hpJ, (stk ll locJ,cnJ,mlJ,pcd :frsJ) 
Tl (xPl,stkJ,locJ,(pcJ-pc(s))) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
Thus, from the rule Seq-Continue and Lemmas 15 and 18, we are able to show 
the desired conclusion. _ 
Lemma 22 (Sequence execution implies block execution) 
wedgeV CFS sf TO Tn X XS. 
xs f- TO ~ Tn ---+ 
CFS[s .. . fJ = xs f\ 
pe(!) < length(geLeode CFS S) f\ 
pe( s ) ::; pC(J) f\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs f\ 
lisLall nOLbraneh xs f\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr xs ---+ 
V hp frs. (CFS,ao) ~ an 
f 
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where 
ao - (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pc(s) + pco) : frso) 
an = (XPn, hpo, (stkn, [ocn, cno, mlo, pc(s) + PCn) : frso) 
TO (XPo,stko,loco,pc(S)) 
Tn (XPn, stkn, loen, PCn) 
PROOF By rule induction on the assumption xs I- TO ~ Tn. 
Base 
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The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the first production rule for the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Stop), giving us 
execindep (xs, TO) = Some Tn /\ 
xs;f[]/\ 
inlist pC( TO) /\ 
outlist pC( Tn) 
(3.24) 
Thus, from the Stop rule for the block execution relation, and Lemmas 16, 17 and 
19 we are able to show the desired conclusion. 
Inductive step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the second production rule for the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Continue), giving us the assumption 
execindep (xs, TO) = Some T1 /\ 
xs;f []/\ 
inlist pC( TO) /\ 
xs I- T1 ~ Tn 
The inductive hypothesis is 
CFS[s ... f] = xs /\ 
pC(J) < length(geLcode CFS S) /\ 
pC( s ) :s pC(J) /\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs /\ 
lisLall nOLbranch xs /\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr xs ~ 
V hp frs. (CFS,a1) ~ an 
f 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
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where 
:I hpofrso.al (XP1, hpo, (stkl,locl,cno,mlo,pc(S)+pcl):frso) 
:I hpo frso. an - (XPn, hpo, (stkm locn, cno, mio, pc(s) + PCn) : frso) 
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We instantiate hp and frs in 3.26 to hpo and frso (as in 0"0) and then, by the 
Continue rule for the sequence execution relation and Lemmas 16 and 17, we are 
able to show the desired conclusion. _ 
Theorem 3 (Block execution deterministic for data-equal states) 
V CFS CFS' sf s' J' ao an a~ a~ IS. 
where 
CFS[s .. ·fl = IS /\ CFS'[s' .. ·J'l = IS 
list-all CFSjndep IS /\ 
list-all not-branch IS /\ 
excep_free IS /\ 
pco - pc(s) = pc~ - pc(s') /\ 
(CFS,ao) ~ an /\ 
f 
(CFS', a~) ~ a~ /\ 
f' 
rv , 
ao = ao 
~ an ~ a~ 
0"0 (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mIo,pco) : frso) 
an (XPn, hpn, (stkn, locn, cnn, mIn, PCn) : frsn) 
a~ - (xp~, hp~, (stk~, loc~, cn~, ml~, pc~) : frs~) 
O"~ (xp~, hp~, (stk~, loc~, cn~, ml~, pc~) : frs~) 
PROOF From Lemma 21, 
where 
TO - (XPo, stko, loco, (pco - pC(S») 
Tn (XPn,stkn, locn, (pCn - pC(S») 
(3.27) 
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and 
where 
(CFS' (T') ~ 
,0 f' 
, (Tn --+ XS 
, 
TO 
T' 
n 
(xp~, stk~, loc~, (pC~ - pC(S'»)) 
(xp~, stk~, loc~, (pC~ - pC( S'») 
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(3.28) 
By the fact that the states (To and (Tb are data-equal (Definition 10) we now have 
from (3.27) and (3.28) 
, 
TO = TO 
This gives us 
xs I- TO ~ Tn 1\ XS I- TO ~ < 
and so by Theorem 2 
which, from the definition of data-equal (10), gives llS 
as required. 
Lemma 23 (Extend CFS independent execution to the right) 
where 
'if xs ys TO Tn. execindep (xs, TO) = Some Tn 1\ 
inlist xs TO 1\ xs =I- [1 
--+ execindep (xs@ys, TO) = Tn 
TO = (XPo,stko,loco,pco) 
Tn (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
-
PROOF By case analysis of the instruction at pco, followed by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition 11) and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution. _ 
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Lemma 24 (Extend CFS independent execution to the left ) 
Vxs ys TO Tn· execindep (ys, TO) = Some Tn /\ 
where 
nOLbraneh YS!pCO /\ 
inlist xs TO /\ xs =I [1 /\ ys =1= [1 
~ execindep (xs@ys, TO) = Some Tn 
TO = (XPO, stko, loco, pco + IXS\) 
Tn = (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn + Ixs\) 
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PROOF By case analysis of the instruction at peo, followed by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition 11) and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution. _ 
Lemma 25 (Extend instance of sequence execution relation to left ) 
xs r (XPo, stko, loco, pco) ~ (xPn, stkn, Zocn, PCn) ~ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs ~ 
lisLall nOLbraneh xs ~ 
ys@xs r (xpo, stko, loco, pco + Iys\) ~ (xPn, stkn, locn, PCn + lysl) 
PROOF By rule induction on the sequence execution relation and by the construc-
tion rules for the sequence execution relation (Seq-Stop, Seq-Continue), and 
Lemma 24. _ 
Lemma 26 (Combine two instances of sequence execution relation ) 
xs r (XPo, stko, loco, pea) ~ (XP1, stkl , Zoel, pel) ~ 
xs =1= [1 ~ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs ~ 
lisLall nOLbraneh xs ~ 
ys r (XP1, stkl , loel, 0) ~ (xPn, stkn, loen, PCn) ~ 
xs@ys r (XPo, stko, loco, pea) ~ (XPn, stkn, loen, pen + Iysl) 
PROOF By rule induction on the sequence execution relation, and by the construc-
tion rules for the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Stop, Seq-Continue) and Lemma 25, using the fact that since none of the 
instructions in xs are branching instructions, pc! = Iysl. This means that in execu-
tion of the sequence xs@ys, execution of xs finishes and leaves the program counter 
pointing to the first instruction in ys. _ 
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3.6 Conclusions 
Having extended the instruction set formalized by Pusch to include arithmetic in-
structions, and modified the model of branching instructions to facilitate proofs of 
concrete values, we now have sufficient relations describing execut.ion t.o develop a 
programming logic for bytecode described in the next chapter. It has been demon-
strated that while a simple execution relation defined by entry and exit from a block 
of code is enough to base much of our programming logic on, it does have several 
limiting features. 
Firstly, it does not allow us to reason about intermediate states in the execution of 
a block. Often in the proofs outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 we wish to say something 
about the final state in the execution of a block. As the value of this state will 
usually depend on the result of execution of some state between the initial and 
final states, the execution path relation becomes necessary. Additionally, the idea 
of deterministic execution of instructions is complicated by the fact that bytecodes 
are seen not as separate entities, but as part of a classfile. Either we could define a 
concept of determinism that includes the context of the instruction, or as we have 
done here retain the accepted definition of determinism, but with a restricted class 
of instructions, a.s in the sequence execution relation. 
These considerations, and others that will be addressed in the coming chapters, raise 
the question once more as to whether it is really desirable to reason about code at 
this level. This is open to debate, but the fact remains that as the current situation 
for both Java and new platforms such as Microsoft's .NET [31] is based on a stack 
machine model running bytecode or similar, considering these questions and finding 
solutions is of definit.e value. 
Chapter 4 
A Bytecode Programming Logic 
Having defined execution relations for byt.ecode programs, we now define a pre- and 
post-condition relation for the execution of such programs. Traditionally, such a 
relat.ion is defined in terms of t.he various syntact.ic patterns of t.he programming 
language in question. As bytecode programs are fiat, no such patterns are explicit. 
in the code and we must therefore determine what constitutes, for example, a loop 
or a conditional statement. 
It is at this point that we must address again the question raised in Section 3.3: 
what do we mean by the execution of a sequence of bytecode? None of the relations 
discussed so far place any particular restraints on the position of the program counter 
of the initial state within the block. But, while one could potentially begin execution 
of a sequence of instructions at any of a number of points in the sequence, the final 
state would be dependent on which instructions in the sequence had actually been 
executed. 
For example, execution of the instructions 
bipush 5 
bipush 4 
iadd 
bipush 2 
could lead to a type-safe execution beginning at either the first instruction, or at 
the last. In the first case, the value of the stack in the final state would be 2 :: 
9 :: iniLstk, in the second it would be 2 :: iniLstk. Consequently the weakest 
precondition with respect to a particular condition for any list of instructions will 
be entirely dependent on which of these instructions are actually executed. 
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Clearly then, a meaningful weakest precondition definition for bytccode must iden-
tify the initial position of the program counter, and it seems reasonable to decide 
that execution should start at the first instruction in t.he list. This problem does 
not arise in standard programming logics as one cannot start execution midway 
through a command in the language. Even in commands built up inductively from 
other commands, it is implicit that execution starts at the beginning of the topmost 
command, and not at one of the inner subcommands. 
4.1 A Pre- and Post-Condition Relation 
for Execution of Bytecode 
We write {P} xs {Q} to mean that for all classfiles CFS containing the instruction 
sequence xs bounded by the instructions identified by sand f, if the condition P 
holds in state ao and (CFS, ao) ~ an, then condition Q holds in state an. The 
f 
definition is given by cases on whether or not xs is empty. 
Definition 16 (Pre-/Post-condition relation for bytecode) 
{P}x:xs{Q}= 'V CFS ao an sf. [(CFS,ao) ~ an 1\ 
f 
CFS[s ... f] = x:xs 1\ pc(ao) = pc(s) 1\ 
P(ao)] ---+ Q(an ) 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Note that logical operations are defined pointwise, i.e. the assertion {P 1\ S} 
applied to state a is taken to mean P a 1\ Sa. 
4.2 Rules 
We present a collection of derived rules for simple bytecode patterns. Proofs for 
loops and conditional statements will be dealt with later in this chapter and in 
Chapter 5. 
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Lemma 27 (Precondition strengthening) 
(''l/ao. P ao ---+ R ao) 1\ {R} xs {Q} ::=} {P} xs {Q} 
PROOF From Definition 16 and induction on the list of instructions xs. _ 
Lemma 28 (Postcondition weakening) 
(\;fao. R ao ---+ Q ao) 1\ {P} xs {R} ::=} {P} xs {Q} 
PROOF From Definition 16 and induction on the list of instructions xs. _ 
We now define a block of instructions, execution of which always results in the 
program counter pointing to the instruction following that block. This describes the 
idea of sequential execution of blocks of instructions, e.g., x immediately followed 
by ys. 
Definition 17 (Simple Block) 
simple xs = \;fCFS ao an sf· xs = CFS[s ... f] 1\ inside ao sf 1\ 
exec( CFS, ao) = Some an ---+ 
inside an sf V pc(an ) = pc(J) + 1 
Note that a simple block may contain an internal loop provided this does not prevent 
the block meeting the requirements of the simple definition. 
Lemma 29 (Splitting a slice of instructions) 
\;f a b xs ys zs. xs =1= [] 1\ ys =1= [] 1\ a < b 1\ 
b < Izsl 1\ xs@ys = slice a b zs ---+ 
xs = slice a ((a + Ixs!) - 1) zs 1\ 
ys = slice (a + Ixs!) b zs 
PROOF From definition of slice (Definition 6) and standard lemmas for take and 
drop in the Isabelle distribution. _ 
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Lemma 30 (Existence of two simple blocks) 
where 
\;fCFS ao al an sf. (CFS, ao) -1 an 
1\ CFS [s ... fl = xs@ys 1\ 
simple xs 1\ simple ys ---t 
3al.(CFS,ao} ~ al 1\ (CFS,al) ~ an 
y f 
m = s{pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl- I} 
n = s{pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl} 
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PROOF From Lemma 9 we show the existence of an instance of the execution path 
relation corresponding to the relation (CFS, ao) ~ an. We then carry out in-
f 
duction on this relation using one of the standard Isabelle induction theorems con-
verse_trancUnduct, which 'unrolls' the transitive closure relation from the start. 
This in conjunction with the definition of simple (Definition 17), gives us 
3 al. (CFS, ao) ==*+ al 1\ (CFS, (1) ==*+ an 
y f 
1\ pc(a1) = pc(s) + Ixsl 
Similar treatment of the second conjunct in 4.3 then gives us 
and from 4.3, 4.4 and Lemma 10 we have the desired result. 
Theorem 4 (Sequencing Rule) 
{P} xs {R} 
{R} ys {Q} 
simple xs 
simple ys 
{P} xs@ys {Q} 
PROOF This follows from Definition 16 and Lemmas 29 and 30. 
(4.3) 
( 4.4) 
• 
• 
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We now describe the lemmas necessary for the proof of a rule for unconditional 
branches forwards. 
Lemma 31 (Narrowing of block containing a simple block) 
where 
V (To (Tn CFS sf. (CFS,(To) ~ (Tn /\ 
f 
CFS[s ... J] = xs@ys /\ 
xs =1= [] /\ ys =1= [] /\ 
simple ys /\ 
pe((To) = pees) + Ixsl + 1 
~ (CFS,(To) ~ (Tn 
f 
y = s{pe:= pees) + Ixsl + I} 
PROOF This follows from the fact that the instructions ys make up a simple block 
(Definition 17), the execution of which can only result in a state where the program 
counter is pointing inside the block or at the instruction immediately to the right 
of it. Under these circumstances, once execution reaches the beginning of ys (or if 
it begins there) the instructions in xs will not be executed again within this block. 
By induction on the block execution relation followed by use of its construction 
rules, we are able to demonstrate the existence of the smaller block as the program 
counter will always be inside this smaller block during execution. _ 
Lemma 32 (Elimination of unconditional branch forward) 
V (To (Tn CFS sf· (CFS, (To) ~ (Tn /\ 
f 
CFS[s ... f] = [Goto_fwd (jxsl+l)]@xs@ys /\ 
xs i= [] /\ ys =1= []/\ 
simple xs /\ simple ys ~ 
3 (Tl. (CFS, (To) ~ (Tl /\ (CFS, (Tl) ~ (Tn 
s f 
where 
y = s {pc := pe( s) + I} 
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PROOF By induction on the block execution relation, and the operational semantics 
of the JVM, we are able to show that 
:3 0"1· exec( CFS, 0"0) = Some 0"1 " 
PC(0"1) = pc(s) + Ixsl + 1 " (4.5) 
(CFS'O"l)~ O"n 
f 
Then by Lemma 31, we can show that this implies the existence of a smaller instance 
of the block execution relation involving 0"1 and O"n. 
Note that as xs and ys are simple, execution will never return to the unconditional 
branch forward instruction from the block xs@ys. • 
Theorem 5 (Unconditional branch forward rule) 
{P} [Goto_fwd Ixsl + 1] {R} 
{R}ys{Q} 
xs =J [I 
ys =J [I 
excep_free [Goto_fwd Ixsl + l]@(xs@ys) 
simple xs 
simple ys 
{P} [Goto_fwd Ixsl + l]@(xs@ys) {Q} 
PROOF This follows from Definition 16 and Lemmas 32 and 31. 
4.3 A Rule for Loops in Bytecode 
Unlike the simple imperative language used in the standard Hoare logic which con-
tains the while command, there are no explicit loop constructs in bytecode pro-
grams. In order to develop rules for programs containing loops it is therefore nec-
essary to identify the patterns of bytecode instructions that are used to code them. 
Of course, Java programs may contain loops other than while loops-- namely for 
loops and repeat-until loops. For the purposes of this work, however, we shall 
restrict our attention to while loops. 
Consider the following very simple Java program that repeatedly increments a vari-
able i 
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public class SimpleWhile { 
public static void main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while (i<5) 
{ i++; } 
the corresponding bytecode for this program is 
o bipush 0 
1 istore_l 
2 goto 8 
5 iine 1 1 
8 iload_1 
9 ieonst_5 
10 iCicmplt 5 
13 return 
where the instructions 
o bipush 0 
1 istore_l 
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initialize the variable i to 0, by pushing the constant value 0 onto the stack and then 
storing it in variable location 1. The return instruction simply returns at the end 
of the method, and so the loop itself consists of the instructions 
2 goto 8 
5 iine 1 1 
8 iload_1 
9 iconst_5 
10 if _icmplt 5 
where 
5 iinc 1 1 
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is the body of the loop, incrementing the value in variable location 1, that is, i. The 
instructions 
8 iload_1 
9 iconst_5 
load the value of i and the constant value 5 on to the stack, ready for the actual 
branching instruction 
10 iCicmplt 5 
Here, if the second value on the stack is less than 5, the program counter is set to 
the instruction labelled 5 ready to execute the body of the loop again, otherwise the 
loop exits. The instruction 
2 goto 8 
is only executed once---~at the beginning of the loop- and ensures that the guard 
condition is tested before the body is executed, thereby making this a while loop 
rather than a repeat-until loop. 
A diagram showing the outline of this loop can be seen in Figure 4.1, where xs 
represents the instructions making up the body of the loop, and ys the instructions 
used to prepare the stack for the conditional branch. A general representation of 
such a loop may now be written 
[(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] (4.6) 
where UBF Ixsl + 1 is the unconditional branch forward instruction to the head of 
ys· a jump of one more than the length of xs, and CBB Ixs@ysl is the conditional 
branch backwards to the start of xs- a jump of the length of xs@ys. 
While other possible loop forms exist . one is shown in Figure 4.2 we shall discuss 
only the type described above in this work. Treatment of the alternative forms 
would, however, be similar. 
The notation UBF n, UBB n, CBF nand CBB n for branching instructions is an 
abbreviation used for clarity of reading. As detailed in Chapter 3, there are a number 
of branching instructions: 
cond_branch-fwd - IfnulLfwd nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_fwd ins_type nat 
IlficmplLfwd nat 
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Figure 4.1: Loop structure 
IfnulLbwd nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_bwd ins_type nat 
I IficmplLbwd nat 
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In the case of a rule involving conditional branch instructions, such as the loop 
rule and the conditional branch forwards rule discussed in Section 4.5.2, it would be 
necessary to prove the rule for all three cases of the conditional branching instruction 
in question in order to obtain a general loop rule. 
Due to the prohibitive size and complexity of such proofs (an issue discussed in 
some detail in Sections 6.2 and 7.1), while the loop rule and conditional branch 
forwards rule are stated generally, only the case relating to the Ificmplt variety has 
been proved. This refers to a branch taken if the value at the top of the stack is less 
than the value immediately below it on the stack. Proofs involving the other two 
conditions would be practically identical. 
The while rule in the standard Hoare logic is 
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Figure 4.2: Loop structure 
{P 1\ S} C {P} 
{P} while S do C {P 1\ oS} 
where P is an invariant of the loop and S is the loop guard. In a similar rule for 
the bytecode representation of a while loop it seems obvious that xs in Figure 4.1 
corresponds to C (the body of the loop), and that the invariant P does not depend 
on the language we are dealing with. This leaves the question of what constitutes 
S, the loop guard, in the bytecode. 
The loop guard is not explicit in the bytecode, as it is in the higher level language. 
But if we consider what role the loop guard plays in the imperative language, it 
becomes clearer. Evaluation of the loop guard determines whether or not the body 
of the loop will be executed for each iteration of the loop. In the bytecode, evaluation 
of the conditional branch determines whether or not the body of the loop is executed 
for a particular iteration. So this must mean that S is the condition branch_cond 
tested by the conditional branch, and our proposed rule looks something like this 
{P !\ branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[UBF Ixsl + lJ@[xsJ@[ysJ@[CBB Ixs@ysll 
{P !\ -,branch_cond} 
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before after 
hd(t1 stk) hd(t1 stk) 
< hd(stk) < hd(stk) 
= True execute = 1 branch if 
EE hd(tl stk) < hd(stk) 
Figure 4.3: State of stack before and after conditional branch 
But this is not quite accurate. The conditional branch instructions test certain 
properties of the value or values at the top of the stack, e.g. 'Jump if the value at 
top of the stack is equal to Null', or 'Jump if the value at the top of the stack is 
not equal to zero'. A side effect of the comparison is to pop the values involved in 
this comparison off the stack, with the result that any predicate involving the top 
of the stack is meaningful zmmediately before execution of the branch instruction. 
An example of this is shown in Figure 4.3 where the branching condition is 'branch 
if the second value on the stack is less than the top value'. Immediately prior to 
execution of the branch instruction this condition can be evaluated, but when the 
branching instruction has been executed the relevant values are no longer on the 
stack and the statement is no longer sensible. In fact, in the case where popping 
the values empties the stack, it is undefined. 
So a rule stating that a branch condition involving values on the stack holds any-
where other than just before the branch is executed is incorrect. This means that 
our rule is incorrect, as we require the branch condition to be true at the beginning 
of execution of the body, X8, and to be false at the end of the loop, immediately 
after execution of the branching instruction. 
The solution to this particular problem is to 'wind back' the conditional being tested 
until we have a condition in terms of actual variables and values rather than items 
on the stack. We are, in effect, reconstructing the original guard condition present 
in the Java source code which is concealed in the bytecode instructions. If we look at 
the bytecode for the loop we can see that the sequence of instructions ys is executed 
prior to the conditional branch every time through the loop. These instructions 'set 
up' the stack so that the correct values are available for the comparison. By taking 
the weakest preconditzon of these instructions and the condition of the branch we 
are able to determine the actual guard S. Our loop rule is therefore as follows: 
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{P 1\ wp ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[(UBF Ixsl + l)j@[xsj@[ysj@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)j 
{P 1\ ...,wp ys branch_cond} 
4.4 Weakest Precondition 
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The weakest precondition· actually called the weakest liberal precondition in cases 
of partial correctness - is the least condition necessary to hold at the start of execu-
tion of a command that will guarantee that a particular condition holds at the end 
of execution (assuming termination): 
Our definition of weakest precondition for bytecode programs is: 
Definition 18 (Weakest precondition for bytecode) 
wp xs Q == (A Uo· V Un· (uo, Un) E {(Uo, U n ).( CFS, uo) 7 Un 1\ 
pc(uo) = pc(s) 1\ 
CFS[s ... fl = xs -- Q u'}) 
Using this, the two defining properties of the weakest precondition can be proved, 
namely: 
Lemma 33 (Weakest precondition is a precondition) 
xs t= [l ===> {wp xs Q} xs {Q} 
PROOF From the definition of weakest precondition for bytecode (Definition 18) .• 
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Lemma 34 (Weakest precondition is the weakest possible precondition) 
vP. {P} xs {Q} ---+ 'lao. P ao:) (wp xs Q) aD 
PROOF From the definition of weakest precondition for bytecode (Definition 18) .• 
Several other useful properties may also be shown: 
Lemma 35 (Postcondition false implies weakest precondition false ) 
'lao an· (CFS,ao) ~ an 1\ xs = CFS[s ... fl 1\ -,Q Un 
f 
---+ -,( wp xs Q) aD 
PROOF Suppose it is possible to execute xs starting in state ao and finishing in 
state an, where the condition Q is false in an. Then the weakest precondition did 
not hold in ao. This is, of course, the contrapositive of Lemma 34. • 
4.4.1 Calculating the Weakest Precondition 
As is the case with conventional Hoare logics, to calculate the value of the weakest 
precondition for a sequence of instructions we start with the desired postcondition 
and work backwards. In this way we can determine what condition must have held 
before an instruction is executed in order to ensure the postcondition holds after 
execution. This condition is in fact the weakest precondition of that instruction 
with respect to the postcondition. This operation is carried out incrementally over 
each instruction in the list. 
To illustrate this, we might calculate the weakest precondition with respect to the 
branching condition of part of our example loop program in Section 4.3: 
public class SimpleWhile { 
public static void main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while (i<5) 
{ i++; } 
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with corresponding bytecode 
o bipush 0 
1 istore 1 
2 goto 8 
5 iine 1 1 
8 Hoad 1 
9 bipush 5 
10 iCiemplt 5 
13 return 
We wish to calculate the weakest precondition of the instructions 
8 Hoad 1 
9 bipush 5 
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with respect to the branch condition, which is 'is the second value on the stack less 
than the value at the top of the stack?', i.e. 
hd (tl stk) < hd stk 
the calculation of which, using the hoisting technique, is as follows. Taking the 
desired postcondition 
hd (tl stk) < hd stk 
we calculate the weakest precondition with respect to the second instruction in our 
list 
bipush 5 
which pushes the value 5 onto the stack, giving us the condition 
hd (tl (5 : stk)) < hd (5 : stk) 
we now calculate the weakest precondition with respect to this new postcondition 
of the first instruction in the list 
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Hoad 1 
which pushes the value stored in local variable 1 onto the stack, resulting in the 
condition 
hd (tl (5 : (LvI: stk») < hd(5 : (lvi : stk» 
When simplified, the weakest precondition is therefore 
LvI < 5 
As the value of i is stored in local variable 1, as can be seen from the initialisation 
instructions at the start of the program 
o bipush 0 
1 istore 1 
the weakest precondition is i < 5: the loop guard of the original Java program. 
In order to carry out this operation we need to know the weakest precondition of 
any individual instruction. Below we give proofs of two instructions: Bipush i is 
a classfile independent instruction that pushes the integer value i onto the stack, 
ins_type IAastore i is a classfile dependent instruction that stores the value i in an 
array. 
Definition 19 (Non-terminating state) 
noLterm-state = >. (xp, hp ,Irs). xp = None 1\ frs =1= [1 
Definition 20 (Insert load and store arguments) 
putLASargs = >.(xp,hp,frs) (stk',loe',pc').let (stk,loe,en,ml,pc) 
hd frs in (xp, hp, (stk', loe', en, ml, pc') : (ti frs» 
Definition 21 (Extract first load and store argument) 
getlASargl = >.(xp,hp,frs).let (stk,loe,en,ml,pe) = hdfrs in stk 
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Definition 22 (Extract second load and store argument) 
getLASarg2 = A(xp,hp,frs).let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) = hdfrs in lac 
Definition 23 (Extract third load and store argument) 
getLASarg3 = A(xp, hp,frs). let (stk, lac, en, ml, pc) = hd frs in pc 
Lemma 36 (Block execution of Bipush implies exec~as Bipush) 
VCFS s ao an i. CFS! s = (Bipush i) 1\ xp(ao) = None 1\ 
(CFS,ao) ~ an ~ 
s 
an = (putLASargs ao (execJas (Bipush i) 
(getLASargl a 0) (getLASarg2 a 0) (getLASarg3 a 0») 
PROOF By Lemma 8 and the operational semantics of the JVM. 
Lemma 37 (exec_las Bipush implies block execution of Bipush ) 
VCFS s ao an i. CFS! s = (Bipush i) 1\ xp (ao) = None 1\ 
pc (s) < length (geLcode CFS s) 1\ 
an = (putLASargs ao (execJas (Bipush i) 
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-
(getLASargl ao) (getLASarg2 ao) (getLASarg30"0))) 
~ (CFS,ao) ~ an 
s 
PROOF By the rules for construction of the block execution relation and the oper-
ational semantics of the JVM. _ 
Lemma 38 (Existence of set of classfiles containing Bipush) 
:I CFS. CFS[s ... s] = [Bipush i] 
PROOF We show that such a set of classfiles exists by constructing an instance of 
Pusch's formalisation of a classfile, substituting this for the existentially quantified 
variable, and simplifying with Isabelle's automatic tactics. _ 
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Lemma 39 (Weakest precondition of bipush instruction ) 
wp [Bipush i] Q = (.A (fo. (noLterm_state (fo) ~ 
Q (putLASargs (Jo (execJas (Bipush i) 
(getLASargl (J 0) (getLASarg2 (J 0) (getLASarg3 (J 0» » 
PROOF In order to prove equality, we prove implication in both directions. This 
involves Lemmas 36 and 37. • 
Definition 24 (Insert manipulate array arguments) 
putMAargs = .A(xp, hp,frs) (stk', loe', pc'). let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = 
hd frs in (xp, hp, (stk', loe', en, ml, pc') : (ti frs» 
Definition 25 (Extract first manipulate array argument) 
getMAargl = .A(xp, hp,frs). hp 
Definition 26 (Extract second manipulate array argument) 
getMAarg2 = .A(xp,hp,frs).let (stk,loc,en,ml,pc) = hdfrs in stk 
Definition 27 (Extract third manipulate array argument) 
getMAarg3 = .A(xp, hp,frs). let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd frs in pc 
Lemma 40 (Weakest precondition of IAastore ) 
excep_free [ (ins _type IAastore i)] ==} 
wp [( ins_type IAastore i)] = 
(.A (fo. V CFS. (noLterm..state (fo) ~ CFS! (Jo = IAastore 
~ Q (putMAargs (Jo (execma (ins_type IAastore i) CFS 
(getMAargl (f 0) (getMAarg2 (J 0) (getLASarg3 (f 0»» 
PROOF Similar to Lemma 39. • 
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We now return to the original aim of this section: a method of calculating the weakest 
precondition of a sequence of instructions. The technique described at the beginning 
of this section is based on the equality: wp (x: xs) (assert Q) = (wp [xl (wp xs (assert Q))). 
To prove this we rely on the assumption .. correct in the case of most standard high 
level languages~ that execution proceeds in a linear manner, moving through the 
code from left to right one command at a time. In the case of bytecode instructions 
this may not be the case, and so we must attach another predicate, linear, to instruc-
tion sequences the weakest precondition of which we wish to be able to calculate. 
This is defined as 
Definition 28 (Linear code) 
linear xs == lisLall not_branch xs 1\ lisLall CFSjndependent xs (4.7) 
It is necessary that all the instructions are classfile independent and non-branching. 
This is due to the fact that the proof hinges on the idea of the deterministic execution 
of a list of instructions. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, in order to obtain proofs 
involving the standard idea of determinism (i.e. for a list of instructions independent 
of context) we must restrict the instructions involved to those which are classfile 
independent. 
The function (assert) provides a way of applying a predicate that is concerned solely 
with the operand stack, stk, and local variables, loc, of a method frame to a complete 
state consisting of an exception option, heap, and frame stack. This is necessary as 
we want to restrict the discussion to data-equal states, and our present definition of 
data-equality involves only the stack and local variables. 
Definition 29 (Assert) 
assert Q == (>.(xp, hp,frs). (let (stk, loc, en, ml, pc) 
Q(stk, loc») 
Lemma 41 (Decompose block) 
VCFS (10 (1n S f m x xs. (CFS, (10) ~ (1n 1\ 
f 
CFS [s ... f] = x:xs 1\ 
linear (x:xs) 1\ 
pC«(1o) = pc(s) ~ 
(hd frs) in 
~(11.( CFS, (10) ~ (11 1\ (CFS, (11) ~ (1n 
s f 
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where 
y = s{pc:= pc(s)+l} 
PROOF This follows by case analysis of block execution relation. \Ve know from the 
definition of linear that the instruction at pC(O"o) is not a branching instruction. This 
means that execution of the instruction will result in a state whose program counter 
is equal to pc( s) + 1. As none of the other instructions in the block are branches, 
execution of the instructions from pc( s) + 1 to pc(J) will continue without returning 
to the instruction at pc( s). Hence, by application of the rules for the block execution 
relation we can show the existence of the two blocks as required. _ 
As we wish to prove that assert Q holds in the state resulting from execution of the 
instructions x : XS, we must show that the execution of x in one classfile, followed 
by xs from another classfile is equivalent in effect to executing x: xs from a single 
classfile. 
Lemma 42 (Two adjoining block executions imply a sequence ) 
VCFS 0"0 0"1 O"n S I m x XS. lisLall nOLbranch (X:XS) 1\ 
lisLall CFSjndependent (X: XS) 1\ 
excep_free (X: XS) 1\ 
where 
0"0 -
0"1 -
(Tn -
TO 
Tn -
(XPO, hpo, 
(Xp1, hpo, 
(CFS, 0"0) ~ 0"1 1\ CFS [S .. . /1 = [xl 1\ (4.8) 
f 
(CFS', 0"1) ~ O"n 1\ CFS' [S' ... !'l = xs 
I' 
~ TO Tn. (X:XS) f-- TO ~ Tn 
( stko, loco, cno, mIo, pco) : Irso) 
(Stkl' lOCI, cno, mio, PCJ) : Irso) 
(XPn, hpo, (stkn, locn, cno, mio, pen) : Irso) 
(XPo, stko, loco,pco - pC(S» 
(XPn, stkn, locn,pcn - pC(S» 
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PROOF We show that the two instances of the block execution relation for x and xs 
and 0"0 and O"n admit an instance of the sequence execution relation involving x: xs 
and the corresponding minstates rand r. This follows from Lemma 21 and Lemma 
26, together with the fact that there exists a classfile containing the sequence x: xs 
(proof similar to that of Lemma 38). • 
Lemma 43 (Weakest precondition of a list of instructions) 
xs=/: [] 
excep_free [x] /\ 
I isLa II noLbra nch (x: xs) /\ 
lisLal1 CFSjndependent (x: xs) /\ 
excep_free (x: xs) /\ 
==> wp (x: xs) (assert Q) - (wp [x] (wp xs (assert Q») 
PROOF Once again, we show equality by proving the implication in each direction. 
After rewriting with the definition of weakest precondition (Definition 18), the right-
t<>-left version of the equality can be proved using Lemma 42, followed by Lemma 
22 to show that the existence of this instance of the sequence execution relation 
implies the existence of an equivalent instance of the block execution relation. The 
left-t<>-right part of the equality can be shown using Lemma 41. • 
4.5 Data-equality and Loops 
One major difference between the execution of a while loop in an imperative language 
and a loop sequence in the bytecode is the effect of executing the 'structure' of the 
loop. As discussed in Section 9 a general pattern for loops in bytecode is 
[(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] (4.9) 
where the instructions xs represent the loop body, and the instructions (UBF Ixsl + 1), 
ys, and (CBB Ixs@ysl) constitute the structual parts of the loop. 
In an imperative language, the rules for execution state that executing a while 
statement in an initial state in which the loop guard is false results in an unchanged 
state. In the bytecode, execution of a loop sequence in which the guard is false in the 
initial state results in a different state, as evaluating the sequences which constitute 
the structure of the loop means the value of the program counter will have changed. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: States before and after evaluation of guard to false 
Figure 4.5: States before and after evaluation of guard to true 
Similarly, with the situation where the body of the loop is executed, if a while 
statement is executed in state 0'0 in which the loop guard is true, we can talk of 
executing the body of the loop in the same state--evaluation of the loop guard does 
not affect the state. Again, this is not the case in the bytecode sequence. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
At first glance, this may seem likely to add to the complexity of a proof of the 
bytecode rule. But closer inspection of the effect of executing the structure of a 
bytecode loop sequence, shows that the only element of the state affected (assuming 
the instructions concerned satisfy certain constraints) is the program counter. This 
means that once again we can use the idea of data-equality, discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. As the branch condition does not mention the program counter, and 
assuming that the loop invariant does not either, data-equal states in the bytecode 
execution can take the place of equal states in the source code execution. 
4.5.1 Data-equality and the Weakest Precondition 
Returning to our postulated While Rule 
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Figure 4.6: States for which weakest precondition must evaluate to true or false 
{P 1\ wp ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\ -,wp ys branch_cond} 
we see that we need wp ys branch_cond to be false in state an, one step after the 
execution of ys is complete. But wp is a relation which deals specifically with the 
state aD immediately prior to execution of ys. In fact, even if the two states in 
question are data-equal ---as they will be in a well-formed loop------it is not the case 
that 
wp ys branch_cond 0"0 ----+ wp ys branch_cond O"n (4.10) 
This is because the definition of wp depends on the block execution relation which 
is expressed in terms of the position of the program counter in a state relative 
to the class file. Unlike higher level languages, a state is inextricably bound to 
the instruction indicated by its program counter. This means that despite every 
other element of the two states ao and an being equal, wp ys branch_cond does not 
hold in an as its program counter value is outside the block containing ys. The 
position of states 0"0 and O"n with respect to ys is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Equally, 
wp ys branch_cond will not hold in the state in which execution of the loop begins, 
because its program counter will be pointing to the unconditional branch instruction. 
The above definition of weakest precondition for bytecode is clearly not suitable for 
the purposes of our While Rule, and we must modify it to remove the dependence 
on the position of the program counter. One solution is to define the weakest 
precondition in terms of the sequence execution relation (Section 3.5.3) rather than 
the block execution relation. This effectively transforms the definition into that of 
the conventional definition of weakest precondition, where only the 'non-positional' 
parts of a state are relevant. We define the sequence weakest precondition as: 
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Definition 30 (Sequence weakest precondition) 
sequence_wp IS Q == >. ao. \;I Tn. noLtermstate aO /\ 
IS f- TO '""vI- Tn --+ (assert Q O"n) 
where 
0"0 {XPo, hpo, {( stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO (XPO, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
an = (XPn, hpo, «stkn, loen, cnO, m1o, PCO + PCn) : frso)) 
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This new definition does not replace our previous definition (Definition 18) since the 
sequence weakest precondition can only be used to reason about classfile independent 
instructions (from the definition of the sequence execution relation, 3.5.3). In order 
to reason about programs including non-classfile independent instructions we will 
need the original definition. However, since the instructions contained in a well-
formed while loop are assumed to be classfile independent, we are able to use the 
sequence weakest precondition. 
Once again, the two defining properties of the weakest precondition were proved for 
sequence weakest precondition: 
Lemma 44 (swp is a precondition ) 
IS =f:. [1 /\ lisLall nOLbranch IS /\ 
lisLall CFSjndependent IS /\ 
excep_free IS 
===} {sequence_wp IS Q} IS {assert Q} 
PROOF From the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) and 
Lemma 21. • 
Lemma 45 (swp is the weakest possible precondition) 
CFS[s ... J] = IS /\ pc(f) < length{geLcode CFS s) /\ 
pc( s) :S pc(f) /\ IS =f:. [1 /\ lisLall not_branch IS /\ 
lisLall CFSjndependent IS /\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr IS /\ 
{assert P} IS {assert Q} 
===} \;lao. (assert P ao) --+ (sequence_wp IS Q) 
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PROOF From the definition of sequence weakest. precondition (Definition 30) and 
Lemma 22. As the pre- and post-condition relation (Definition 16) is defined in 
terms of the block execution relation, it is necessary to include more information in 
the assumptions of the theorems involving both the pre- and post-condition relation 
and sequence_wp than in those concerned only with only sequence_wp. 
As for the block execution definition of weakest precondition, the following lemmas 
were proved for the sequence weakest precondition: 
Lemma 46 (Condition false implies swp false ) 
V (70 (7n S f CFS xs Q. xs =I [1 A lisLall nOLbranch xs A 
lisLall CFSjndependent xs A 
excep_free xs A (CFS, (70) ~ (7n A 
f 
,(assert Q)(7n 
-- ,(sequence_wp xs Q) (70 
PROOF If it is possible to execute xs starting in state (70 and finishing in state (7n, 
where the condition Q is false in (7n, the sequence weakest precondition does not 
hold in (70. This is the contrapositive of Lemma 44 and can be understood intuitively 
as the consequence of Lemma 45. • 
Lemma 47 (swp false implies condition false) 
xs f- TO ~ Tn A ,(sequence_wp xs Q) (70 ===} ,(assert Q) (7n 
where 
(70 = (XPo, hpo, «stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO = (XPo, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn - ( XPn, stkn, locn, pcn) 
(7n = (XPn, hpo, «stkm locn, cno, mlo, pco + pen) : frso)) 
PROOF If the relevant parts of states (70 and (7n are in the sequence execution rela-
tion, and sequence_wp xs Q does not hold in (To, then assert Q will not hold in (Tn. The 
result follows from the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definit.ion 30) .• 
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Lemma 48 (Condition holds implies swp held ) 
xs f- TO ~ Tn /\ (assert Q) (Tn ==:::} (sequence_wp xs Q) 0'0 
where 
0'0 (XPO, hpo, ((stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO - (XPo, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn - (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
an (xPn' hpo, ((stkn,locn, cno, mlo, pco + PCn) : frso)) 
PROOF If the relevant parts of states 0'0 and an are in the sequence execution 
relation, and assert Q holds in an, then sequence_wp xs Q must have held in 0'0. The 
result follows from the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) .• 
Lemma 49 (Relation of wp to swp ) 
linear xs /\ excep_free xs /\ 
lisLali excep_free_instr xs /\ xs =1= [1 
~ wp xs (assert Q) = sequence_wp xs Q 
PROOF This is similar to the the proof of Lemma 43, and again we show equality 
by proving implication in both directions. In this case, however, the result follows 
simply from Lemma 21 and Lemma 22, along with a proof that there exists a classfile 
containing the sequence xs (as in Lemma 41). • 
Lemma 50 (swp preserved by data-equality) 
PROOF This follows from the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Defini-
tion 30), assert (Definition 29), and data-equality (Definition 10). • 
Lemma 51 (Assert preserved by data-equality) 
(assert Q) 0'0 /\ 0'0 ~ an ==:::} (assert Q) an 
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PROOF From the definitions of assert (Definition 29) and data-equality (Defini-
tion 10). • 
We are now able to state the final version of the While Rule for bytecode. As we 
have seen, the role in the conventional Hoare logic of the loop guard S is played 
here by the sequence weakest precondition of the instructions ys with respect to the 
branch condition. From its definition, (Definition 30), we know that the sequence 
weakest precondition is only meaningful in the context of a non-terminating initial 
state. So, in order to ensure that the actual value of sequence_wp ys branch_cond 
can be calculated - essential when actually using the logic to prove properties of 
programs -we add the predicate noLterm_state to the postcondition of the while 
rule. 
The predicate welLformedJoop is defined as 
Definition 31 (Well-formed loop) 
welLformedJoop zs == :lxs ys. CFS[s ... f] = zs A 
zs = [( UBFlxsl + l)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] A 
xs =I- [] A ys =I- [ ]A 
simple xs A simple ys A 
ref _trans_2 ys A linear ys 
Note that the above definition includes the requirement that the instructions ys 
should be referentially transparent, denoted by the term ref _trans2 ys. The execu-
tion of a sequence of referentially transparent instructions affects only the stack and 
the program counter. For a list of instructions ys, the execution of which places two 
values on the stack. the definition is 
Definition 32 (Referential transparency of a list of instructions ) 
reLtrans_2 ys == V CFS ao an sf. ys = CFS[s ... f] A 
linear ys A pc(ao) = pc(s) A 
(CFS,ao) ~ an ~ 
J 
XPo = XPn A hpo = hpn A 
3 a b.stkn = a: (b : (stko)) A loco = locn A 
eno = cnn A mlo = min A frso = frsn 
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where 
(10 = (XPo, hpo, ((stko, loco, eno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
(1n (XPn, hpn, ((stkn, [ocn, e~, min, PCn) : frsn)) 
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This, of course, states that execution of the instructions ys results in two values 
being placed on the stack. If, for example, ys = [Pop, Pop] this would not be 
the case. Certainly, any well-formed program involving an Ificmplt or Ifiacmpeq 
branch should place two values to be compared on the stack immediately before the 
branch. However, this would not be the case with an Ifnull branch (where only one 
value would be placed on the stack). 
Thus the definitions of referential transparency and of a well-formed loop would have 
to be modified to reflect these situations in any future version of the programming 
logic. For the purposes of the proofs described in this dissertation, however, the 
current definitions are adequate. 
Our final version of the While Rule is as follows, and a proof of the soundness of 
this rule appears in Chapter 5. 
{P 1\ sequence_wp ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
weILformedJoop[(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[(UBF Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\ .sequence_wp ys branch_cond} 1\ noLterm_state 
4.5.2 Conditional Branch Forward Rule 
We now describe a rule for conditional branches forward which, like the while rule, 
depends on the lemmas for sequence weakest precondition and the fact that the 
instructions zs immediately prior to the conditional branch instruction are referen-
tially transparent. 
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Lemma 52 (Execute up to conditional branch) 
V CFS era ern s f m n xs ys zs. (CFS, ero) ~ ern /\ 
f 
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CFS [s ... J} = zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)]xs@ys /\ 
where 
pc(ero) = pc(s) /\ 
simple zs /\ 
simple [CBF (Ixsl + 1)]@xs@ys 
---l> ::JerI' (CFS, era) ~ erl /\ 
y = S{pC:= pC(S) + Izsl- 1} 
z = S{pC:= pC(S) + Izsl)} 
y 
(CFS,UI) ~ Un 
f 
PROOF From the definition of simple (Definition 17), and Lemma 30. • 
Theorem 6 (Conditional branch rule ) 
{P} zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)] {R} 
{R /\ (sequence_wp zs branch_cond)} ys {Q} 
{R /\ -,(sequence_wp zs branch_cond)} xs@ys {Q} 
xs =1= []; ys =I- []; zs =I- [] 
excep_free zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)]@xs@ys 
simple xs; simple ys 
ref _trans_2 zs; simple [CBF (Ixsl + 1)]@xs@ys 
{P} zs@[CBF (I xsl + l))]@xs@ys {Q} 
PROOF From the pre- and post-condition relation for bytecode (Definition 16) we 
know that there is a block 
( 4.11) 
such that 
CFS[s ... f] - zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)]@xs@ys (4.12) 
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and P holds in state 0"0. 
From Lemma 52 we know that 
where 
30"1· (CFS, 0"0) ~ 0"1 /\ (CFS,O"I) ~ O"n 
y f 
y=s{pc.- pc(s)+lzsl)-1} 
z = s {pc .- pC(s) + Izsl} 
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(4.13) 
where the first block, from s to y, corresponds to execution of the instructions zs 
prior to the conditional branch instruction. The program counter in state 0"1 points 
to the conditional branch instruction. 
Execution of the second block can take one of two forms depending on whether the 
branching condition is true in state 0"1 or not. In the case where the condition is 
true, the branch is taken, branch_cond holds in state 0"1 and only the instructions ys 
are executed. In the case where the condition is false, branch_cond does not hold in 
state 0"1 and the instructions xs@ys are executed. 
We now apply case analysis to the second block, noting that the case involving the 
Stop rule cannot apply as it would require the program counter to finish outside 
the block xs@ys as a result of executing a jump of length xs+ 1 where both xs and 
ys are non-empty. This gives us 
(4.14) 
A case split on the value of the branch condition in state 0"1, followed by narrowing 
of the blocks as in Lemma 31, along with Lemma 52, gives us the two possible 
situations 
and 
where 
30"1 0"2.branch_cond{0"1) /\ (CFS, 0"0) ~ 0"1 /\ 
y 
exec(CFS,O"d = Some 0"2 /\ (CFS, 0"2) ~ O"n 
f 
30"1 0"2· ....,branch_cond(O"I) 1\ (CFS, 0"0) ~ 0"1 1\ 
y 
exec(CFS,O"d = Some 0"2 1\ (CFS,0"2) ~ 0"' 
f 
w = s{pc:= pc(s) + Izsl + Ixsl+1} 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
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Using Lemma 7 we are now able to obtain a block covering execution of the instruc-
tions zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)] 
And from the assumption 
{P} zs@[CBF (Ixsl + 1)] {R} 
we know that R holds in state a2. 
From Lemma 21 and Lemma 48 we know that 
branch_cond (al) 1\ (CFS,ao) ~ al 1\ 
y 
exec(CFS,al) = Some a2 
===? (sequence_wp zs branch_cond) (Jo 
and from Lemma 21 and Lemma 47 
-,branch_cond (al) 1\ (CFS, (Jo) ~ (Jl 1\ 
y 
exec ( CFS, (Jl) = Some (J 2 
===? -, (sequence_wp zs branch_cond) (To 
We must now show that in the case of 4.19 that 
(sequence_wp zs branch_cond) (J2 
and in the case of 4.20 that 
-'(sequence_wp zs branch_cond) (J2 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21 ) 
(4.22) 
Since the instructions zs are referentially transparent it follows that when zs is of 
length 2, in state (Jo the stack is equal to the stack in state al with the addition of 
two extra values at the top meaning that 
stko = tI(tl(stk1)) (4.23) 
and all other values in (Jl--excluding the program counter-are equal to those of (Jo· 
Execution of the conditional branch instruction in state (Jl pops the two topmost 
values from the stack (after comparing them). This means that 
stko = Stk2 (4.24) 
and, as all other elements of the states apart from the program counters are equal 
(4.25) 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.7. We can now use this result with 4.15,4.16 
and the assumptions {R 1\ (sequence_wp zs branch_cond)} ys {Q} and {R 1\ -,(sequence_wp zs bra 
to show that Q holds in state an. • 
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stk before ys stk after ys stk after branch 
Figure 4.7: Stack unchanged by zs followed by branch 
4.6 Conclusions 
We have described a programming logic containing rules for sufficient patterns of 
bytecode to prove bytecode programs including loops and branching structures. Al-
though the rules described are clearly closely related to the rules in the conventional 
Hoare logic, they differ in a number of important ways. In particular, the necessity 
of treating the execution of the instructions defining a program structure explicitly. 
In the following chapter we describe in detail the difficulties this presents in the case 
of a proof of soundness of the rule for loops in the bytecode logic, and the ways in 
which these problems can be overcome. 
Chapter 5 
Soundness of the Loop Rule 
In this chapter we will discuss a proof of the soundness of the rule for loops in 
bytecode programs that was proposed in Chapter 4. We begin by describing the 
proof of the while rule in the conventional Hoare logic and how it relates to our 
proof of the loop rule for bytecode programs. Both of these proofs depend on proofs 
of two subsidiary properties: w 
1. The loop guard condition will be false on exit from the loop 
2. If a property is invariant for one execution of the loop body it is also invariant 
for the loop itself 
In a conventional axiomatic semantics these properties are very simple to prove 
as they follow almost immediately from the execution rules for the language. In 
the bytecode world. however, they are considerably more difficult to prove and we 
discuss the methods used to achieve these proofs in some detail. 
5.1 Outline of Proof Method 
The standard Hoare logic while rule for a simple imperative programming language 
(4.3) states that if P is an invariant for one execution of C whenever S holds then 
it is also an invariant for the execution of the statement while S do C, and that S 
will be false on termination of the loop. 
{PAS}C{P} 
{P} while S do C {P A oS} 
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Example proofs of its soundness can be found in [10] and [56], and they can be 
broken down into proofs of each of the two properties mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter. In [10] these are represented by the following lemmas: 
Guard false on exit from loop-conventional Hoare logic 
V C sl s2. eval C sl = s2 ----+ (V S' C'. (C = while S' C') 
----+ -(S' s2)) 
Preservation of invariant-conventional Hoare logic 
V C sl s2. 
eval C sl = s2 ----+ 
(V S' C'. (C = while S' C') ----+ 
(V sl s2. P sl /\ S' sl /\ C' sl s2 ----+ P s2) ----+ 
(P sl ~ P s2)) 
Both lemmas can be proved using the operational semantics of the languages they 
are concerned with, either immediately or by strong rule induction. 
For the Bytecode Programming Logic, recall that our postulated Loop Rule is 
{P /\ sequence_wp ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
welLformedJoop[(UBF Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[(UBF Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P /\ -sequence_wp ys branch_cond /\ nOLterm-state} 
and we assert that equivalent statements can be defined for the bytecode: 
Proposition 1 (Guard false on exit from loop--bytecode logic) 
V ao an CFS sf· (CFS,ao) ~ an /\ 
f 
CFS[s ... f] = [(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] /\ 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... f) 
----+ - (sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an 
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Proposition 2 (Preservation of invariant-bytecode logic) 
\;/ 0"0 O"n CFS s f. (CFS, 0"0) ~ O"nA 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... J] A 
P 0"0 A 
['V O"~ O"~ O"~ CFS' w y s' !,. 
(CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ A 
y 
( CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ A 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' .. . J'] 1\ 
P O"~ A 
(sequence_wp ys branch_cond) O"~ ~ 
P O"~] 
~ P O"n 
where 
w = s' {pc := pc{ s/) + 1 } 
y = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
z = s' {pc := pC(S') + Ixsl + 1} 
Here, the fact that the invariant is preserved by one execution of the body of the 
loop is represented by the statement 
\;/ O"~ O"~ O"~ CFS' w y s' J'. (CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ A 
y 
(CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ A 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS/[s' .. . J'] 1\ (5.1) 
P O"~ 1\ 
(sequence_wp ys branch_cond) O"~ ~ 
P O"~ 
which says that, in fact, the invariant is preserved by one execution of the body of 
the loop-the list of instructions xs~ -~plus execution of the 'structural' instructions 
ys@CBB. 
In the next three sections we present proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, followed by a 
proof of soundness of the Loop Rule. 
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5.2 Guard Condition False on Exit from Loop 
Our aim here is a proof of Proposition 1 
Vao an CFS s fo (CFS,ao) ~ an A 
f 
CFS[s'ldotsfl = [(UBF Ixsl + 1)l@[xsl@[ysl@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl 
---+ -, (sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an 
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Our strategy involves showing that there exists a penultimate state an-I, whose 
program counter points to the conditional branch instruction, and execution of which 
results in final state an: 
Proposition 3 (Penultimate state exists) 
where 
Vao an CFS sf y Zo (CFS,ao) ~ an 1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s o· ofl ---+ 
::I an-2 an-I' (CFS,an_2) ~ an-l 1\ 
z 
exec (CFS, an-I) = Some an A 
pc(an -l) = pc(J) 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl} 
z = f {pc := pC(J) - 1} 
We then use the fact that the branching condition must be false in this penul-
timate state in order for us to exit the loop, the idea of data equality (Defini-
tion 10), and the lemmas for the sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) to 
show -, (sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an. 
5.2.1 Lemmas for Guard Condition False 
In this section we describe a series of lemmas necessary for the proof of Proposition 1: 
the guard condition is false on exit from the loop. 
To allow us to focus attention on the main part of the loop--the section 
xs@ys@[CBB Ixs@ysll we show that for a well-formed loop in the block execu-
tion relation, executing the initial unconditional branch forward results in another 
instance of the relation consisting only of the instructions xs@ys@[CBB Ixs@ysll· 
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Figure 5.1: Elimination of unconditional branch 
Lemma 53 (Elimination of unconditional branch) 
where 
V ao an CFS sf. (CFS,ao) ~ an /\ 
f 
welUormedJoop CFS[s ... fl -
:1 a1' exec ( CFS, ao) = Some aJ /\ 
pc(aJ) = pc(s) + Ixsl + 1 /\ 
(CFS,al) ~ an 
f 
w = S {pc:= pc(s) + 1} 
PROOF This follows from the fact that the instructions 
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xs@ys@[CBB Ixs@ysll make up a simple block (Definition 17), the execution of 
which can only result in a state where the program counter is pointing inside the 
block or at the instruction immediately to the right ofit. Under these circumstances, 
once the unconditional branch instruction at the beginning of the loop has been 
executed once, it will never be executed again within this block. We are therefore 
able to effectively discard it and concentrate our attention on the smaller resultant 
block. The situation is represented in Figure 5.1. • 
We now consider our smaller loop, and show that there exists a state, a2, in which 
the conditional branch instruction is executed for the first time. 
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Lemma 54 (Conditional branch is executed at least once ) 
'tfCFS Ul Un S / w y z.( CFS, (1) ~ Un /\ 
I 
where 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fJ /\ 
simple ys /\ 
pc(a1) = pc(s) + Ixsl + 1 ~ 
3a2.( CFS, (1) ~ a2/\ 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+1} 
z 
pc(a2) = pc(J)/\ 
(CFS,a2) ~ an 
I 
y = S {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z =/ {pc:= pc(f) -I} 
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PROOF \Ve know that the program counter of Ul is pointing to the first instruction 
of ys. As we are assuming the existence of the larger block from Uo to an, we know 
that execution must leave the block ys at some point in order to reach state an· 
But because ys is a simple block we cannot reach Un directly from any instruction 
in ys, and there must exist an intermediate state, U2, whose program counter is 
pointing to the instruction immediately to the right of ys, i.e. the conditional 
branch instruction. Execution of the conditional branch instruction in this state 
will then lead to an, either immediately or following a number of executions of the 
loop- . represented by the instance of the block execution relation (CFS, (2) ~ an. 
I 
In order to prove the existence of a penultimate state (Proposition 3), we now 
consider the block (CFS,a2) ~ Un, with PC(U2) = pc(f) , and apply the block 
I 
execution case rule. This presents the two possibilities shown in Figure 5.2 
• the Stop rule applies: 
exec(CFS,U2) = Some Un /\ PC(U2) = pc(f) (5.2) 
• the Continue rule applies: 
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Continue 
~~top 
0'3 0'2 an 
I xs I ys I eBB I 
Figure 5.2: Possible outcomes of executing branch instruction 
In the Stop case the proof of Proposition 3 is complete; in the second case we need to 
know whether or not the branch condition is true in order to determine the position 
of the program counter after execution. 
In the case where the condition is false we have a contradiction: executing the branch 
instruction in this situation results in the program counter of 0"3 being outside the 
block, but the existence of the block (CFS,0"3) ;1 O"n means that, from Lemma 1 
it must be inside the block. 
This leaves the third case in which the branching condition is true. Again we consider 
statement 5.3, relating to the situation where the branching condition is true. From 
the definition of a well formed loop (Definition 31) we know that the program counter 
of state 0"3 points to the first instruction in xs as a result of the conditional branch 
backwards in a state where the condition is true. We now reason 'backwards' from 
the final state, O"n. 
We show that if, starting in a state whose program counter is equal to pc(s) + 1, 
i.e. the state produced by executing the conditional branch when the condition is 
true, we have reached O"n-a fact implicit in the definition of the block execution 
relation (Stop, Continue)-then there must be some state O"n-l in the execution 
path relation for the block that evaluates to O"n. 
Lemma 55 (Penultimate state exists in execution of the loop ) 
VCFS 0"3 sf w. (CFS, 0"3) ~ O"n 1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl ~ 
30"n-l. (CFS, 0"3) ~+ fO"n-l 1\ 
w 
pc( 0" n-l) = pc(f) 
1\ exec ( CFS, O"n-l) = Some O"n 
where 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+l} 
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PROOF From Lemma 9 we know that as l13 and l1n-I are in the block execution 
relation, they are also in the execution path relation. We then apply transitive 
closure elimination to 'unwind' the final execution step from the relation which, 
along with the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8), implies that 
::!CTn-i' exec ( CFS, l1n-I) = Some CTn. As xs and ys are simple, we can show that 
PC(l1n -I) = pc(f), since from the definition of simple, (Definition 17), it is impossible 
to reach the final state outside the block from either xs or ys. • 
We show that if we have reached this penultimate state, l1n-I, starting from a 
position l13 inside xs there must be a sequence of states spanning the final execution 
of ys that starts in a state whose program counter points to the first instruction in 
ys and culminates in CTn-i' 
Lemma 56 (Ante-penultimate state exists in loop execution) 
where 
VCFS CT3 s / w. (CFS,l13) ~ l1n /\ welLformedJoop CFS[s .. . /]----+ f 
::!CTn-l l1n-2· (CFS, (13) ~+ l1n-2 /\ 
f 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+l} 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = / {pc:= pc(f) - 1} 
(CFS, l1n-2) =&.+ l1n-l /\ 
z 
pC(CTn -2) = pc(m) 
pC(CTn -l) = pc(f) 
exec( CFS, l1n-d = l1n 
PROOF From the definition of simple, (Definition 17), the only section of the block 
from which it is possible to reach the conditional branch instruction is ys, and 
in order to reach ys we must have come from xs (as it is not reachable from the 
conditional branch). Furthermore, the only instruction outside xs reachable from 
within it is the first instruction in ys. The path of execution is shown in Figure 
5.3 • 
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Figure 5.3: Final steps of execution 
This allows us to prove Proposition 3 
Lemma 57 (Final step preceded by execution of ys exists) 
where 
V (70 (7n CFS s f. (CFS, (70) ~ (7", 1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl ~ 
:3 (7",-1 (7n-2 . (CFS, (7",-2) ~ (7n-1 1\ 
w = s {pc := pC( s) + 1} 
Y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc:= pc(J) - I} 
z 
exec (CFS, (7",-1) = Some (7", 1\ 
PC((7n-2) = pc(m) 
PC((7",_l) = pC(J) 
PROOF From Lemma 55 and Lemma 56. 
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• 
We now prove some more preliminary lemmas in order to prove prove Proposition 
1. 
We know from Lemma 57 that 
:3(7n-1' exec (CFS, (7",-1) = Some (7", (5.4) 
where the instruction at (7n-1 is the conditional branch backwards to the start of 
xs. The fact that the branch is not taken execution results in state (7n which is 
outside the block--implies that the branch condition is false in state {7n-1 (from the 
operational semantics of branching instructions). This gives us 
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Lemma 58 (Branch condition false implies swp false ) 
V an-l an-2 . (CFS,an-2) -.!.. an-l A 
where 
z 
welLformedJoop CFS[s .. . fJ A 
...,(branch_cond an-I) ---t 
..., (sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an -2 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc:= pc(f) - 1} 
PROOF From Lemma 56 and Lemma 46. 
'rVe now show that states an-2 and an are data-equal: 
Lemma 59 (Antepenultimate and final states are data-equal) 
where 
V an-l an-2 . (CFS, an-2) -.!.. an-l A 
z 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fJ A 
exec( CFS, a n-l) = Some an ---t 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - 1} 
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• 
PROOF From the definition of a well formed loop (Definition 31) we know that 
ys is referentially transparent. From Definition 32 we see that the execution of 
a sequence of referentially transparent instructions affects only the stack and the 
program counter. 
So in state an-l the stack is equal to the stack in state an-2 with the addition of 
two extra values at the top implying that 
stkn - 2 = tl(tl(stkn _ 1) (5.5) 
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stk before ys stk after ys stk after branch 
Figure 5.4: Stack unchanged by ys followed by branch 
and all other values in (Tn_l-~excluding the program counter-- are equal to those of 
(Tn-2· 
Execution of the conditional branch instruction in state (Tn-l pops the two topmost 
values from the stack (after comparing them). This means that 
stkn - 2 = stkn (5.6) 
and, as all other elements of the states apart from the program counters are data-
equal 
(5.7) 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
• 
Using these lemmas and the lemmas for the sequence weakest precondition we can 
now prove Proposition 1: 
Theorem 7 (Loop guard false on exit-bytecode logic) 
V (To (Tn CFS s f. (CFS, ao) ~ an 1\ 
f 
CFS[s ... f] = [(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl 
~ -, (sequence~wp ys branch_cond) an 
PROOF From Lemma 56, Lemma 57, and Lemma 59. 
• 
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Figure 5.5: Preliminary execution of the loop 
5.3 Preservation of the Invariant 
Assuming that execution of the loop begins in state 0"0, in which the invariant 
assert P holds and whose program counter points to the unconditional branch in-
struction, we show that the conditional branch instruction is reached for the first 
time via the execution of the instructions ys. This is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
Lemma 60 (Initial pattern of loop execution ) 
where 
'V 0"0 O"n CFS sf y z. (CFS, 0"0) ~ O"n 1\ 
f 
pC(O"o) = pc(s) 1\ 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl ----+ 
:30"1 0"2. exec (CFS,O"o) = Some 0"1 1\ 
PC(0"1) = pc(m) 1\ 
y = s {pC:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - I} 
(CFS, 0"1) ~ 0"2 1\ 
z 
PC(0"2) = pc(J) 1\ 
(CFS, 0"2) ~ O"n 
f 
PROOF From Lemma 53 and Lemma 54. 
As in the proof described in Section 5.2, we now consider the block 
• 
(CFS,0"2) ~ O"n, where w = s {pc := pc(s) + I} and PC(0"2) = pc(J), and apply 
f 
the block execution case rule. Once again this presents the two possibilities shown 
in Figure 5.2 
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• the Stop rule applies: 
exec (CFS, 0"2) = Some O"n /\ pc( 0"2) = pc(J) (5.8) 
• the Continue rule applies: 
:30"3· exec (CFS, 0"2) = Some 0"3 /\ (CF8, 0"3) ~ O"n /\ PC(0"2) = pc(J) (5.9) 
f 
In the Stop case, we prove the following lemma: 
Lemma 61 (Initial, second and final states data-equal ) 
where 
V 0"0 0"1 0"2 O"n CFS sf y z. welLformedJoop CFS[s .. ·fl /\ 
pC(O"o) = pc(s) /\ 
exec (CFS,O"o) = Some 0"1 /\ 
(CFS, 0"1) ~ 0"2 /\ 
z 
exec (CFS, 0"2) = Some O"n /\ 
PC(0"2) = pc(f) --+ 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - I} 
PROOF From the operational semantics of the unconditional branch instruction, we 
know that only the program counters of states 0"0 and 0"1 differ, so 0"0 ~ 0"1· 
From the definition of a well formed loop (Definition 31) we know that ys is refer-
entially transparent and so, as in Lemma 59, 0"1 ~ O"n. _ 
This then allows us to show that the invariant is preserved for the Stop case: 
Lemma 62 (Invariant preserved-Stop case) 
V ao an CFS sf y z. (CFS,ao) ~ O"n /\ 
f 
exec ( CFS, 0"0) = an 
pC(O"o) = pc(s) /\ 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl --+ 
(assert P) an 
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PROOF From Lemma 60, Lemma 61 and Lemma 51. 
• 
\Ve now turn to the case relating to the Continue rule. As in the proof of Theorem 
7, we reason by cases on the branch condition, which produces a contradiction in 
the case where the condition is false, leaving us to consider the case in which the 
branch is taken. 
We again use the fact that the unconditional branch instruction will not be reached 
again during the execution of this block (Lemma 53). This leaves us to concentrate 
on the preservation of the invariant, assert P, by the execution of the instructions 
xs@ys@[GBB], assuming we start in a state pointing to the start of xs and in which 
assert P holds. 
It is obvious that, in order to prove that the preservation of assert P by one execution 
of the loop body implies its preservation by multiple executions, it will be necessary 
to use some form of inductive argument. This is the approach used in the proofs of 
soundness of the while rule for more traditional Hoare logics [56, lOj. These proofs 
are rea..<;onably straightforward as in the inductive definition of the language, one 
step of execution corresponds to one execution of the body of the loop. 
In the bytecode programming logic, however, this is not the case. The block execu-
tion relation works at a much finer grain, i.e. that of individual bytecode instruc-
tions, several of which may be needed to represent a single 'higher level' instruction 
like array assignment. In addition, although the invariant holds at the beginning 
and end of the body of the loop, it mayor may not hold between these points. 
In standard inductive definitions of execution like those mentioned above, this is 
not a problem as the body, C, of a loop many be inductively built up from several 
commands el , ... , en, but is viewed as a single command in its own right. In this 
way we can abstract away from the finer detail and view its execution to be viewed 
as a single step. In the block execution relation however, a single step of execution 
is that of a single bytecode instruction, and so we cannot use the block execution 
relation directly to reason about the preservation of assert P across a loop body 
consisting of several bytecode instructions. 
It is clearly necessary to find a relation describing a 'big step' of execution in the 
bytecode world. If the execution of the loop can be described in such a manner 
we can then carry out a successful induction leading to the proof of preservation of 
the invariant. Of course, this relation must also take into account the fact that we 
must explicitly execute the 'structure' of the loop, represented by the instructions 
ys@[GBBj. 
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Figure 5.6: Decomposition of loop 
a 
Figure 5.7: Loop as transitive closure of blocks 
5.3.1 A 'Big Step' Execution Relation for Loops 
If we consider the section xs@ys@[GBB Ixs@ysl] of a well-formed loop for which 
the relation (GFS,(jo) ~ (jn holds, where w = s {pc := pc(s) + l)jpc(s)], we see 
f 
that it could be viewed as two separate blocks: xs and ys@[GBB]. The states (jo 
and (j n can then be seen to be members of a set of states representing 'big steps' of 
execution: 
Definition 33 (Loop as series of big steps) 
bigstepJoop == ({a, b): :3 c. (GFS, a) ~ c 1\ (GFS, c).2...,. b}+ 
x f 
where 
w = s {pc:= pc(s) + 1)jpc(s)] 
x = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl)jpc(s)] 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + l)jpc(s)] 
Even if the branch is taken back to the start of xs, the state b is outside the block 
ys@[GBB Ixs@ysl] and so the relation holds. This is shown in Figure 5.6 and 
Figure 5.7. 
As the pairs of states in this relation span the whole of the block 
xs@ys@[ GBB Ixs@ysll we now have a relation upon which we can perform induction. 
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But first we must show that if two states are in the block execution relation they 
are also in the 'big step· relation, (Definition 33). Once again the mismatch of step 
size means the proof cannot be obtained directly by induction on (CFS, ao) --! an, 
f 
and we must first address this issue. 
The following lemma defines the notion of 'big' steps of execution that start any-
where in the instructions xs@ys and finish by executing the conditional branch 
instruction at pe(J), as shown in Figure 5.8. The conditional branch can be viewed 
as a 'pivot' instruction: after each execution of the body of the loop, the conditional 
branch must be executed, resulting either in termination of the loop, or at least one 
subsequent execution of the loop body. 
Lemma 63 (Loop execution 'pivots' on conditional branch) 
where 
VCFS sf w z ao an· (CFS, ao) ~ an 1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl ----+ 
(ao, an) E 
{( a, b): exec ( CFS, a) = b 1\ pe( a) = pe(!) V 
(3 c. exec(CFS, c) = b 1\ 
w = s {pc := pees) + 1} 
z = f {pc := pe(J) - 1} 
pe( c) = pe(J) 1\ 
(CFS, a) ~ c) V 
z 
w 
PROOF By rule induction on (CFS, ao) ----+ an. In both the Stop and Continue 
f 
cases we now proceed by cases on the condition pe(ao) = pc(J). 
In the Stop case we have 
exee(CFS,ao) = Some an (5.10) 
If pe(ao) = pe(f), the lefthand disjunct of our goal holds. In the case where 
pe(uo) =1= pe(f), we have a contradiction as pc(un ) is outside the block and is only 
reachable from the instruction at f. 
For both truth values of pe(ao) = pe(J) in the Continue case, we use the induction 
hypothesis, along with the standard Isabelle theorems for "unrolling" transitive 
closure relations and the construction rules for the block execution relation to show 
that the required result holds. • 
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s f 
Figure 5.8: Relation "pivoting" on instruction at f 
Lemma 64 (States in block relation imply states in big step relation) 
where 
VCFS ao an sf w X y. (CFS,ao) ---! an 1\ 
f 
welUormedJoop CFS[s ... f] ~ 
w = s {pc:= pc(s) + 1} 
(ao, an) E {(a, b): :3 c. (CFS, a) ~ c 1\ 
I 
(CFS, c) -.!!..... b}+ 
f 
x = s {pc := pc(s) + Ixsl} 
y = s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
PROOF From Lemma 63 • 
This result allows us to carry out the induction over the body of the loop (plus 
structure instructions), leading us to a proof of Proposition 2: 
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Theorem 8 (Invariant preserved by loop) 
'V 0"0 O"n CFS sf· (CFS,O"o) ~ O"n/\ 
f 
welLformecUoop CFS[s ... fJ /\ 
P 0"0 /\ 
['V O"~ O"~ O"~ CFS' w y z s' 1'. (CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ /\ 
x 
( CFS', O"~) ~ O"~ /\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' .. . 1'J /\ 
P O"~ /\ 
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(sequence_wp ys branch_cond) O"~ --. 
where 
--+ P O"n 
w = s' {pc := pc( s') + 1} 
x = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
y = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl + 1} 
P O"~] 
PROOF By induction on the Bigstep relation (Definition 33), and from Lemma 60, 
Lemma 61, Lemma 62, Lemma 63, and Lemma 64. • 
5.4 Proof of Soundness of Loop Rule 
In this section we describe the proof of soundness of the Loop Rule itself, beginning 
with the proof of some necessary lemmas. 
Lemma 65 (First exception is None in exception free block ) 
'V 0"0 O"n CFS s f. (CFS, 0"0) ~ O"n /\ 
f 
CFS[s ... fJ = xs /\ 
excep_free xs 
--. XPo = None 
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where 
PROOF By case analysis of the block execution relation plus the definition of excep_free .• 
Lemma 66 (Exception free implies final state non-terminating) 
"lao an CFS s f. (CFS, ao) ~ an " 
f 
CFS[s ... f] = xs" 
lisLalLnoLshifLframe xs " 
excep_free xs 
~ noLterm.5tate an 
PROOF By induction on the block execution relation, and Lemmas 4 and 65. • 
\Vhen the Loop Rule is rewritten with the definition of the pre- and post-condition 
relation described in Chapter 4 and simplified, it becomes a proof of the statement 
(assert P " ..., sequence_wp ys branch_cond " nOLterm.5tate) an (5.11) 
under the assumptions 
['V CFS (10 (1n sf. ( CFS, (10) ~ an " 
f 
(CFS,ao) ~ an 
f 
CFS[s . .. f] = xs " (assert P) ao 
~ (assert P) an] 
CFS[s . .. f] = [UBF Ixsl + l]@[xs]@[ys]@[CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop [UBF Ixsl + l]@[xs]@[ys]@[CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
(assert P) ao 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
A proof of (..., sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an, can be obtained immediately by 
Theorem 7 and Assumptions 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15. Similarly, a proof of the third 
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conjunct, noLterm.state an, can be achieved by Lemma 66 and Assumptions 5.13, 
5.14 and 5.15. 
The proof of (assert P) an is, however, slightly more complex. \Ve begin by resolving 
with Theorem 8 (after implication introduction), as its conclusion matches that of 
our current goal. After simplification, we require to prove 
V a~ a~ a~ CFS' s' f' w x y y. (CFS', a~) ~ a~ /\ 
x 
(CFS', a~) ~ a~ /\ 
f' 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' ... f'] /\ (5.17) 
where 
w = s' {pc:= pc(s') + 1} 
x = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
y = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl + 1} 
(assert P) a~ /\ 
(sequence_wp ys branch_cond)a~ ---t 
(assert P) a~ 
under Assumptions 5.12,5.13,5.14,5.15 and 5.16. Further simplification transforms 
this into the problem of proving 
(assert P) a~ 
under the assumptions 
[V CFS ao an sf· (( CFS, ao) ~ an /\ 
f 
(CFS,ao) ~ an 
f 
CFS[s . .. fl = xs /\ (assert P) ao 
---t (assert P) anl 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... j] (assert P) ao 
(CFS',a~) ~ a~ 
x 
(CFS',a~)~---t a~ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' .. . f'] 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
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(assert P) O"~ 
(sequence_wp ys branch_cond}O"~ 
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(5.26) 
(5.27) 
Working with these assumptions, we begin by proving that the invariant holds in 
state O"~, after one execution of the loop body: 
Lemma 67 (Preservation of invariant across body of loop) 
where 
V CFS' O"~ w x s'1'. [V CFS 0"0 O"n S f· (CFS, 0"0) ~ O"n /\ 
f 
CFS[s . .. J] = xs /\ (assert P) 0" 
-- (assert P) 0" n] /\ 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' ... 1']/\ 
(CFS',O"~) ~ O"~ /\ 
x 
(assert P) O"~ 
-- (assert P) O"~ 
w = s' {pc := pc( s') + 1} 
x = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
PROOF From instantiation of the universally quantified variables CFS, 0"0, O"n> s, f 
in Assumption 5.19 to CFS', O"~, O"~, k, l, followed by simplification. _ 
We now need to show that the invariant is preserved by the block 
(CFS', O"D ~ O"~, representing execution of the instructions 
f' 
ys@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)]. 
The definition of a well-formed loop (Definition 31) tells us that ys is simple, and 
we begin by showing that this means that the block (CFS, O"D -'!4 O"~ can be split 
f' 
into a smaller block representing the execution of ys, followed by the execution of 
the conditional branch. 
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Lemma 68 (Final state reached by execution of branch) 
where 
V CFS' a~ a~ s' I f' IS yS. (CFS',a~) ~ a~ 1\ 
f' 
x = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
inside s' x a~ 1\ 
IS =J. [J 1\ ys =J. [ J 1\ 
CFS'[S' ... f'J = ys@[(eBB IIS@ysl)J -+ 
3(J2' (eFS',(J~) ~ (J~ 1\ 
x 
exec ( CFS', (J~) = Some (J~ 1\ 
pc( (J~ ) = pc(J') 
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PROOF From the definition of simple (Definition 17), the only position outside ys 
that it is possible to reach from within ys is the instruction at f. Therefore the final 
state, (J~, must be reached by executing the instruction at f. We know that (J~ is 
inside the instructions ys as it is reached by executing the simple block xs and so 
its program counter must be equal to pc(s) + length xs + 1. State (J~ is the state 
reached by executing the loop once (as mentioned in the previous lemma) and so is 
inside the block IS. • 
This gives us (assert P) (J~ from Lemma 51, and we are now able to prove the Loop 
Rule. 
Theorem 9 (Loop Rule) 
{P 1\ sequence_wp ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
welLfermedJoop [( UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[Is]@[ys]@[(eBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[( UBF Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\ ....,( sequence_wp ys branch_cend 1\ nOLterm~tate} 
PROOF From Theorem 7, Theorem 8, Lemma 51, Lemma 66, Lemma 67, and 
Lemma 68. • 
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5.5 Conclusions 
Despite the superficial similarity of the rule for loops in bytecode to the while rule 
of the conventional Hoare logic, the proof of soundness for the former is a great deal 
more complex than that of the latter. This is due mainly to two points: the need 
to impose a structure on a 'fiat' bytecode program, and the granularity or step-size 
of our execution relations. 
Conventional Hoare logics are normally based on an operational semantics defined 
in terms of a small number of commands. The semantics consist of rules for how 
these commands may be combined to form other commands, and these map easily 
onto the corresponding rules in the Hoare logic. Additionally, each command can be 
viewed as a separate entity, independent of its context. In the bytecode world, the 
commands involved relate to very small steps of execution, and there is no concept 
of combining commands to create other commands. A program has no structure, 
it is simply a list. This means that in order to prove more complex properties of 
bytecode programs, we are compelled to impose a structure on the bytecode which, 
to some extent, does not really exist. Also, in order to reflect the 'real world' nature 
of the JVM, instructions are not independent entities, but must be viewed within 
the context of a classfile. 
When it comes to proving properties of our imposed higher level structures that 
involve induction, such as in the case of the preservation of an invariant by a loop, we 
again come up against the problem of the lack of any sort of 'combinatory' property 
of bytecode commands. In the conventional logic, the body of a loop is a command 
and so, using an inductively defined semantics based on the idea of the execution of 
commands, we are able to induct over the body of any loop regardless of how it is 
formed. In the bytecode world, the only situation in which we could induct over the 
body of a loop using the execution relations defined at the level of execution of a 
bytecode command, is if the body only contained one instruction. Again, there is no 
notion of two bytecode instructions combining to become another type of bytecode 
instruction, they will merely form a list of two instructions. Consequently, there is 
no way of proving that any property is preserved by one step of execution of the 
body, as there is no relation which describes this concept. 
As we have demonstrated, these problems can be overcome and indeed quite elegant 
solutions found. The idea of data-equality of states deals with the problem of exe-
cuting the structure of higher level patterns explicitly. This brings the proof more 
in line with that of the conventional logic, where such 'control' structure as if and 
while are explicitly present in the rules by nature of their formulation in terms of 
syntax. The definition of execution of a block of bytecode in terms of 'big-steps' 
again puts us in a situation parallel to the conventional world, where we are able to 
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talk about the execution of a 'compound' command in one step. 
We have shown that, despite the apparent mismatch between the structured lan-
guage of the conventional Hoare logic and the fiat unstructured world of bytecode, 
and the considerable challenges it represents, it is possible to reconcile the two. In 
addition, we have been able to produce a workable logic that will allow proofs of 
simple bytecode programs including loops. 
Chapter 6 
Verification Example 
In this chapter we present a proof involving a simple bytecode program containing 
a loop, demonstrating the bytecode programming logic in use. We also discuss why, 
while is would be possible to prove that the array bounds checks for another small 
program could be eliminated, it is not currently practical to do so. 
6.1 While Program 
This section details a proof involving the small loop program from Chapter 4: 
public class SimpleWhile { 
public static void main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while (i<5) 
{ i++; } 
with corresponding bytecode 
o bipush 0 
1 istore 1 
2 goto 8 
5 iinc 1 1 
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8 iload 1 
9 bipush 5 
10 if_icmplt 5 
13 return 
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We wish to prove that, if execution terminates, the value stored in variable i is 5. 
In terms of the bytecode program, we want to show that the final value in local 
variable 1 (written loc ! 1) is equal to 5. We omit the return instruction as the 
bytecode logic currently does not allow method call or return. 
Proposition 4 (Proof of a small program with loop) 
{A a. (let (stk,loe,en,ml,pe) = hd (snd(snd a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ xp = None 1\ frs I- []) } 
[LAS bipush 0, LAS IAstore 1, 
UBF (Goto_fwd 2), LAS (Iinc 1 1), LAS (iload 1), 
LAS (Bipush 5), eBB (lficmplLbwd 3)] 
{>. a. (let (stk,loe, en, ml, pe) = hd (snd(snd a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ (loe! 1) = 5)} 
We begin by considering the part of the program containing the loop: 
2 goto 8 
5 iinc 1 1 
8 iload 1 
9 bipush 5 
10 iCicmplt 5 
We take the loop invariant to be 
A a. (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd(snd(snd a) in 
1 < length loe 1\ (loe! 1) ~ 5) (6.1) 
and want to show that this is preserved across the body of the loop. The term 
1 < length loc is included because the local variable are represented in the oper-
ational semantics as a list- with indices 0, 1, 2, ... ~-but the Java compiler starts 
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indexing the local variables from 1. This means that, in order for us to be able to 
carry out proofs on the list of local variables in Isabelle, we must know that the 
length of the list is at least one greater than the highest indexed variable we refer 
to. 
The loop guard is 
sequence_wp [ LAS (iload 1), LAS (Bipush 5)J 
('x ~. let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd (snd(snd (1)) in (6.2) 
(hd(tI stk» < hd stk»» 
and we want to show that this is false on exit from the loop. 
We begin by calculating the sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) of the in-
structions [ LAS (iload 1), LAS (Bipush 5)J which set up the stack for the conditional 
branch. 
Lemma 69 (Example calculation of swp of list) 
'if ~. nOLterm_state £1 ~ 
[(sequence_wp [ LAS (iload 1), LAS (Bipush 5)J 
(,x £1. let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd (snd(snd (1)) in 
(hd(tl stk» < hd stk») £1 
(A £1. let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) hd (snd(snd (1» in (loe! 1) < 5) ~J 
PROOF By Lemma 43, Lemma 49, and lemmas for weakest precondition of 
(6.3) 
iload and bipush. • 
We now show that execution of the body of the loop preserves the invariant, as 
required by the loop rule: 
Lemma 70 (Loop body preserves invariant) 
{,x £1. (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd (frames (~» in 
1 < length loe 1\ (loe!1) ~ 5 1\ (loe!1) < 5)} 
[LAS (Iinc 1 1)J 
{,x~. (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe) = hd (frames (~» in 
1 < length loe 1\ (loc! 1) ~ 5)} 
(6.4) 
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PROOF By the weakest precondition of the line instruction, and simplification. _ 
These lemmas now allow us to prove the following lemma about the loop section of 
the program 
Lemma 71 (Proof of correctness-loop section) 
{(A a. (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe) = hd (frames (a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ (loe! 1) ::; 5 /\ (loe 1 1) < 5} 
[UBF (Goto_fwd 2), LAS (line 1 1), LAS (iload 1), 
LAS (Bipush 5), eBB (lficmplLbwd 3)J 
{(A a. (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe) = hd (frames (a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ (loe! 1) ::; 5} 
PROOF By Lemma 70 and the Theorem 9 (Loop Rule). 
-
We are also able to prove that, on termination of the loop, the desired postcondition 
holds. 
Lemma 72 (Invariant and negation of guard implies postcondition) 
Va. (A a. (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd (frames (a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ (loel 1) ::; 5 /\ -, (loe 1 1) < 5 
/\ nOLterm_state a)) a 
==> (A a. (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc) = hd (frames (a)) in 
1 < length loe /\ (loel1) = 5)) a 
PROOF By Lemma 28 (Postcondition Weakening) and simplification. 
We now return to the first section of the program: 
o bipush 0 
1 istore 1 
-
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and show that, assuming the desired precondition, execution of these instructions 
results in the loop invariant 
Lemma 73 (Precondition leads to invariant) 
{'x u. 1 < length loc 1\ xp = None 1\ (frames (u)) =1= []} 
(let (stk,loc, cn, ml, pc) = hd (frames (u)) in 
[LAS bipush 0, LAS IAstore 1] 
{(,X u. (let (stk,loc, cn, ml,pc) = hd (frames (u)) in 
1 < length loc 1\ (loc! 1) ~ 5))} 
PROOF By Theorem 4 (Sequencing Rule) and lemmas for the weakest preconditions 
of the instructions bipush and IAstore. _ 
We are now able to prove Proposition 4: 
Theorem 10 (Proof of simple incrementation while loop program) 
{,X u. (let (stk,loc, cn, ml, pc) = hd (frames (u)) in 
1 < length loc 1\ xp = None 1\ (frames (u)) =1= []) 
[LAS bipush 0, LAS IAstore 1, UBF (Goto_fwd 2), LAS (Iinc 1 1), LAS (iload 1), 
LAS (Bipush 5), eBB (lficmplLbwd 3)] 
{.A u. (let (stk, loc, cn, ml, pc) = hd (frames (0")) in 
1 < length loc 1\ (loc! 1) = 5)} 
PROOF By the Sequencing Rule (Theorem 4), Lemma 72 and Lemma 73. _ 
6.2 Array Bounds Elimination 
After the proof of a small program containing a loop, our intention was to prove 
that it was safe to eliminate the array bounds checks on a program containing a 
loop which updated an array: 
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public class Arraybounds { 
} 
public static void main(String args[]) { 
int i=O; 
} 
int myarray[] = new int[5]; 
while (i< 5) { 
} 
myarray[i] = 2; 
i++; 
with bytecode 
0 iconst_O 
1 istore_1 
2 iconst_5 
3 new array int 
5 astore_2 
6 goto 16 
9 aload_2 
10 iload_1 
11 iconst_2 
12 iastore 
13 iinc 1 1 
16 iload_1 
17 iconst_5 
18 if_icmplt 9 
21 return 
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Our aim is to prove that, immediately before an array update operation the array 
address is non-null and the index is within bounds. However, the array update 
instruction is in the middle of the body of the loop. As we can only say with 
certainty that the loop invariant holds at the beginning and end of the loop body, 
we cannot ensure that a loop invariant that included our desired property will hold 
just before the array update instruction. 
The ideal solution to this problem would be to introduce some kind of assertion 
statements to the logic. These would allow us to state that certain properties hold 
at various intermediate points in the code. But this would entail a fairly major 
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addition to the logic, and is therefore included in the "Further Work" section of 
Chapter 7. 
A more ad hoc solution would be to alter the bytecode of the program slightly so 
that the array update instruction appeared at the beginning of the loop body, where 
the loop invariant would hold. 
° 
iconst_O 
1 istore_1 
2 iconst_5 
3 newarray int 
5 astore_2 
6 aload_2 
7 iload_1 
8 iconst_2 
9 goto 16 
10 aload_2 
11 iload_1 
12 iconst_2 
13 iastore 
14 iinc 1 1 
16 iload_1 
17 iconst_5 
18 iLicmplt 9 
21 return 
But while this would produce a program that our current programming logic could 
deal with, it seems to defeat the purpose of our aim of smaller, more efficient byte-
code programs as the "provable" bytecode program is three instructions longer than 
the original program. 
In addition to this, the proof involving the smaller loop program of seven instructions 
is in the region of 400 lines long. As the longer proof involves a program containing 
almost three times as many instructions, it is likely to be around 1,200 lines long. 
Therefore, while it would be feasible to carry out an array bounds elimination with 
the logic in its current state, it can be argued that it is not really reasonable. Ren-
dering such proofs managable in practice is likely to require two features. Firstly, 
the addition of assertion statements to the logic to avoid the necessity of reordering 
bytecode instructions, and secondly, a tactic capable of taking as arguments a list of 
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instructions, a precondition, and a postcondition and carrying out the proof using 
the rules of the programming logic. A description of such a tactic can be found 
in [16]. 
6.3 Conclusions 
Although we have not successfully managed to prove a property more related to 
JIT optimization, the above proof demonstrates that we have been successful in 
constructing a framework in which it is possible to prove properties of bytecode 
programs. With the addition of the features discussed in Section 7.2 most of them 
already documented in other work~ it would be possible to prove many properties 
necessary for JIT optimization. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Our aim was to develop a way of proving properties of bytecode programs that would 
allow JIT compilers to make optimizations not currently possible. 
In chapter 3 we give the definitions of a number of relations for the execution of 
bytecode programs, and describe the proof of some related lemmas and thE'orE'ms. 
The concept of data-equality is introduced as a method of comparing thE' parts of 
two JVM states not related to position within a particular classfile. 
These formalized concepts form the basis for the subsequent development of several 
rules constituting a programming logic for bytecode programs. The derivation of 
these rules is presented in Chapter 4, and the idea of data-equality is used again, 
this time to overcome the problems inherent in having to execute the structure of 
loops and conditional sequences explicitly. 
In chapter 5 we present a proof of the soundness of our proposed rule for loops, 
contrasting its complexity with that of the same proof in conventional Hoare logics. 
Finally, in chapter 6 we present a proof of a simple bytecode program containing a 
loop, thereby demonstrating the use of our programming logic. 
7.1 Bytecode Proof and Mechanized Reasoning 
In this section we discuss our experiences of the difficulties inherent in carryinl!, out 
proof at the level of bytecode instructions, along with the benefits and disadvant ages 
of using a mechanized proof tool. 
The use of a mechanized proof tool is central to our results. It has the benefit 
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of enabling us to keep track of very complex proofs involving many definitions. 
Additionally, as mentioned before, it provides an additional degree of confidence in 
the validity of these proofs. The Isabelle system was considered particularly suitablf' 
for our work as it facilitates the definition of logics and subsequent proofs involving 
them. In the course of the work, however, we encountered several difficulties which 
offset these advantages. 
7.1.1 Size and Complexity of Proofs 
As previously discussed, bytecode programs lack the sort of syntactic structure 
present in the higher level languages for which Hoare logics are more usually de-
fined. This means that rather than recognising, for example, the keyword while 
and applying the relevant rule, we must identify 'structural instructions' within a 
bytecode pattern, check that they conform to certain constraints, and explicitly ex-
ecute them. This results in a great deal of proof in addition to that neces.c'a.ry in th£> 
conventional logics (c.f. Chapter 5). 
Possibly the main difficulty we encountered in the course of this work was the sheer 
length and complexity of the proofs involved. Although the concepts behind the 
proofs can be communicated in a fairly high-level way to human beings as we hope 
we have demonstrated in the preceding chapters this approach cannot be applipd to 
the Isabelle definitions and proof scripts. The JVM world is vpry detailed; it contains 
a great deal of information and the Isabelle model must reflect this. It Hwans, 
however, that there can be no 'glossing over' of the details, and every inference 
however small---must be spelled out. 
The proofs of the various theorems in this report each run to several hundred lines 
of code, not including the necessary lemmas. The files related to the soundness of 
the while rule contain in the region of 10,000 lines of code. The complete count for 
the whole logic is around 22,000 lines. It is likely that this could be reduced to some 
extent by packaging repeated patterns of proof as tactics, or by more effective use 
of the automatic tactics. It gives an idea, however of the amount of detail involved 
in the proofs. 
One feature that would be invaluable with proofs of this length would b£> the a.bility 
to save only the successful commands in a proof session. The basic Isabellf' intt'rfac(' 
relies on the user remembering to note down every successful command and remove 
every unsuccessful command used to achieve a proof in a text editor. This is 
reasonable with smaller proofs, but in those running to several hundred lines it is 
all too easy to make mistakes. Unfortunately even one instruction missed out or left 
in unintentionally may necessitate running through the entire proof in small st£>ps 
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in order to identify the error. 
Fortunately, Proof General [7], the most recently available interface for use with 
Isabelle, has a mechanism for "locking" commands in a text editor as they are 
successfully executed by the prover. It is our opinon that improved user int£'rfaces 
to proof tools will become essential as proofs get larger and more complex in order 
to deal with real world systems (c.f. the ESC and LOOP projects). Certainly it 
is the case that no team of software engineers would attempt to carry out sizeable 
projects with only a compiler and a text editor. 
7.1.2 Proofs Involving Lists 
Another drawback to the structureless form of bytecode programs is the necC'5..<;ity 
of dealing with a large number of proofs involving lists. Normally this would not 
be a problem: list properties can usually be proved by induction, and the Isabelle 
distribution already contains many lemmas about lists. 
Unfortunately the lists of instructions we are interested in are often not lists in their 
own right as such, but slices of a larger list (Definition 6). As we are, in a s£'nse, 
coming at the list from both ends we cannot use induction: if we induct on either 
the start or end position we change the length of our list; if we try to induct on th£' 
slice itself we upset the relationship between the start and end points. This ml'ClnS 
that we must rely on rewriting with the various lemmas for take and drop, which 
can result in some quite tricky proofs. 
7.1.3 Automatic Tactics 
The fact that instructions are not viewed as independent entities, but rather Illust 
be extracted from a set of class files and a state, means that a lot of information 
is contained within the assumptions of each proof. The block execution H'lation 
involves two states each consisting of three elements, a set of classfil£'s. two class 
name identifiers, two method identifiers, and two program count('r valul's. So an ~­
sumption or definition involving quantification over these variables requir£'s thirh'£'ll 
instantiations. Often there are too many possibilities for Isabelle's rC'solution tactics 
to find these instantiations automatically, so each variable must bp instantiat{'(l hy 
hand. 
The large number of assumptions in many of the proofs also frC'qu('utly confusC's 
the automatic tactics. It is often the case that the simplifier will g('t nowh£'rf' 
with a particular goal if it contains many assumptions not pertinent to the desirl'1\ 
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conclusion. But if the relevant assumptions are extracted and used in the goal of a 
separate lemma the tactics succeed almost immediately. 
This may well be a problem that is solved in more recent versions of Isabelle; in 
particular the rewriting of asm_full_simp_ tac so that results do not depend on the 
order in which the assumptions appear might well have a significant effect on this 
problem. Unfortunately, one of the more recent versions of Isabelle made significant 
changes which would have necessitated changes in Pusch's formalisation of the se-
mantics, and consequently we made the decision to stay with our current version of 
the prover (Isabelle 99) despite the improved features of newer versions. 
The size and complexity of our proofs pushed the computing power available to ns 
to its limits. The memory requirements of our proofs often exceeded the 256Mb of 
RAM available to us, causing Isabelle to crash. 
These difficulties call into question the wisdom of attempting proofs of bytecode 
programs. But, as mentioned before, despite its drawbacks, the stack based virtual 
machine appears to be here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Therefore 
the ability to carry out proof at this level has oefinite value. 
7.2 Further Work 
Having developed a simple programming logic for bytecode programs, then" are a 
number of ways in which it could be extended. The most obvious first step is the 
extension of the operational semantics to include all bytecode instructions available 
in the JVM, rather than the subset currently treated. One possibility would b(' 
to transfer the underlying formalization on which our work is based to the J!Java 
theories [39], which include a larger set of instructions and deal with exception 
handling. 
In terms of the bytecode execution relations, the main drawback is the restriction 
that states must be all in the same method of a particular class. This means that 
it is impossible to work with bytecode programs that include method invocation 
or return, which is clearly not realistic. One possible way of lifting this restriction 
might be to in effect inline the code of the method being called (Section 1.2), which 
would result in a larger block that included the code of all methods called. 
Alternatively, as the frame of the method in which we start a block remains on the 
frame stack when a new method is called, we could require that rather than all 
classes and methods being equal across a path of execution that there exists a chain 
through various method calls, returning to the calling method. That is 
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in_frame_stack s (xp, hp,fr: Irs) same_method s (xp, hp,fr) V 
in_frame..stack s (xp, hp,frs) 
in_frame_stack S (To " 
same_method s (Tn 
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The fact that our programming logic relies on the code that is being executed never 
throwing exceptions is again unrealistic in a real world situation. Consequently, 
another useful extension would involve modelling Java's exception handling method 
in the operational semantics, and altering the programming logic in such a way 
that it allows us to reason about programs that terminate abruptly as a result of 
exceptions being raised. The logic described by Jacobs in [21] has this ability. 
Finally, it would be useful to add assertion statements to the programming logic. 
This would allow the proof of assertions at intermediate points in a program, rather 
than just the start and finish. This would facilitate the proof of more complex loop 
programs, as discussed Section 6.2. 
In terms of incorporating bytecode proof into a working system, it would obviously 
be unreasonable to invoke Isabelle at runtime. Also, any system requiring much 
extra work from users is unlikely to be popular, and so a model similar to that used 
by ESC where user input to the proof process is minimal and viewed as a kind of 
"advanced typechecker" would be preferable. 
Another possibility would be to build on either the Annotated JIT projfft where 
bytecode programs arrive with optimizing annotations than can be used by an an-
notation aware JIT compiler. Obviously this raises the question of whethrr or not 
the annotations can be trusted. Therefore it seems likely that some sort of digita.l 
signature might be required here, or possibly a proof checker like that used in proof 
carrying code systems. Alternatively, it might be possible to prove that for cer-
tain patterns of bytecode particular optimizations are safe, e.g. a loop of thl8 form 
including an array operation can have the array bounds check eliminated. These 
'proved patterns' could be stored as a library against which incoming programs could 
be compared and action taken by the JIT accordingly. 
7.3 Contribution 
We have demonstrated that it is possible to define a progrcuullling logic for byte-
code programs that allows the proof of bytecode programs containing loops. Thr 
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instructions available for use in the programs are currently limited, but the basis is 
in place for extension. 
The development of this logic was not by any means straightforward. It required the 
definition of several execution relations for bytecode programs, each necessary for 
proofs of different aspects of execution. In addition, the flat, unstructured nature 
of bytecode programs presents a number of difficulties, particularly when reasoning 
about loops. But there are, as we demonstrate, some quite elegant solutions to these 
problems. 
While it would be possible to use the logic in its current state to prove properties that 
would allow the speeding up of bytecode programs, we believe that such proofs would 
be of an unreasonable size and complexity to carry out in practice. The addition 
of assertion statements to the logic and the creation of an Isabelle tactic capable of 
automating such proofs would be necessary to render such proofs managable. 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
In the course of this work we have demonstrated that it is possible to carry out proof 
at the level of Java bytecode instructions. In order to reach this state we have bC<'n 
forced to consider and find solutions for some hard problems, involving some long 
and complex proofs which pushed the bounds of wha.t our mechanized proof tool 
was able to handle. The resulting programming logic, while not complete, provid('s 
a firm basis that with some extension should allow the proofs of bytecode pro~rams 
necessary to allow several JIT optimizations. 
Appendix A 
Extension of LoadAndStore. thy 
LoadAndStore = Runtime + 
(** load and store instructions transfer values between local variables 
and operand stack **) 
datatype load_and_store = 
lAload ins_type nat (11_ load _" 30) 
(* load intlref from local variable *) 
I lAstore ins_type nat ("_ store II 30) 
(* store int into/ref local variable *) 
I Bipush int 
(* push int *) 
I Aconst_null 
(* push null *) 
I line nat int 
(*increment local var by int *) 
I ladd 
(*add two integers at top of stack *) 
consts 
exec_las :: II[load_and_store,opstack,locvars,p_count] => 
(opstack * locvars * p_count)II 
primrec 
"exec las (X load idx) stk vars pc = 
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((vars ! idx) # stk , vars , pc+l)" 
"exec las (X store idx) stk vars pc = 
(tl stk , vars [idx: =hd stk] , pc+1) " 
"exec las (Bipush ivaI) stk vars pc = 
(Intg ivaI # stk , vars , pc+l)" 
"exec_las Aconst_null stk vars pc = 
(Null # stk , vars , pc+i) " 
"exec_las (linc idx ivaI) stk vars pc = 
(stk, vars[idx:= (lntg(get_Intg(vars ! idx) + ivaI))], pc+i)" 
"exec_las Iadd stk vars pc = 
(Intg ((get_Intg (hd stk)) + 
(get_Intg (hd(tl stk)))) # (tl(tl stk)) , vars , pc+i)" 
end 
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Appendix B 
Isabelle . thy Files 
B.l ListSlice. thy 
ListSlice = HOL + List + Nat + 
(* mid m n xs consists of n elements of xs from position m 
onwards. Precondition is that m + n <= length xs. *) 
constdefs mid :: "nat => nat => ) a list => ) a list" 
"mid m n xs == take n (drop m xs)" 
(* fromto s f xs consists of the elements of xs from position s to 
position f inclusive. Precondition is that s < length xs & 
f < length xs *) 
constdefs fromto :: "nat => nat => ) a list => ) a list" 
"fromto s f xs == mid s (Suc (f - s)) xs" 
end 
B.2 State_parts. thy 
State_parts =HOL + Exec + 
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types 
boundary 
minframe "opstack *locvars *p_count" 
minstate = "(xcpt option *minframe)" 
constdefs 
get_stk 
"get_stk 
get_Ioc .. 
"get_Ioc 
frame => opstack 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). 
"frame => locvars" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). 
"boundary => cname" 
%(cn,ml,pc). cn" 
cn_of:: "boundary => cname" 
stk" 
loc" 
"cn_of strt == let (cn,ml,pc) = strt in cn" 
st_cn_of:: "frame=> cname" 
"st cn of st == let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = st in cn" 
stk_of :: "frame => opstack" 
"stk_of st == let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = st in stk" 
loc_of :: "frame => locvars" 
"loc_of st let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = st in loc" 
st_pc_of :: "frame => p_count" 
"st_pc_of st == let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = st in pc" 
"boundary => method_loc" 
%(cn,ml,pc). ml" 
ml_of :: "boundary => method_loc" 
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let (cn,ml,pc) = s in ml" 
st_ml of "frame => method_loc" 
"st_ml_of st == let (stk,loc, cn,ml,pc) st in ml" 
get_pc "frame => p_count" 
"get_pc -- %(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). pc" 
pc_equals :: "[frame, p_count] => bool" 
"pc_equals frs pca == let (stk,loc,cn,ml ,pc) .. frs in 
pc = pca" 
pc_of .. "boundary => p_count" 
"pc_of %(cn,ml,pc). pc" 
same_method_bounds :: "[boundary, boundary] => bool" 
"same_method_bounds s f == (cn_of s = cn_of f) &: 
(ml_of s = ml_of f)" 
same_method_frs :: "[boundary, frame,frame, boundary] -> bool" 
"same_method_frs s a b f == «st_cn_of a = st_cn_of b) &: 
Cst_cn_of a = cn_of s) &: Cst_cn_of a = cn_of f» &: 
CCst_ml_of a = st_ml_of b) &: (st_ml_of a amI_of s) &: 
(st_ml_of a = ml_of f»" 
inlist:: "[instr list, minframe] => bool" 
"inlist xs a == let (stk,loc,pc) = a in 
o <= pc &: pc <= «(length xs) - 1)" 
outlist ::" [instr list, minframe] -> bool" 
"outlist xs a == let (stk,loc,pc) = a in 
(length xs) <= pc" 
third_of :: "excpt option * heap *frame list) =>frame list" 
"third_of == % (xp, hp, frs). frs" 
inside "[frame list, boundary, boundary] .. > bool" 
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"inside frs s f let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) = hd frs in 
outside :: "[frame list, boundary, boundary] => bool" 
"outside frs s f == let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) = hd frs in 
constdefs 
getOSargl "frame => opstack" 
"getOSargl 'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). stk" 
getOSarg2 "frame => p_count" 
"getOSarg2 'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). pc" 
getOSarg3 "frame => cname" 
"getOSarg3 == 'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). cn" 
getOSarg4 "frame => method_loc" 
"getOSarg4 'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). ml" 
putOSargs ::"[frame,(opstack*p_count)] => frame" 
"putOSargs == %(stk', loc', cn' ,m!' ,pc') (stk, pc). 
(stk, loc' ,cn' ,ml' ,pc)" 
getLASargl 
"getLASargl 
getLASarg2 
"getLASarg2 
getLASarg3 
"getLASarg3 
== 
--
"frame => opstack" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). stk" 
"frame => locvars" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). loc" 
"frame => p_count" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). pc" 
putLASargs ::"[frame,(opstack*locvars*p_count)] => frame" 
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"putLASargs == %(stk', lac', cn',ml',pc') (stk,loc, pc). 
(stk, lac, cn' ,ml' ,pc)" 
get_p_count :: "frame => p_count" 
"get_p_count == %(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). pc" 
consts 
execCFSindep::"( instr list*minstate) => (minstate option)" 
recdef execCFSindep "{}" 
"execCFSindep ([], (xp, frs» None" 
"execCFSindep (xs, (None,(stk,loc,pc») = (case (xs!pc) of 
LAS ins => (let (stk',loc',pc') = exec_las ins stk lac pc 
in 
Some (None,(stk',loc',pc'») 
ICO ins => None 
IMO ins => None 
IMA ins => None 
ICH ins => None 
1M! ins => None 
IMR ins => None 
IDS ins => (let (stk' ,pc') = 
in 
Some (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
ICBF ins =>(let (stk' ,pc') = 
in 
exec_os ins 
exec_cb_fwd 
Some (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
stk pc 
ins stk pc 
ICBB ins =>(let (stk',pc') = exec_cb_bwd ins stk pc 
in 
Some (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
IUBF ins =>(let (pc') = exec_ub_fwd ins pc 
in 
Some (None,(stk,loc,pc'») 
IUBB ins =>(let (pc') = exec_ub_bwd ins pc 
in 
Some (None,(stk,loc,pc'»» II 
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"execCFSindep (xs, (Some xp, f» None" 
end 
B.3 Exec_blockO. thy 
(****************************************** •• * •••••••••••••••••••• ) 
(* Relation equivalent to the block execution relation, but with .) 
(* separate listing of head and tail of frame list .) 
(* Used to produce big step relation for loops .) 
(***********************.**.***** ••• ***** ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ) 
Exec_blockO = HOL + Set + List + Exec+ State_parts + ListSlice + 
consts exec_blockO ::"(bytecode • (cname.(mname.param_desc) .p_count) • 
(cname*(mname*param_desc).p_count) • (xcpt option. heap .(opstack • 
locvars *cname .(mname.param_desc).p_count».(xcpt option. heap. 
(opstack .locvars *cname *(mname*param_desc).p_count».(opstack • 
locvars .cname .(mname*param_desc) .p_count)list.(opstack .locvars • 
cname *(mname*param_desc) .p_count)list) set" 
inductive exec_blockO 
intrs 
(.*** ••• **** End of execution of a block - •••••••••••• ) 
(*** ••• ***** pc' outside block** •••••••••• ) 
Stop" [I (exec(CFS, (xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs» • \ 
\ Some (xp',hp',(stk',loc',cn',(mn',pd'),pc')#frs'»;\ 
\ inside «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs) (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) 
(cnF, (mnF,pdF),pcF);\ 
\ pcF < (length(get_code CFS enS (mnS, pdS»); \ 
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\ same_method_frs (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) «stk,loc,cn, (mn,pd) ,pc» 
«stk' ,loc' ,cn' ,(mn' ,pd') ,pc'» (cnF, (mnF ,pdF) ,pcF) ; \ 
\ outside «stk',loc',cn',(mn',pd'),pc')#frs') 
(cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) (cnF, (mnF,pdF),pcF)I]\ 
\ ==> (CFS, (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS), (cnF, (mnF,pdF) ,pcF) , 
(xp, hp, (stk, loc, cn, (mn,pd), pc», 
(xp', hp',( stk', loc', en', (mn',pd'), pc'», frs, frs'):exec_blockO" 
(*********** Continuation of execution of a block -'***********) 
(*********** pc" inside block ***********) 
Continue "[I(exec(CFS, (xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs» • 
Some (xp",hp",(stk",loc",cn",(mn",pd"),pc")#frs"»;\ 
\inside «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs) (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) 
(cnF, (mnF,pdF),pcF);\ 
\ pcF < (length(get_code CFS cnS (mnS, pdS»);\ 
\ same_method_frs (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc» 
«stk' , ,loc ' , ,cn' , , (mn' , ,pd' , ) ,pc' , ) ) (cnF, (mnF, pdf) ,pcF) ; \ 
\ (CFS, (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS), (cnF,(mnF,pdF),pcF), 
(xp" ,hp", (stk" ,loc" ,cn", (mn" ,pd") ,pc' '» , 
(xp' ,hp', (stk' ,loc' ,cn', (mn' ,pd') ,pc'», frs", frs') :exec_blockO 11\ 
\ ==> (CFS, (cnS,(mnS,pdS),(pcS», (cnF,(mnF,pdF) ,pcF) , 
(xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc» , 
(xp' ,hp', (stk' ,loc' ,cn', (mn' ,pd') ,pc'», frs, frs') :exec_blockO" 
end 
B.4 Exec_block3. thy 
(*************************************************.* •••• *) 
(* Block execution relation .) 
( ••••• ********************************************.**.***) 
Exec_block3 = Exec + Exec_blockO + 
consts exec_block3 ::"(bytecode * boundary *boundary * 
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syntax l@exec_block3" :: [bytecode, boundary, boundary, 
jvm_state , jvm_state] => bool (" ___ 1- _ -block-> _" ) 
translations 
"CFS s f 1- a -block-> b" 
inductive exec_block3 
II (CFS, s,f,a,b):exec_block3" 
intrs 
Stop II [I 
\ 
exec (CFS, a) = Some b ;\ 
inside (third_of a) s f; \ 
.\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
(pc_of f) < length (get_code CFS (cn_of s) (ml_of s»;\ 
same_method_frs s (hd(snd(snd a») ( hd(snd(snd b») f ;\ 
outside (third_of b) s fl] \ 
==> CFS s f 1- a -block-> b" 
Continue "[1 exec (CFS, a) = Some c ;\ 
inside (third_of a) s f;\ \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
end 
B.5 
(pc_of f) < length (get_code CFS (cn_of s) (ml_of s»;\ 
same_method_frs s (hd(snd(snd a») (hd(snd(snd c») f ;\ 
CFS s f 1- c -block-> bl]\ 
==> CFS s f 1- a -block-> b" 
Block_pairs. thy 
(******************************************* ••••••• *.* •• *) 
(* Execution path relation *) 
(***********************************.*** •••••••••••••• * •• ) 
Block_pairs = HOL + Exec + Assign + State_parts + Exec_block3 
+ Exec_block_conds + 
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constdefs 
narrow_boundary 1 "boundary => boundary II 
"narrow_boundaryi b == let (cn,ml,pc) = b in 
(cn,ml, (pc-i» II 
constdefs 
block_pairs :: II[bytecode, boundary, boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap *frame list), (xcpt option * heap *frame list)] => bool" 
(" ___ 1- _ -execute-> _") 
"CFS S F 1- s -execute-> t == 
(s,t) : {(s,t). exec (CFS, s) Some t 
& same_method_frs S (hd(snd(snd s») ( hd(snd(snd t») F & 
inside (third_of s) SF}" 
block_pairs_trancl :: II [bytecode, boundary, boundary, (xcpt option * 
heap *frame list), (xcpt option * heap *frame list)] => bool" 
(" ___ 1- _ -execute~+-> _") 
"CFS S F 1- s -execute-+-> t == 
(s,t) : {(s,t). exec (CFS, s) = Some t & 
same_method_frs S (hd(snd(snd s») ( hd(snd(snd t») F 
& inside (third_of s) S F }-+" 
big_step :: "[ bytecode, boundary, boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap *frame list), (xcpt option * heap *frame list)] => bool" 
(" ___ 1- _ -bigstep-> _H) 
"CFS S F 1- a -bigstep-> b == 
(a,b): {(a,b).«pc_equals (hd(third_of a» (pc_of F) & 
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exec(CFS, a) = Some b) I (EX c. «pc_equals (hd(third_of c» (pc_of F) ) 
& exec (CFS,c) = Some b & 
(CFS S (narrow_boundary1 F) 1- a -block-> c»» }" 
(*** series of big steps - but all within s to f **********) 
big_step_trancl :: "[ bytecode, boundary, boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap *frame list), (xcpt option * heap *frame list)] => bool" 
(11 ___ 1- _ -bigstep-+-> _") 
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"CFS S F 1- a -bigstep-+-> b == 
(a,b): {(a,b).«pc_equals (hd(third_of a» (pc_of F) & 
exec(CFS, a) = Some b) 1 ( EX c. «pc_equals (hd(third_of c» (pc_of F) ) 
& exec (CFS,c) = Some b & (CFS S(narrow_boundaryl F) 1- a -block-> c»»Y+" 
end 
B.6 
constdefs 
excep_free :: "[instr list] -> bool" 
"excep_free (ys) -- (ALL CFS xpl hpl frsl xp' hp' frs' cnl mll en' 
ml' pcS pcF.« ys - (fromto pcS pcF (get_code CFS cnl mIl» 
& (CFS (cnl,(mll),pcS) (cn',(ml'),pcF) 
1- (xpl,hpl,frs1) -execute-+-> (xp',hp',frs'») --> 
xp1 = None & xp' - None»" 
excep_free_instr :: "[instr ] -> bool" 
"excep_free_instr (y) -= (ALL xp stk loc pc xp' stk' loc' pc' xs . 
«xs!pc - y) & (execCFSindep (xs,(xp,stk,loe,pc» -
Some (xp' ,stk' ,loc' ,pC'» --> xp - None & xp' - None»" 
well_formed_loop:: "[instr list]-> bool" 
"well_formed_loop zs =- ( ALL CFS cnS mlS cnF mlF pcS pcF xs ys. 
( zs - (UBF (Goto_fwd (Suc (length xs»)#xs ~( ys ~ 
[CBB (Ificmplt_bwd (length xs + length ys»]» --> 
( peS < pcF & get_code CFS cnS (mIS) ! peS -
UBF (Goto_fwd (length (xs) + 1» 
& excep_free ys & list_all excep_free_instr ys & 
(xs - fromto (pcS + 1) (peS + (length xs» (get_code CFS cnS (mIS») & 
APPENDIX B. ISABELLE. THY FILES 162 
(ys = fromto (pcS + length xs + 1) 
(simple_block xs) & simple_block ys 
( pcF-1) (get_code CFS cnS (mIS))) & 
& ys -= [] &xs-=[] & 
get_code CFS cnS (mIS) ! pcF CBB 
(pcF = pcS + length (xs ~ ys) + 1) 
ref_trans_2 ys & linear ys & 
correct_init_loop_state (cnS,(mIS), 
end 
B.7 
constdefs 
is_branch :: "instr => bool" 
"is_branch instr == case instr of 
LAS ins => False 
CO ins => False 
MO ins => False 
MA ins => False 
CH ins => False 
MI ins => False 
MR ins => False 
OS ins => False 
CBF ins => True 
I CBB ins => True 
UBF ins => True 
I UBB ins => True" 
(Ificmplt_bwd (length (xs ~ ys))) & 
&(simple_block ys) & 
pcS) (cnF, (mIF) ,pcF) )))" 
( •••••• instructions which only alter stk, pc, and xp •••••••••••• ) 
consts 
is_load ::"load_and_store => bool" 
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primree 
"is_load (X load idx) = True" 
"is_load (X store idx) = False " 
"is_load (Bipush ivaI) = True" 
"is_load (line idx ivaI) = False" 
"is_load Iadd = True" 
eonstdefs 
simple_stk_op .. "instr => bool" 
"simple_stk_op instr == case instr 
LAS ins => (is_load ins) 
CO ins => False 
Mo ins => False 
MA ins => False 
CH ins => True 
MI ins => True 
MR ins => False 
OS ins => True 
CBF ins =>False 
I CBB ins => False 
UBF ins => False 
I UBB ins => False" 
eonstdefs 
stk_op "instr => bool" 
"stk_op instr == case instr of 
LAS ins => (is_load ins) 
CO ins => False 
Mo ins => False 
MA ins => False 
CH ins => True 
MI ins => True 
MR ins => False 
OS ins => True 
of 
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eBF ins => True 
I eBB ins => True 
I UBF ins => True 
I UBB ins => True" 
consts 
all_stk_ops :: "instr list => bool" 
recdef all_stk_ops "measure (7. xs. length xs)" 
consts 
get_cbf_branch 
primrec 
"get_cbf_branch (Ifiacmpeq_fwd X i) = i" 
"get_cbf_branch ( Ificmplt_fwd i) = i" 
consts 
get_cbb_branch 
primrec 
consts 
get_ubLbranch 
primrec 
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consts 
get_ubb_branch 
primrec 
constdefs 
get_branch :: "instr => nat option" 
"get_branch instr == case instr of 
LAS ins =>None 
CO ins => None 
MO ins =>None 
MA ins => None 
CH ins => None 
MI ins => None 
MR ins => None 
as ins => None 
CBF ins => Some (get_cbf_branch ins) 
I CBB ins => Some (get_cbb_branch 
UBF ins => Some (get_ubf_branch ins) 
UBB ins => Some (get_ubb_branch 
constdefs 
ins) 
ins) " 
is_target ::"[bytecode,cname,mname,param_desc, p_count] => bool" 
"is_target CFS cn mn pd pc == ( ALL pc1. 
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(is_branch ( (get_code CFS en (mn,pd) ) ! pc1) 
--> pc1 + the (get_branch 
( (get_code CFS cn (mn,pd) ) ! pc1)) = pC)" 
constdefs 
"inrange a b s f (s < a) & (b < f)" 
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linear :: "[instr list] => bool" 
constdefs 
simple_block :: "[instr list] => bool" 
"simple_block (ys) == ALL CFS xpl hpl frsl xp' hp' frs' cnl mll cn' 
ml' pcS pcF.( ys = (fromto pcS pcF 
(get_code CFS cnl mIl» 
& inside frsl (cnl,mll,pcS) (cn',ml',pcF) 
& same_method_frs (cnl,mll,pcS) (hd frsl) 
(hd frs')(cn',ml',pcF) 
& pcF < length (get_code CFS cnl mIl) 
& exec (CFS, (xpl,hpl,frsl» = Some(xp',hp',frs'» --> 
inside frs' (enl,mll,peS) (cn',ml',peF) I 
pc_equals (hd frs') (pcF + 1)" 
constdefs 
insert_pc_frm "[frame, p_countl => frame" 
"insert_pc_frm s x == let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = s in 
(stk, lac, cn,ml,x)" 
add_pc_frm :: "[frame, p_count] => frame" 
"add_pc_frm s x == let (stk, loc, cn,ml,pc) = s in 
(stk, loc, cn,ml,(pc + x»" 
consts 
insert_pc_frames :: "(frame list. p_count) => frame list" 
recdef insert_pc_frames "{}" 
"insert_pc_frames ([] , x) = []" 
"insert_pc_frames «y#ys), x) = [Unsert_pc_frm y x)] (II (ys) " 
consts 
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add_pc_frames :: "(frame list* p_count) => frame list" 
"add_pc_frames «(] ,x) = []" 
constdefs 
insert_pc :: "[jvm_state, p_count] => jvm_state" 
"insert_pc s x == (let (xp, hp, frs) = s in 
(xp, hp, (insert_pc_frames (frs, x»»" 
add_pc :: "[jvm_state, p_count] => jvm_state" 
"add_pc s x == (let (xp, hp, frs) = s in 
(xp, hp, (add_pc_frames (frs, x»»" 
minimise_frm :: "frame =>minframe" 
"minimise_frm a == let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) 
consts 
a in (stk, loc,pc)" 
minimise_frs :: "frame list => minframe list" 
recdef minimise_frs "measure (% xs. length xs)" 
"minimise_frs ([]) = []" 
"minimise_frs (x#xs) = (minimise_frm x)#(minimise_frs xs)" 
consts 
meta_frames :: "(frame list* frame list) => bool" 
recdef meta_frames "measure (% (xs, ys). length xs)" 
"meta_frames ([], []) = True" 
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"meta_frames «x#xs),[]) = False" 
"meta_frames ([], (y#ys» = False" 
"meta_frames «x#xs), (y#ys» = «stk_of x = stk_of y) '" 
(loc_of x = loc_of y) '" 
meta_frames (xs,ys»" 
constdefs 
(******* compare only xp, stk, loc of top of stk *****.*.***) 
"a =-= b == (fst a) = (fst b) '" 
stk_of (hd(snd(snd a »)= stk_of (hd(snd(snd b») & 
loc_of (hd(snd(snd a») = loc_of (hd(snd(snd b»)" 
(.****** should mention only xp, stk, loc of top of stk .*****.**.*) 
meta_holds:: "[instr list, (jVIn_state => bool), jVIn_state] => bool" 
"meta_holds ys q s == (ALL CFS cnl mll pcS pcF. 
«ys) = (fromto pcS pcF 
(get_code CFS cnl (mll») 
-->q (insert_pc speS»)" 
(*.**.** should mention only xp, stk, loc of top of stk *** •••••••• ) 
meta_inv .. " [«(xept option * heap *(opstaek .loevars *cname 
.method_loc *p_count)list»=>bool) ] => bool" 
ALL s x. P (s) --> P «insert_pc s x»" 
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ref_trans_2 "[instr list] => bool" 
"ref_trans_2 ys == ALL CFS xpl hpl frsl xp' hp' frs' cnl ml1 cn' 
ml' pcS pcF.«( ys = (fromto pcS pcF 
(get_code CFS cnl mIl») 
& linear ys & pc_equals (hd frsl) pcS 
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& (CFS (cnl,(mll),pcS) (cn',(ml'),pcF) 1- (xpl,hpl,frsl) 
-block-> (xp',hp',frs'») 
end 
B.8 
--> 
(xpl = xp' & hpl = hp' & 
( EX a b. stk_of (hd(third_of (xp',hp',frs'») = 
(a#(b#(stk_of (hd(third_of (xpl,hpl,frsl»»» 
& loc_of (hd(third_of (xpl,hpl,frsl») ~ 
loc_of (hd(third_of (xp',hp',frs'») 
& st_cn_of (hd(third_of (xpl,hpl,frsl») = 
st_cn_of(hd(third_of (xp',hp',frs'») 
& st_ml_of (hd(third_of (xpl,hpl,frsl») = 
st_ml_of(hd(third_of (xp',hp',frs'») 
& (tl(third_of (xpl,hpl,frsl») = 
(tl(third_of (xp' ,hp' ,frs'»»»" 
Exec_instrs. thy 
(********************************************************************) 
(* Sequence execution relation *) 
(********************************************************************) 
I 
r 
l 
II 
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Exec_instrs = Exec + State_parts + 
consts exec_instrs ::"(instr list * minstate * minstate) set" 
syntax lI(Oexec_instrs" :: [instr list,minstate, minstate] => 
bool ("_ 1- _ -instrs-> _" ) 
translations 
"xs 1- a -instrs-> btl -- "(xs ,a,b):exec_instrs" 
inductive exec_instrs 
intrs 
Stop 
\ 
"[I execCFSindep (xs, a) 
xs -= [];\ 
= Some b ;\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
inlist xs «snd a»; \ 
outlist xs «snd b»I] \ 
==> xs 1- a -instrs-> btl 
Continue " [I execCFSindep (xs, a) 
\ xs -= [] ; \ 
\ inlist xs «snd a»; \ 
\ xs 1- c -instrs-> blJ\ 
= 
\ ==> xs 1- a -instrs-> 
end 
B.9 Triple.thy 
Some c 
btl 
;\ 
(*************************************************************** •••• *) 
(* Pre- and Post-condition relation .) 
(***********************************************.*******.*** ••• ****.*) 
Triple = List + Exec_blockO + Exec_block3 + Exec_instrs + 
Block_pairs_conds + Ref_trans + 
consts 
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triple:: " ««xcpt option * heap *(opstack *locvars *cname *method_loc 
*p_count)list»=>bool)* instr list* 
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«(xcpt option * heap *(opstaek *loevars *cname *method_loe 
*p_count)list) )=>bool) => bool) II 
reedef triple"{}" 
"triple(p, [], q) = (ALL xp hp frs 
xp' hp' frs' .«(p«xp, hp, frs») 
--> q«xp', hp', frs'»»)" 
"triple(p, (y#ys), q) = (ALL CFS xp hp frs enl mll cn' ml' xp' hp' 
frs' pcS pcF. 
«(CFS (cnl,(mll),peS) (en', (ml'),pcF) 1- (xp, hp, frs) -bloek-> 
& «y#ys) = (fromto pcS peF 
& st_pe_of (hd frs) = peS 
& p«xp, hp,frs»--> 
q«xp', hp', frs'»»)" 
eonstdefs 
(xp' ,hp' ,frs'» 
(get_code CFS enl (mIl»» 
assert :: "[«opstaek *loevars)=>bool) , (xept option * heap * 
(opstaek *loevars *cname *method_loc *p_count)list)] => bool" 
"assert P == (%(xp,hp,frs). (let (stk, loc,en,ml,pe) = hd frs in 
p (stk,loc»)" 
end 
B.lO Wpc.thy 
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(***********************************************************************) 
(* Weakest Precondition for a list of commands *) 
(***********************************************************************) 
constdefs 
WI> :: "[ instr list, ««xcpt option * heap *«opstack *locvars *cname * 
method_loc *p_count)list ) ») => bool)] => 
««xcpt option * heap *«opstack *locvars *cname *method_loc * 
p_count)list »» => boo!)" 
"WI> ys q == (i.(xp,hp,frs). 
(ALL CFS xp' hp' frs' cnl mIl cn' ml' pcS pcF. 
«(CFS (cnl,(mll),peS) (en', (ml'),peF)I-
«xp, hp, frs» -bloek-> (xP'. hp'.frs'» 
& «ys) = (fromto pcS pcF (get_code CFS cnl (mIl»» 
& st_pc_of(hd frs) = pcS»--> 
q(xp', hp', frs'»)" 
not_term_state :: "jvm_state => bool" 
"not_term_state s == «fst s) = None & (third_of s) - [])" 
(******************************************) 
(* Sequence weakest precondition *) 
(******************************************) 
meta_WI> :: "[ instr list, «opstack *locvars) => bool)] => 
««xcpt option * heap *«opstaek *locvars *ename *method_loc 
*p_count)list »» => boo!)" 
" meta_WI> ys q == (i.(xp,hp,frs). (let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) 
(ALL xp' stk' loc' pc'. 
(not_term_state (xp,hp,frs) & 
(hd frs) in 
ys 1- (xp,stk,loc,O) -instrs->(xp',stk',loc',pc'»--> 
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assert q (xp', hp, (stk' ,Ioe' ,en,ml, (pe + pe'»#(tl frs»»)" 
end 
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